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ABSTRACT

The use of system data to make predictions about the future system state, commonly
known as prognostics, is a rapidly developing field. Prognostics seeks to build on current
diagnostic equipment capabilities for its predictive capability. Many military systems,
including the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), are planning to include on-board prognostics
systems to enhance system supportability and affordability. Current research efforts
supporting these developments tend to focus on developing a prognostic tool for one
specific system component. This dissertation research presents a comprehensive
literature review of these developing research efforts. It also develops presents a
mathematical model for the optimum allocation of prognostics sensors and their
associated classifiers on a given system and all of its components. The model
assumptions about system criticality are consistent with current industrial philosophies.
This research also develops methodologies for combining sensor classifiers to allow for
the selection of the best sensor ensemble.

xii

A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGNOSTICS REASONING

I. Introduction

Historically, military aircraft maintenance has been conducted using manual inspections
of various aircraft components. These inspections occur either after a completed flight,
or according to a particular maintenance schedule. This work is usually conducted
without knowledge of existing aircraft faults. This traditional pattern of maintenance and
inspection has become increasingly less efficient as aircraft systems have become more
complex [9]. Various sources estimate that up to 50 percent of the components removed
from the aircraft for fault repair actually retest as fully functional at the maintenance
repair facility [17], [19].

As the above problem continues to absorb more manpower and resources, alternative
approaches to aircraft maintenance are being considered. Rather than following the
pattern of traditional inspections conducted in a periodic fashion without knowledge of
existing faults, various organizations are attempting to improve the efficiency of this
process. Typically, this is being done through the addition of sensors to the aircraft
components, allowing for a direct measure of system functionality. In addition, these
sensor data streams may also be able to provide information about the remaining life of
the aircraft component. This sensor data would conceptually be fed into an intelligent
system which would attempt to detect existing or impending component faults. Not only
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would this increase the efficiency of the current process, it would also allow for on-board
fault detection and subsequent flight plan modification. This dissertation addresses some
of the different aspects associated with this effort to improve current aircraft maintenance
practices.

1.1 Definitions: Diagnostics and Prognostics
The science of diagnostics is best described as the utilization of specialized machinery
monitoring hardware and/or software for detecting and isolating faults in a given system,
which may be either mechanical, electrical, or both. This system may include both
hardware and software components. The Air Force Research Laboratory [21] defines
diagnostics as the determination of a failure cause (fault detection and isolation) given all
available information. Once a failure occurs, diagnostic information can be used to
expedite the troubleshooting/repair process. The analysis may also be used for future
diagnostics. Current machinery monitoring technology provides data used in expert
analysis to extract usable information to isolate causes of any problem. This situation
leads to today's time-based or event-driven maintenance approach (i.e., perform
maintenance every 100 hours or when something breaks). Consequences of this
approach may include performing unnecessary maintenance actions and causing other
problems in the machine that did not exist prior to the maintenance action.

Prognostics is an emerging technology that seeks to build on current diagnostic
equipment capabilities. Some current diagnostic systems can accurately detect and
isolate faults in a particular system. The goal of a prognostics system is to use diagnostic
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information to accurately predict a system’s future health, as well as report the systems’
current and predicted health, using automated procedures which do not require human
intervention to provide the systems’ health report. (For clarity, system health is defined
as the instantaneous operational status of the equipment being monitored. It relates to the
equipment’s immediate readiness for deployment or its need for repair actions [21].) In
effect, the prognostics system provides the expert interface, and reports on the systems’
health. The Air Force Research Laboratory [21] defines prognostics as an assessment of
likely future health (educated prediction) of a piece of equipment, based on current
information (current health status, history, etc). Accurate analysis of prognostic
information can prevent equipment failure and minimize the frequency of scheduled
maintenance actions through performance monitoring, tests, and reasoning.

A prognostics system is often referred to as condition-based maintenance, since the
prognostics system indicates required maintenance actions, either now or in the future.
This condition-based method should replace time-based or event-driven maintenance
methods, ideally resulting in less system downtime and only required maintenance
actions.

The terms “Prognostics and Health Management” (PHM) system, and “Autonomic
Logistics System” (ALS) are also found in the literature. The “PHM system” term
usually refers only to the sensors, diagnostic algorithms, and prognostic algorithms
required for predictive failure capability on a particular system. An ALS is defined as a
system intended to communicate appropriate maintenance, supply, and other appropriate
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actions to the proper agencies in a timely fashion, based on the information obtained from
a prognostics system. However, the term “PHM system” may also refer to both of the
previous two definitions: both the predictive failure capability and the ALS component.
In this dissertation, it will be clear from context which meaning of “PHM system” is
intended.

1.2 Problem Statement
As previously discussed, a PHM system is intended to predict when aircraft component
failure will occur. The data from PHM system sensors are collected and fed through to
an intelligent data model which has been trained to recognize and differentiate between
healthy, degraded, and failure modes of different aircraft components. According to
Scheuren [78], this analysis is currently conducted using regression models, allowing all
relevant sensor data to be analyzed before a failure is reported. This section discusses the
motivations for pursuing a prognostics program, primarily from an Air Force perspective.

The Air Force’s aircraft diagnostic approach uses Built-in Test (BIT) units which are
incorporated as part of the aircraft hardware and software to detect aircraft faults.
However, these BIT units do not adequately identify all aircraft failures down to the
single component level. The aircraft mechanic has access to other technical data in
addition to the BIT unit data, such as: logic trees, fault charts, symptom/cause charts, and
schematics/wiring diagrams. However, the maintainer is still often left with an inability
to correctly diagnose the problem, and many times cannot replicate the problem the BIT
unit reported. The reported fault may not even exist, which contributes to the inability of
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the mechanic to replicate the problem. As stated on Joint Strike Fighter’s (JSF)
homepage [76], “Aircraft Maintenance and supportability based on Built in Test (BIT)
Diagnostics is an antiquated strategy that has proven countless platforms to be
unsuccessful in producing the desired results in aircraft reliability and availability.”

There is significant motivation in the Air Force to streamline the aircraft maintenance
process, from both a cost and operational readiness perspective. According to Stoll and
Vincent [87], there is considerable room for improvement in the current Air Force
maintenance system. Problems identified in their report include trial-and-error switching
of electrical components to determine where the fault is, if one exists. The “Can not
duplicate (CND)” and “Re-Test OK (RTOK)” diagnoses also occur regularly (50% of the
time [17],[19]). This is thought to be due to stresses related to the operating conditions
aboard the aircraft that intermittently interrupt the functioning of the part, causing it to be
removed for maintenance. Usually, these stresses cannot be duplicated on the ground.
The communication busses and permanent wiring on an aircraft are not tested at present.
These components degrade over time, causing intermittent failures in flight and/or
sluggish responses from aircraft systems which may be attributed to otherwise fully
functional aircraft components. Lastly, since CND results indicate an inability to
duplicate on the ground a fault detected during flight, many maintenance personal believe
obtaining aircraft system diagnostic information at the time of the fault would improve
their ability to identify the problem. This would allow the exclusion of maintenance on
parts that did not function because of an aircraft system problem, rather than the part
itself actually malfunctioning. Borden [18] expresses similar thoughts. Borky, et al [19]
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also express this idea - the Air Force is committed to reducing aircraft life-cycle costs,
and to achieving high sortie rates with a reduced force structure. To achieve this, the Air
Force requires a built-in diagnostics system that can achieve a high rate of accurate fault
detection. This capability is at the heart of a PHM effort. Blemel [16] indicates testing
costs are skyrocketing, to the point where they are beginning to exceed half the cost of
the aircraft they were built to test. Resources are being stretched to the point where it
may no longer be feasible to produce adequate, functional test equipment and software.
It will be far easier in the future to take advantage of the built-in processing power and
software diagnostics aboard the system. MacDonald [52] sums it up by saying most
aircraft are over-inspected at great cost to the Air Force.

A panel of defense experts reached similar conclusions in 1996 [71]. The Institute for
Defense Analyses held a conference with 41 participants from the technology
development, acquisition, and functional support areas of the Armed Services. The
participants concluded that current performance of defense systems is not commensurate
with what the current state-of-the-art suggests is attainable. Current performance
limitations constitute critical problems resulting in increased life cycle costs (and
consequently increased support and maintenance workloads), and decreased systems
availability. Perhaps even more importantly, the panel stated that potential integrated
diagnostic solutions are not limited by currently available technologies. Hence, the
diagnostic problem is not a technological problem, but “…a political, cultural, and
organizational problem” [71]. However, given the amount of research being done and
the fact there are almost no fielded integrated diagnostics/prognostics systems, it seems
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that there are still many technical hurdles remaining before implementation of these
systems is possible.

The idea of using sensors to predict equipment failure has been around for some time.
Most references indicate published research along this line began to appear in the early
1980’s [57].

Select test

Test

Ready
to Test

Start

Perform test

Result

End

Apply result

Diagnosis

Verify

Determine repair

Perform
repair

Repair

Figure 1-1. A generalized diagnostic process [81]

Figure 1-1 shows a generalized diagnostic process. The initial assumption is that the
system undergoing diagnosis has a known fault. At first, the system is prepared for the
diagnostic procedure (“Ready to Test”). The appropriate test procedure is chosen
(“Test”), conducted (“Result”), and the test outcome is transformed, if required, into a
diagnosis. Once the diagnosis is completed, the appropriate repair action is identified
(“Determine Repair”) and implemented (“Perform Repair”). If there are multiple system
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faults, the system is again prepared for diagnosis and the above procedure is repeated
until the system is fully functional again. All repairs are also verified: the diagnostic
process is repeated to ensure that there are no faults in the system once all repairs have
been performed.

In the early 1980’s, there were two main groups each favoring a different approach to
diagnostics. One group contended that a simple yet comprehensive collection of the
observed “abnormal” behaviors of a test unit and the actual failure mechanism provided
sufficient understanding of the situation to diagnose the fault. This refers to the testing of
a component using a fault tree approach (see Figure 1-2). The test results obtained while
following the fault tree’s directions help narrow the possible failure mechanisms until the
actual mechanism is identified. There is little concern with connecting the failure with
the associated symptom since an established diagnostic approach exists. At times, this
approach is known as a rule-based diagnostics system, since it was often implemented as
an “if-then” set of rules.
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Figure 1-2. Diagnostic fault tree [14]

Figure 1-2 shows a fault tree which may be used to determine the state of a given system
or component. Each node in a fault tree indicates the particular type of test, ti, that should
be conducted. The goal is to determine the current system state, shown in this diagram as
an si index. The 1s and 0s indicate a pass or fail result, respectively, for a particular test.
The technician systematically conducts tests to isolate the correct system state. This is
similar to the current Air Force maintenance process. However, as discussed previously,
CND and RTOK results undermine the fault isolation process.

The second group preferred a model-based prognostics system. This approach assumes
an underlying knowledge of the system under consideration. The methodology includes
“black box” approaches like neural nets, genetic algorithms, etc. where the user does not
require exact knowledge of the workings of the model to obtain useful results. The
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knowledge base then contributes to a fundamental understanding of the unit under test,
although at times this knowledge may be quite superficial.

The model-based system is being introduced into the Air Force maintenance process.
Various authors have published papers summarizing their efforts in this area. One such
example described in [22] is the use of neural nets to develop troubleshooting procedures
for an on-board avionics system. The particular system chosen for this study was the F16 Fire Control Radar (FCR) data. Only units known to be faulty were chosen for this
study. The purpose of this experiment was to use a neural net to distinguish between
three types of faulty FCRs. In this experiment, a success was defined as (correctly)
classifying a FCR unit as faulty. FCR units which were classified as faulty were called
“normal”. The other two ratings were “lemon” or “bad actor”. A “lemon” rating meant
the faulty FCR system was consistently (incorrectly) identified as a good system in
different aircraft. A “bad actor” rating indicated the faulty FCR system was (incorrectly)
identified as good only in certain aircraft, and this identification was not necessarily
consistent within that aircraft. The neural net obtained around 80% accuracy, which was
somewhat less than the authors hoped to achieve.

The panelists at the workshop specified in [60] identified three major classes of models:
physical, phenomenological, and empirical models. The panel considered these classes
of models important for manufacturing and machine monitoring. Physical models, or
mathematical descriptions of a system derived from its physics, represented the first class
of models they identified. The panel felt that the most useful physical models do not
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capture every detail of the system, but capture the essential features with minimum
complexity. Secondly, they summarized phenomenological models as those which
identify certain key features of the data, such as spectral lines or modulations, which are
used to characterize the system. These models demonstrate a much looser or even only a
qualitative coupling between the actual physics of the process and the model features.
Finally, they called "empirical," or data-driven models, those models that were based
predominantly on features extracted from training data by mathematical or statistical
methods without direct reference to the physical system. Some examples from this class
of models include Markov models, varieties of neural networks, and simulation models.

The panelists also discussed the conflict between physically based models and empirical
models. (Phenomenological models represent the middle ground between the two
approaches.) The following direct quote mirrors directly the conflict between the two
different modeling camps, as previously mentioned before from [60]:
Perhaps the greatest differences of opinion among workshop participants centered
on the topic of physical versus empirical modeling. Some participants felt that
only models well grounded in physics could lead to significant progress.
Proponents of empirical modeling argued that, while empirical modeling might
not lead to the best possible solution, it can offer substantial improvements, it can
be applied immediately in situations for which adequate physical models do not
currently exist or are too expensive or complicated to obtain, and substantial
success has been demonstrated in real applications. Perhaps grudgingly, almost
all workshop participants ultimately agreed that both physical and empirical
models have an important role to play, and that significant research is needed in
both of these directions. [60, Section 3.4.5]

The participants in [60] did manage to agree that the two physical and empirical
modeling approaches require different approaches to model validation. Empirical models
require a training/validation set containing sufficient examples spanning the full range of

1-11

machines, faults, or situations. Of course, this makes it much more challenging to
develop a robust empirical model, in terms of the volume of work required. Physical
models usually have a much smaller, more restricted set of parameters, and the validity of
the model is determined with a much smaller test set. Furthermore, the intrinsic
confidence in a physical model is usually much higher since it is based on known
principles of physics rather than “unknown” features which empirical models identify
based on the data. Empirical models, in general, require much more rigorous, extensive,
and expensive training and validation than physical models; however, there are situations
in which the necessary quantity and quality of training and validation data is available or
can be collected more easily than developing an adequate physical model.

The workshop participants then commented that methods used to analyze the data from
mechanical system processes must be robust, i.e., methods which can tolerate significant
deviations from assumed or nominal signal characteristics. In general, the signal and
noise environment in these kinds of applications is highly complex, non-Gaussian, and
exhibits large variability and/or non-stationarity. The operating conditions may vary
dramatically between sensor locations. To ensure the user accepts these monitoring
methods, low false alarm rates are an absolute necessity. This places an additional
burden on the robustness of the methods.

The workshop participants identified reliable estimation of time-to-failure as one of the
greatest challenges in manufacturing and machine monitoring, and one of weakest areas
in existing methods. Most faults of interest are believed to begin with small precursor
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events and to stem from a progressive (not necessarily linear) degradation of the tool or
machine component. Thus, the tracking of this degradation along with ongoing
prediction of the time-to-failure is of great importance. As the signal characteristics from
many types of degradations are non-monotonic, continuous monitoring which tracks the
history of the developing fault is often essential.

1.3. Motivation for a Prognostics System
The manufacturing infrastructure of most of the civilized world embodies the operation
and maintenance of machine systems. Both the commercial and government sectors have
a vested interest in technical advancements which may enhance the productivity,
efficiency, or quality of these machine systems’ operations. Such efforts can potentially
provide enormous cost savings and enhance industrial competitiveness. A primary
example is the repair and maintenance of these systems, which represents an annual cost
of many billions of dollars to U.S. consumers, industry, and government [60]. Although
monitoring is not cost-effective for inexpensive and non-critical machines such as
lawnmowers or fans, accurate system component condition assessment has the potential
to save large amounts of money while dramatically increasing safety and reliability of
important, complex systems.

Examples where system assessments are appropriate include power generation turbines
and critical equipment in nuclear reactors or on large oil rigs, where unscheduled failure
can result in lost revenue approaching a million dollars per day. Failure during
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operations of aircraft engines or power train components in helicopters can often result in
loss of life as well as the equipment [60].

The combination of rapid advances in signal processing techniques with cost-effective
digital technologies for their implementation may alleviate the system monitoring
challenges that currently exist. These advances include both improvements on existing
methods such as spectral analysis and cyclostationary signal analysis, and emerging
techniques. Among these new technologies are advances in wavelet and time-frequency
signal analysis. These techniques can be used to characterize both transient phenomena
and persistent harmonic structure. Consequently, they appear well-matched to the signals
associated with rotating machinery. Other recent developments, such as higher-order
spectral theory, could also possibly contribute in these applications. Also, higher-level
techniques such as neural networks and statistical pattern recognition and classification
provide means for combining lower-level processing into detection and categorization of
faults. In fact, preliminary research by several groups in applying the techniques
mentioned above to a variety of related problems has demonstrated improvements over
traditional approaches [60]. These methods, with appropriately directed research, may
offer solutions for the critical technology needs in manufacturing and machine
monitoring and assessment.

Methods for machine monitoring and assessment which provide warning in time to cease
operations or schedule maintenance can provide immense value in these applications,
such as aircraft engines, aircraft electrical systems, and automobile assembly lines. In a
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number of cases, some prognostic monitoring is routinely used or at least eagerly sought.
An excellent example is found in some military applications. Since the cost (and security
risk) of unscheduled failure in some military applications is enormous, preventative
maintenance is routinely practiced. Future weapons systems, such as the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF), will have these kinds of prognostic condition assessment methods designed
and built as an integral part of the system.

Prognostic condition assessment allows performance of maintenance during regularly
scheduled service rather than on an emergency basis after failure, thereby greatly
reducing the total cost of the maintenance operation. Other sources of unnecessary cost
include replacing critical components based on mean time to failure data versus actual
component operational status. Additionally, fault indicators can be unreliable, meaning
many good components are removed for maintenance or repair as a result of an incorrect
fault indication, thus wasting resources on non-existent problems. This action violates
the "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" philosophy. However, the practicality of this philosophy
is predicated on reliable system condition assessment. To accomplish the converse of the
above principle (“fix things only if they’re broken”) requires early detection of precursors
to equipment failure. Finally, routine maintenance itself may cause failures. Some
sources state that routine maintenance is actually the dominant cause of failure [60].

A recent DoD study noted that “There does not appear to be a consistent approach in
either commercial or defense systems for functional and physical partitioning of the
hardware and software used to perform integrated diagnostics functions.” [72] This study
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defines integrated diagnostics as"…part of the systems engineering (or reengineering)
process in which diagnostic functions are partitioned to components, both on and off the
product, to optimize economic and functional performance throughout a products life
cycle. Optimal performance is achieved by ensuring effective communication of
information relevant to the test and diagnostic process occurs between diagnostic
functions and components and across each life cycle phase." Success in these efforts is
essential for a successful prognostics system.
This study encompassed fourteen civilian and military programs in an attempt to
determine what current industrial and military practices were in the field of prognostics.
Besides the preceding conclusions, the study determined that a consistent approach to
diagnostics is feasible. In general, the study’s approach consists of four steps. The first
is to develop a consistent, information-based technical architecture for integrated
diagnostics. The second is to identify key/critical interfaces and elements of this
architecture. The third step is to develop a rough information model for integrated
diagnostics. And the fourth step is to prepare a roadmap to advance an open system
approach to integrated diagnostics.

The DoD study also identified key requirements for success in the development of
prognostic programs. Among these items were: reducing diagnostic ambiguities and
inaccuracies, correlating diagnostics with operational performance, the development of
measurable and relevant metrics, and the development/maintenance of industry standards
facilitated by a domain specific organization. A significant requirement for the last item
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is the development of standardized data encapsulation and adherence to a consistent
architecture for integrating diagnostic elements.

The Air Force intention is to use prognostic systems to completely eliminate traditional
aircraft inspection and repair patterns. Currently, an aircraft goes on a mission and
returns. The aircraft mechanic then uses Built In Test (BIT) results from Line
Replaceable Units (LRUs) (available only after the aircraft lands) and pilot input (when
available) to check the aircraft for malfunctions. The malfunctioning units are identified,
removed, and sent to the maintenance depot for further diagnosis and repair. As
previously indicated, a BIT result does not always indicate the exact system fault, nor can
the mechanic always identify the problem, if one even exists. The first goal of the
proposed prognostics system is to fix this diagnostics problem; the new system is
intended to be able to find and isolate aircraft faults with complete confidence. Once this
is complete, the prognostics system can report the specific aircraft faults to the
maintenance and planning/operations activities. (While the goal for a prognostics system
is to predict the occurrence of these faults, the first capability required for a prognostics
system is the ability to identify an aircraft fault with high confidence.) Reported aircraft
faults allow the mechanic to estimate the required workload and preposition/order the
necessary maintenance equipment or replacement parts. This capability is usually
referred to as health management. Any fault and time-required-to-fix information can be
sent to the planning/operations activity to allow them to update the functional capability
of that aircraft and overall mission readiness.
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Quoting from the JSF homepage [76], “Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) is a
technology maturation project focused on using advanced sensors integrated through
algorithms and intelligent models such as neural nets to monitor, predict, and manage
aircraft health. The goal of PHM is to enable what the JSF program calls Autonomic
Logistics: a maintenance and supply system wherein information on aircraft faults
detected while the aircraft is airborne is automatically downlinked to trigger the logistics
system to meet the returning aircraft with appropriate parts, maintenance personnel, and
maintenance equipment. This will allow the Right maintenance action, at the Right time,
for the Right reason.”

A National Science Foundation (NSF) Workshop on Signal Processing for Manufacturing
and Machine Monitoring workshop brought together 37 academic researchers and
industrial leaders and users of prognostics together to identify the pertinent signal
processing technologies and the most important industrial needs. Their findings were
disseminated to the entire community [60].

Most of the applications discussed in the NSF workshop involved either rotating or
reciprocating machinery. It thus appears quite possible that a promising prognostic
method could potentially solve a wide variety of machine monitoring problems.
However, the workshop participants cautioned that requirements, signals, and data rates
can be very different for similar kinds of machinery (rotating and reciprocating
machinery), as well as different types of machinery. Consequently, different prognostic
methods may be required based on the individual case. [60]
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The industry participants in the NSF workshop [60] made it clear that the value of
monitoring lies primarily in fault prediction. As might be expected, after-the-fact
detection of serious failures is generally of little use, and does not require specialized
sensors to determine that something has gone seriously wrong. As an example, consider
the failure of an F-16 jet engine. Since the F-16 is a single-engine aircraft, engine failure
will almost always lead to pilot ejection and consequent loss of the aircraft. It is clear in
the case of engine failure that there was a catastrophic failure—what may be unclear is
the cause of this failure. Specialized sensors may have been able to detect an impending
failure condition, and that detection may have been able to save the aircraft.

The primary value of monitoring comes in predicting failure in time to prevent it, and in
reliably estimating the remaining time before the component fails. (See the taxonomy of
a PHM system in the immediately following section for a complete discussion of PHM
system capabilities.) The NSF conference participants provided the following example
from the automotive industry:
…in the automotive manufacturing industry, it is a common practice to change all
of the tool faces in all of the machines at the end of a shift. The only monitoring
question of real interest in this context is whether a tool will fail before the end of
the shift and thus cause an extremely expensive unscheduled shut-down; the exact
amount of wear on a drill bit is of little interest unless it presages a catastrophic
failure. Research efforts should thus be more focused on prognostics and on early
detection of fault precursors. [60, Section 3.4.1]

Researchers at the Boeing Company have also devoted considerable thought to the
integration of on-board monitoring methods in mechanical systems, specifically military
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aircraft. They term their concept Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) [9].
Their concepts include on-board monitoring elements and ground-based logistic support
functions, which function similarly to the DoD’s concepts of a PHM and ALS,
respectively. The title of their paper includes the term “Tri-Reasoner,” and this term
refers to the incorporation in their system of three independent views of the vehicle’s
health. These three views are: the anomaly detection and reasoning system, the
prognostic reasoning system, and the diagnostic reasoning system. Outputs from all three
systems are combined in a concept termed the “integrated model” and the “reasoner
integration manager”. This paper provides a valuable overview of the issues which must
be addressed for any prognostics system.
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Figure 1-3. The Tri-Reasoner IVHM system [9]
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Figure 1-3 shows the data collection scheme and reasoners for different aircraft
subsystems. Each subsystem has a dedicated set of detectors and the three independent
reasoners. Detector information is combined in a data fusion engine and passed to the
three reasoning subsystems. The subsystem integration manager takes the results from
the three reasoners and sends the appropriate information to the central integration
manager.

Each reasoner has a specific function as well. The anomaly detection algorithms
typically use the raw detector data. These detection algorithms condition the data as part
of their processing. The associated Anomaly Reasoner (AR) assesses this conditioned
information within the integrated model. The AR’s task is to evaluate both the raw data
and extracted features for correlation and measures of evidence for fault conditions. The
main tools the AR uses are generic signal processing and statistical techniques. The
correlation and “ripple” effect of anomalies across subsystems is then examined within
the Air Vehicle Anomaly Reasoner (AVAR). The AVAR’s goal is to correlate anomalies
that occur across subsystems and to separate the “upstream” causes from “downstream”
effects.

The individual diagnostic algorithms and the associated Diagnostics Reasoner (DR)
further examines the root cause of an anomaly detected by the AR. The DR is intended
to incorporate a-priori engineering knowledge and models of a component or subsystem
(i.e. model-based diagnostics).
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The Prognostic Reasoners (PR) and their associated individual prognostic algorithms are
focused on predicting the time to system failure, or the failure of a component or
components within a subsystem. The intent is for these predictions to be given as
distributions about a Mean Time To Failure (MTTF), thus resulting in different
acceptable risk limits based on the consequences of the particular failure mode. A PR
relies inherently on the individual prognostic algorithm results and an integrated model.

The overarching reasoner, known as the Reasoner Integration Manager’s (RIM) function
tracks and evaluates the progression of anomalies, diagnoses and prognoses across all
subsystems. Through direct algorithm interaction with the Integrated Model and
corroborating/conflicting evidence associated with the individual reasoner reports, the
RIM prioritizes the most probable fault or failure modes at the air vehicle level. The
RIM then isolates the most probable failure modes. The RIM then creates reports for the
operators, maintenance personnel and engineering support staff.

Since not all aberrant behavior patterns in a new aircraft system can be predicted before
system completion, the IVHM will need to be flexible in its capability to diagnose system
problems. Similarly, the techniques and technologies used for observing the aircraft's
behavior, and for reasoning about these observations, will continuously improve during
an aircraft's operational life. To ensure these capabilities for new diagnoses and new
methodologies can be included in the current on-board system, the IVHM architecture
incorporates embedded learning components. Additionally, the underlying diagnostic
procedures and reasoners will be coded in a modular format to allow for easy exchange
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of software modules as new diagnostic procedures are developed and new programmatic
tools come into existence. The overall scheme is shown in Figure 1-4 below:
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Figure 1-4. The Tri-Reasoner Integrated Vehicle Health Management system [9]

Figure 1-4 shows the overall IVHM tri-reasoner architecture. As previously explained,
there are three independent views of the vehicle’s health and a reasoner integration
manager (RIM) (the box at the top center of Figure 1-4). Each aircraft subsystem has a
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dedicated reasoner suite composed of the three models and the associated sensors or fault
indicators. This information flows to the RIM for overall diagnostic/prognostic
assessment and reporting to appropriate entities. The tri-reasoner algorithms are generic
and decoupled from any domain knowledge to enable the use of algorithms that have
withstood a wide variety of applications thus increasing the confidence in their reliability.

1.4 Research Goals
There are three main research goals for this dissertation. The first is to summarize the
major areas of research currently being performed in the field of prognostics. The second
goal is to create a mathematical architecture for the implementation of a prognostics
system. This architecture includes a sensor selection algorithm and methodologies for
combining sensor information. The third goal is to demonstrate the utility of this
algorithm by solving some notional examples.

1.5 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. This chapter has provided a general
overview of the prognostics problem. The second chapter provides a literature review of
prognostic method papers. Chapter three provides an overview of some mathematical
techniques which are commonly used in the analysis of prognostic data. The fourth
chapter presents a notional methodology for defining and solving a prognostics problem.
Chapter five illustrates this methodology using a sample problem. Chapter six
summarizes the contributions of this work and provides recommendations for further
research.
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II. Literature Review

2.1 Background
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the history of aircraft diagnostics/prognostics
development, provide a PHM system taxonomy, and summarize the major areas of
research being performed today. The first section summarizes the historical development
of diagnostic/prognostic efforts, and describes a notional PHM system. The second
section describes some technologies that may be used in a prognostics application. The
third section describes the main diagnostic approaches used for aircraft maintenance.
The fourth section describes the main modeling approaches used for
diagnostic/prognostic applications. The last section summarizes the information provided
in this chapter.

2.1.1 History
The material for the history section is primarily drawn from Atlas, et al [9].

Early generation aircraft relied on manual detection and isolation of problems on the
ground. These aircraft were composed of systems that were analog and independent of
one another. Only a schematic, voltmeter, and reports from the pilot were required to
diagnose problems.

As these aircraft systems became more complicated, Built In Test Equipment (BITE) was
introduced in the aircraft to warn the pilots of critical failures in important components.
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However, the aircraft mechanic did not use BITE. The mechanic still relied on the
schematics, voltmeter, and pilot reports.

In time, aircraft design engineers realized that the output of the fault detection monitors
could be made available to support mechanic troubleshooting (in the form of analog
BITE reports). With these monitors, the concept of “fault balls” was born, and was
incorporated on some aircraft systems as early as the 1940s. Fault balls are indications,
normally on the front of a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU), that a fault has been detected they were originally mechanical, but later were replaced with small Light Emitting
Diodes (LED’s). In many cases, the LRU front panel contained a test switch to command
the LRU to test itself in a manner similar to how ground support equipment could test the
LRU. This capability also became known as Built In Test Equipment (BITE). This
capability began to decrease the need for some of the ground support equipment
previously used to test airplane equipment. Depending on the system, the fault balls
could effectively point the mechanic in the right direction, but schematics and voltmeters
were still needed for most conditions. The BITE results of this era was often confusing,
unreliable, and difficult to use. Mechanics often distrusted it. Despite problems, many
systems on airplanes such as the Boeing 707, 727, early 737/747, McDonnell Douglas
DC-8, DC-9, and DC-10’s employed this type of maintenance design.

In the 1970s, some of the increasingly complex aircraft systems began to use computers
to perform their fault diagnostic calculations. This was called digital BITE. With these
computers came the ability to display fault detection and isolation information in digital
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form, normally via numeric codes, on the front panel of the LRU. The digital logic could
produce codes that could better isolate the cause of the fault. The digital display offered
the capability to display many different codes to identify each type of fault that was
detected. These codes often pointed to some description in a manual that could be used
to isolate and correct the fault. Many systems on the Boeing 757/767, Airbus A300/310,
McDonnell Douglas DC-10, and Lockheed L-1011 still employ this approach.

As the number of systems grew, use of separate front panel displays to maintain the
systems became less effective, particularly since each LRU often used a different
technique to display its fault data. In addition, some of the systems had become
increasingly integrated with each other, due to the introduction of digital data buses, such
as the ARINC 429. Autopilot systems were among the first to use digital data buses and
depend on sensor data provided by other systems. Consequently, these autopilot systems
have been a leading cause of requiring more sophisticated maintenance systems. The
more sophisticated monitoring was necessary to meet the integrity and certification
requirements of its automatic landing function. For example, the 767 Maintenance
Control and Display Panel integrated the maintenance functions of many related systems.
In 1986, the ARINC 604 digital data bus defined a Central Fault Display System (CFDS)
to incorporate the maintenance indications for potentially all of the systems on the
airplane into one display. This approach enabled more consistent access to maintenance
data across systems, a more comprehensive display function than each of the systems
could provide individually, and saved the cost of implementing front panel displays on
many of the associated system LRUs. In this approach, the CFDS is used to select the
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aircraft system for which the aircraft mechanic desires maintenance data, and then the
CFDS routes the maintenance data from that aircraft system to the display. This
approach was employed on some of the systems on later Boeing 737s, and most systems
on the Airbus A320/330/340, and McDonnell Douglas MD11.

As systems became more complex and integrated, a single airplane fault could cause
fault indications for many systems, even when displayed using the CFDS. The mechanic
had little help in determining which fault indication identified the source fault, and which
were merely effects of the source fault. To solve this problem and related issues, the
ARINC 624 was developed in the early 1990’s. This system provides a more integrated
maintenance system that can consolidate the fault indications from multiple systems, and
provide additional functionality to support maintenance. Minimal ground support
equipment is needed to test airplane systems, as most of this capability is included in the
ARINC 624. For example, most factory functional tests of airplane systems on the
Boeing 747-400 and 777 airplanes consist of little more than execution of selected tests,
monitoring fault displays, and monitoring certain bus data using the ARINC 624.

The main goal in fault isolation on the airplane has always been to identify the LRU
causing a fault. This allows the aircraft mechanic to confidently remove the failed
component and correct the fault condition. Although in many cases this is possible, there
are many other cases where diagnosis and repair is not possible without the addition of
sensors and/or wiring. The addition of sensors and/or wiring increases the number of
components that can fail, and thus sometimes can worsen the maintenance effort, since
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the aircraft mechanic must now distinguish between failed aircraft systems and failed
aircraft sensors and/or wiring. In addition, these diagnostic sensors and/or wires add cost
and weight to the airplane.

As a result, current fault isolation techniques for aircraft cannot produce the perfect
answer (the single faulty LRU) in all cases. This is a practical matter, since the wholesale
integration of aircraft systems is really the reason why perfect diagnosis in modern
aircraft is impossible, given current techniques. However, today, it can point the
mechanic to a small group of LRUs in almost all cases. Since the technical limit of
diagnostic systems has been reached, aircraft engineers are looking into prognostic
systems for assistance with diagnostic issues. The accurate prediction of when faults on
an aircraft can be expected to occur is the next big step.

2.1.2 Fault Taxonomy
Any given system has a multitude of unique characteristics due to myriad sources of
variability. These sources include manufacturing (both across and within manufacturers),
reaction to ambient environmental conditions, system part replacement and repair, etc. In
addition, variability appears in the performance of the system’s components (e.g.
mechanical, electrical, and hydraulic). A system’s age also modifies these unique
characteristics. In the presence of this variability, on-board aircraft health management
systems must be able to accurately distinguish between “normal” operation and the
presence of a fault.
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This section presents a taxonomy of system behaviors between which a prognostics
system must be able to distinguish. These behaviors are defined as: nominal, incipient
fault, intermittent fault, active fault, system fault, sensor fault, and novel fault. The term
“anomalous event” is used to collectively include the six kinds of faults. An anomalous
event indicates a system that either does not have all available functionality or is not
operating within its intended design constraints.

The nominal behavior of a system is that behavior that exists when all intended
functionality is available and is operating within the constraints of the intended design at
a given point in time. The system can be functioning as intended at two different points
in time, even though the characteristics of individual system components and sensor
operating characteristics may have changed. As an example, the Concorde fuselage
expands about 12 inches in length during a flight across the Atlantic. However, the
aircraft does not lose functionality as a consequence of this expansion.

An incipient failure exists on a system or component that is still operational, but is
trending towards a failure condition. An example would be a hydraulics systems that is
losing pressure. The hydraulic system may still be fully functional, but is trending
towards a state of non-functionality.

An intermittent fault occurs infrequently, yet repeatedly. The system with an intermittent
fault has full functionality when the fault is not present. An example of this kind of fault
is a loose electrical connection that causes sporadic short circuits in the affected system.
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An active fault is system behavior outside the range of intended functionality. An
example is exceeding the revolutions per minute limit of a passenger car engine—this is
an operation of the engine above its intended functionality. Active faults do not
necessarily indicate a loss in system functionality, though a system may quickly
transition from an active fault to another kind of fault.

A system fault is when a system component or subcomponent is no longer functional.
Examples include an engine that no longer rotates or a hydraulics system that has lost
sufficient fluid/pressure to properly operate system components.

A sensor fault occurs when a sensor within a system component or subcomponent
1) reports a fault condition when none exists, or 2) does not report a fault condition when
one does exist. Of these two conditions, the second may be more detectable on an
attended system since an operator will likely notice a loss of functionality despite the lack
of a fault report. The first condition, also called a false alarm, is likely to be the most
troublesome since measures may be taken to correct the non-existent fault which disable
other correctly functioning systems. For example, a false alarm of an aircraft engine fire
may lead the pilot to eject from the aircraft, resulting in destruction of the entire aircraft,
and possible injury or death to the pilot.

A novel fault is an unknown anomalous condition. This type of failure event does not
result in nominal system behavior, nor can it classified in any of the known fault
conditions. It is something completely new in the system’s behavior. This type of fault
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may adversely affect the performance of the system, or it may not. It is the only kind of
fault which may not be of concern to an operator. An example is the development of a
rattle in an aircraft throttle lever. If it does not affect the pilot’s control of the engine
speed, it would be classified as a novel fault, and is not likely to concern the pilot.

2.1.3 PHM System Taxonomy
The main goal of prognostics, and a PHM system, is to accurately predict future failure of
system components in order to replace these components before they actually fail,
avoiding shutdown and potential damage to the system. The ultimate benefit is enhanced
performance at lower cost, since components are not needlessly replaced before their life
cycle ends, and components do not fail while still integrated in the system. Components
left to fail while still in the system can shut the system down and potentially lead to
damage to other, otherwise healthy, system components.

A PHM system accomplishes accurate detection through real-time on-board diagnostics
and the performance of prognostic functions (forecasting the useful remaining life of
component parts) with reasonable lead times, eliminating traditional inspection and repair
patterns. Rather than fixing a component after it has failed, it can be replaced when
prognostics indicate that probable time to failure (or probability of component failure) is
within some critical threshold.
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Figure 2-1. A notional prognostics system

Figure 2-1 shows the flow of data through a notional prognostics system. Aircraft sensor
data is routed to a diagnostics data collection terminal. This data is sent to an expert
interface which employs a prognostics framework to analyze the diagnostics sensor data.
The expert interface then provides a report on the health of the aircraft. This report
includes a list of components with estimated time to fail, a list of components that have
failed, required maintenance parts and actions, and an assessment of aircraft
readiness/time before becoming fully operational again.

A prognostics system needs a fully functional diagnostics system. The diagnostics
system must accurately report appropriate data from system components up to an
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appropriate level (based on the system). This may be done in either of two ways: passive
or active monitoring.

A passive monitoring system observes the current behavior of the system components.
For example, this can be a sensor (ensemble) that monitors the current coming from a
motor, or a sensor (ensemble) monitoring airflow from an engine. The majority of
sensors used in aircraft today are passive. As an example, an on-board BIT unit is a
passive monitoring system, since it observes and records component performance.

An active monitoring system interacts in some way with a system component of interest
(even while the system is in operation). It may send a known signal of some kind into the
system component of interest. It may also collect a sample from the system component,
such as engine fluid. As an example, an external sensor (ensemble) is attached to the
component, and this sensor (ensemble) sends a signal through the component at a level
that minimally affects the component’s operation. The component’s reaction to this
signal is captured through either the same or a different sensor (ensemble). A BIT
capability to conduct a component self-test is an active monitoring capability. This
captured data is then sent to an expert interface for analysis.

A prognostics system also requires an expert interface with appropriately high levels of
sensitivity and specificity. In this context, sensitivity means the prognostics system
correctly identifies when a fault or degradation is present. Specificity means the
prognostics system correctly identifies when a fault or degradation is not present. The
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incoming diagnostic data must be correctly classified as indicative of either correct
system function, system degradation, or a system fault. This expert interface may be just
for a single system component, meaning there very likely are many of these interfaces
within one system. The expert interface may also be an overarching system which
combines the results of all the diagnostics inputs from all the system components. The
design will depend upon the mechanical system.

A prognostics system should also provide system component health predictions based on
the incoming diagnostic data. There are many different kinds of predictions that a
prognostics system may produce. These predictions include assessments of future
component/system events and probabilities associated with both current and future
component/system events. The following paragraphs discuss the main predictive outputs
of a PHM system.

The expert interface of a prognostics system should provide a level of confidence
associated with its assessment of fault/non-fault for a particular system component.
Another key prediction capability is the time remaining until component/system failure.
The prognostics system may also be able to characterize this measurement using two
confidence level measurements and a system-level measurement. The first confidence
level measurement is associated with the predicted time remaining until component
failure. In turn, this leads to a system-level measurement of the probability that this
component actually fails before the “predicted time remaining” elapses. These predictive
measurements allow for the replacement of components before they actually fail,
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preventing catastrophic consequences in systems where component failure can lead to the
failure of many previously healthy components. Related operational measures are
degraded system status information and a future time frame health status for critical
systems, such as aircraft.

The above prediction capabilities may then be extended to the prediction of a degraded
component/system condition. The definition of “degraded” is unique to the component
or system under consideration. The expert interface should have a third classification
status of degraded, in addition to indicating fault and non-fault status. Again, the
prognostics system may then use confidence level measurements similar to those
previously described. A “degraded” predictive measurement allows for a more precise
(perhaps) replacement of parts that are about to fail – it may allow for increasing the
functional lifetime of the part before it is removed to prevent system failure.

Another measure is the probability of failure of a component/system within the next cycle
of operation of the mechanical component/system. As an example, the goal could be to
determine the probability of failure of an aircraft engine during its next overseas flight, or
during its two-week hiatus in a location with very limited access to maintenance parts.
Again, a level of confidence in the immediately preceding probability definition is a
desirable measurement.

Any predictive information can be obtained from a prognostics system and used for
automatic maintenance planning, parts orders, mission planning, etc. This automated
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logistics concept is called the Autonomic Logistics System (ALS). The goal of PHM and
ALS is to provide a complete overall system health monitoring capability, and
consequent maintenance and planning management capabilities. Eventually, sufficiently
redundant mechanical systems may be designed that can reconfigure themselves based on
predicted failures. However, much basic research remains to be done before a complete
overall system health monitoring capability becomes a reality.

2.1.4 Description of an ALS System
A main component of a PHM system is an ALS. An ALS is intended to be a real-time,
intelligent global logistics network dedicated to the support of the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF). An ALS is intended to identify and communicate appropriate maintenance,
supply, engineering, safety, and training actions to support and enhance mission
execution. Figure 2-2 shows a notional ALS concept.

^
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Figure 2-2. Autonomic Logistics System (ALS) model [77]
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Figure 2-2 shows how aircraft sensor data, once processed by a PHM system onboard an
aircraft, provides a list of degraded and failed components to appropriate maintenance
and planning activities. This information provides an up-to-date picture of the aircraft
health, required maintenance actions and parts, and updated mission planning schedules.
The aircraft mechanic’s Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM) is also updated
with information about the current state of the aircraft’s systems.

The autonomic term in the ALS acronym refers to an intended automatic trigger of
appropriate actions within the system (subject to human controller inputs), based on
current mission status and requirements. The autonomic support concept is similar to the
human autonomic nervous system that directs the human body to perform heartbeat,
breathing, and other functions with minimal human intervention. The logistics parallel is
a system that is stimulated, prior to an aircraft’s return, to ready appropriate tools and
spare parts.

The ALS, using PHM input, automatically determines that certain parts are reaching the
end of their service life and ought to be replaced, and reports this information before the
aircraft lands. This is in contrast to the traditional method of diagnosing aircraft
component failures upon the return of the aircraft, and then readying the appropriate tools
and spare parts. Also, in present systems, maintainers rely on often ambiguous problem
descriptions from the pilots. The autonomic system, in contrast, relies on an integrated
report from aircraft diagnostics that minimizes incorrect maintenance actions and
consequently reduces maintenance support requirements. The ultimate intent of the ALS

2-14

and PHM working in concert is to reduce maintenance manpower, logistics machinery,
and increase sortie rates. Most of the discussion that follows focuses on the PHM aspects
of the system, rather than the autonomic support concepts, as PHM capabilities are
necessary to realize ALS goals.

Su [88] divides how people have thought about prognostics into two different concepts:
component/part and system. The concept used to model prognostics has influenced the
way the prognostics problem is addressed. According to Su, prognostics have
traditionally been regarded as a component/part problem. This led to the adoption of
failure statistics and analysis methods to identify and replace failed components. Some
examples of the sensors employed include time/stress measurement devices, vibration
monitoring, and system sensors (oil, water, etc.). Some examples of the analysis methods
investigated include neural networks, genetic algorithms, and trend analysis. These
techniques are usually system specific—they are applied piecemeal to the particular
problem under consideration and combined in a unique fashion to provide results which
are meaningful only for that particular piece of equipment. However, when viewed as a
system problem, the prognostic approach necessarily becomes much more involved.
Systems such as satellites operate in environments with little or no human interaction.
Ideally, there would exist a common set of sensors and techniques which could be
applied to all of these types of systems. Su calls this concept an overall Prognostics
Framework, a generic, tailorable software tool that uses model-based reasoning to
integrate embedded test and sensor data into diagnostic and prognostic systems. The
ultimate goal is to produce a generic tool capable of being applied to all different kinds of
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warfighting systems. This would lead to the integration of all warfighting systems into a
single architecture for the future battlefield.
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Figure 2-3. Future military systems support concept [77]

Figure 2-3 illustrates the single architecture concept. PHM and ALS are extended from
just aircraft systems to all systems used in a warfighting scenario. All the PHM and
resulting logistics information from the involved warfighting platforms is collected via a
distributed information system, and delivered to an enhanced logistics system. This
enhanced logistics system handles all the required logistics actions, allowing for joint
logistics interoperability and the notional improvements in logistics performance shown
in Figure 2-3.
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2.1.5 Technical Feasibility
The main goal of a PHM system is to understand and predict when components (and
possibly consequent systems) will fail. To accomplish this, a PHM system will likely use
artificial intelligence or other methods to predict failure of system components.
Traditional sensor-based diagnostics recognize the functional and failure modes of the
aircraft and its components. A PHM system extends this approach, using models to
predict the onset of failure modes.

MODEL BASED PHM

£<idy Current Sensor?
Low Power Wfr^l^ss Integral^
Micro3^nscn

Algorithms
F^st Fomior Tr^nsform^
OtKTvte Fouri&r Trmatorms

Figure 2-4. Model of PHM system [77]
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Figure 2-4 shows the collection of raw data from the sensors, the transformation of this
data into a meaningful output via algorithms, and the extraction of key features from the
output via some reasoners. The focus is on using the mathematical models of artificial
intelligence, such as neural nets and fuzzy logic, to extract key features of the operation
of the aircraft system. Individual sensor data is used in these computations, but all
features are fused before a PHM system reports a failure. This fusion action is intended
to minimize the number of incorrect diagnoses the system produces, reducing
unnecessary maintenance actions and costs. Research with intelligent diagnostic systems
has shown that accurate measurements of appropriate variables can be used to reliably
predict future failure [11], [12].

Figure 2-5. Spectral lines from a faulty item (left) and a correctly functioning item
(right) (Magnitude in dB vs. frequency; wavelet decomposition can detect the difference)
[49]

Figure 2-5 shows an example of raw data taken from accelerometers attached to the aft
transmission of a helicopter. According to the authors, exhaustive tests indicate there are
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no obvious features in this raw data which can be used to classify it as a fault or no-fault
class. So, the authors used a wavelet decomposition on the data in an attempt to extract
useful features. They discovered the features useful for classification are non-stationary,
confirming the wavelet decomposition as a very suitable choice. (The features were
certain frequency bands.) For fault classification, the wavelet coefficients are computed
as a function of time. A simple average and standard deviation are computed for each
data channel in a given time window, and the results are compared to a set of nominal
values for fault classification.

Other research programs seem to indicate that a PHM system is, in fact, an attainable
goal. The UK Ministry of Defense used a neural net model to accurately predict
structural life used on the basis of recorded flight data [10]. Also, DARPA participated
in a research project which showed an engine control sensor suite could be operated with
4 sensors instead of 7 [32].

2.2 Technologies/Applications
According to the NSF workshop [60] participants, the most prominent method (by far)
for manufacturing and machine monitoring is spectral, or "FFT" (fast Fourier transform)
analysis. Cepstral variants are often employed to increase robustness or to reduce the
variability of the FFT estimates.

A cepstrum is the Fourier transform of the log magnitude spectrum:
FFt(ln( | FFt(window . signal) | )
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and was coined in a 1963 paper by Bogert, et al [17]. (A “window signal” is the signal
that appears on a given graph—it occurs in the “window” that the graph shows.) They
observed that the logarithm of the power spectrum of a signal containing an echo has an
additive periodic component due to the echo, and thus the inverse Fourier transform of
the logarithm of the power spectrum should exhibit a peak at the echo delay. They called
this function the cepstrum, interchanging letters in the word spectrum because "in
general, we find ourselves operating on the frequency side in ways customary on the time
side and vice versa. (sic)" This term has come to be accepted terminology for this inverse
Fourier transform of the logarithm of the power spectrum of a signal [66].

The unusual terminology surrounding the computation of the cepstrum was introduced in
the original article by Bogert et al [17], in which various terms from signal processing
(spectrum, frequency, analysis, phase) were rearranged into anagrams (cepstrum,
quefrency, alanysis, saphe). The authors did this to highlight this unusual treatment of
frequency domain data. The frequency data was treated as if it were time domain data in
the transformation of it to a data set which had units of seconds across its x-axis values
(the quefrencies), but which indicated variations in the frequency spectrum.

The cepstrum is commonly used in voice recognition applications and
rotating/reciprocating machinery analysis. As an example of the former, the consonants
of speech are usually transient and of short-burst character. However, vowel sounds (and
tones sung by a singer) are formed by repetitive emission of pulses into the vocal tract
[62]. This leads to the use of the cepstrum to analyze these pulses. Similarly, rotating
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machinery exhibits a repetitive emission of pulses, and this suggests the same analysis
technique. As a result, the concept of the cepstrum has become a fundamental part of the
theory of systems for processing signals that have been combined by convolution [62].
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Figure 2-6. Frequency response of a round horn without reflection [7]

Figure 2-6 shows a graph of horn signal strength (dB) vs. frequency. The center to upper
right hand corner portion of the graph is relatively smooth, lacking a definite periodic
component.
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Figure 2-7. Power cepstrum plot of the data from Figure 2-6 [7]

Figure 2-7 shows the cepstrum transformation of data from figure 2-6. Since there is no
periodic component associated with this signal, the cepstrum shows very little power.
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Figure 2-8. Frequency response of the same horn when reflection is included (notice the
ripples in the curve) [7]
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Figure 2-8 shows a graph of frequency response of the same horn, but with a reflected
component. The reflection of the signal can be seen in the upper center to right hand
corner of the graph (the oscillations). It is this feature that the cepstrum excels in
detecting.
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Figure 2-9. Power cepstrum plot of the data from Figure 2-8 [7]

Figure 2-9 shows the cepstrum transformation of the data from Figure 2-8. With the
addition of the repetitive signal component, the cepstrum shows a dramatic increase in
power. This type of unambiguous signal processing is particularly useful for
diagnostic/prognostic applications, provided the presence/absence of repetitive emissions
is the sole determinant of proper functioning.
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For machinery analysis, usually a number of spectral lines associated with harmonics of
the various rotating frequencies of the machinery are identified and their levels are
compared to pre-selected thresholds. Spectral analysis has the advantages of a natural
and direct association with the characteristics of rotating machinery, relatively simple
interpretation, a certain robustness to noise, propagation path, and other sources of
distortion, backed by a large body of theory and experience. "Trending," in which the
evolution of parameters over time is tracked, is also commonly used; for example, the
rate of increase of the magnitude of a spectral line may be estimated or even used to
predict the time to failure.

The NSF workshop participants noted that many types of sensors which measure a great
variety of physical phenomena are used for both manufacturing and machine monitoring.
Mechanical characteristics such as vibration, torque, displacement, shaft velocity, strain
and pressure are measured by many different types of sensors, ranging from
accelerometers to strain gauges to non-contact displacement pickups using eddy currents.
Electrical characteristics such as motor current, capacitance, and RF emissions are often
used. Acoustic emissions (AE) play an increasingly important role in manufacturing
applications and are under investigation for certain machine monitoring tasks. Visual,
infrared, ultrasonic, and X-ray inspection for non-destructive evaluation (NDE) play
major roles in certain applications. In spite of this vast array of sensor technologies, there
appears to be a constant need for new, more, and better sensors. Many types of sensors
have significant limitations, such as restricted bandwidth, nonlinear behavior, or a
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susceptibility to saturation. The Air Force goal is to minimize the number of sensors
since these are going in smaller JSF aircraft.

Montauk [26] contends that sensors were integrated into electronics systems to
accomplish four tasks. The first two tasks related to engine operation and wear. The first
task determines when an aircraft’s engine performance has deteriorated to the point
where the fuel burn changes to something other than its optimal level. At that point, the
fuel burn is readjusted to a proper level, instead of letting the condition degrade until the
engines needed an overhaul. The second task determines engine damage, hopefully
before it impacts the operational schedule or significant consequential damage occurs.
The third task assesses how realistic the operational procedures are in order to improve
operational safety and enhance profitability. The fourth task is most relevant to this
study, as it concerns locating and rectifying faults in complex avionics systems.

This final task evolved into two different types of systems. The first concerned itself
with determining how long an aircraft can operate in a particular condition, and the
second provided data on which components need replacement. Chu [22] refers to the
first system as an Aircraft Integrated Data System (AIDS). The primary goal of AIDS is
preventative maintenance, and as such is not usually used to troubleshoot an aircraft,
although it may help an experienced user in pinpointing some problems. He refers to the
second system as a Central Maintenance System (CMS), and this system is the one
intended to allow a mechanic to easily identify faulty avionics units. The exact methods
by which either system makes it diagnoses are not mentioned in the article. The CMS
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would also trigger the Autonomic Logistics System to provide appropriate spare parts.
This trigger and subsequent parts delivery would allow the aircraft repairs to begin as
soon as it lands, which improves operational efficiency, and for commercial airlines,
profitability.

Moving on to more specific applications, Su [88] proposes an overarching software
solution to the prognostics problem. The software would be capable of handling data
inputs from any sensor on any system. These inputs would be tied in with a logistics
infrastructure to provide the “Autonomic Logistics System” capability. A primary
requirement would be the collection and analysis of system data in real-time or near realtime. Faults would be identified using a “Diagnostician” consisting of algorithms that,
among other things, would correlate all possible faults to all possible system components.
The prognostic part of the software uses predictive techniques which include item
specific mechanisms such as neural networks. It also includes linear signal degradation
measures, historical conclusions and statistics, and engineering correlations. These
correlations are presumed to be the correspondence between sensor indications and
resulting system faults. Su does not provide any estimate of when this proposed software
solution would be functional.

A number of authors address the issue of the human/machine interface. Dussalt, et al
[29] focus on the development of management tools to support diagnostic decision
making. The current Air Force Integrated Diagnostics policy requires that all faults,
either known or expected, be detectable and unambiguously isolated within a system.
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This policy does not specify the amount of automation required to be present for system
diagnostics. Consequently, a diagnostic system may consist of automatic and manual
testing procedures. The paper describes an approach the Air Force is taking to consider
what the most appropriate mix of diagnostic measures may be. Similar concerns are
expressed by Dean [27].

Thesen and Beringer [91] take a slightly different approach. They use a hierarchical
model which represents the user and system as two independent control systems.
Communication between these two “independent systems” takes place when each
operates with appropriate expectations about the control strategy used by the other. The
human must be in-the-loop with the diagnostic system to ensure the automatic
recommendations the system makes are correctly understood, and that type I and II errors
are not made with regard to the system recommendations (type I - ignoring correct
automatic decisions; type II - acting on decisions that are incorrect).

Eilbert and Christensen [30] note that search procedures designed to detect system faults
may discern apparent patterns when none, in fact, actually exist. The following figure
provides an example of their viewpoint.
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Figure 2-10. Hypothetical bivariate data set [30]

Figure 2-10 shows a data set with complete discrimination ability between both data
classes using either a parabolic or circular separator (dashed lines). The optimal linear
discriminator misclassifies three events. Because of the small sample size, it is not clear
that a quadratic discriminant is preferable, or indeed correct. The implication is that
using a search procedure to determine the cause of a particular sensor’s report may
continue the string of problems (RTOK and CND) already present in the current
diagnostic system. This effect may be mitigated to some extent if the system can provide
a level of confidence associated with its diagnosis.

2.3 Diagnostic applications
A diagnostic approach using decision trees is presented in [14]. Determining the
sequence of steps required to reach a diagnostic conclusion (using a decision tree) has
been shown to be NP-hard [41]. Biasizzo, et al [14] represent the fault-free operation of
a system and the presence of a system fault as two distinct system states. The diagnostic
procedure is intended to discover the actual system state using tests which provide
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information about system components. The sequence in which the tests are conducted
and how information from previous tests is incorporated into the test sequencing
procedure is the subject of this paper. Determining this sequence using the minimum
number of steps (minimum cost) is known as the test sequencing problem.

Much research has been devoted to this problem. The conventional approach has been to
use symmetrical tests. A symmetrical test has only two possible outcomes.

Biasizzo, et

al [14], use asymmetrical tests. An asymmetrical test has more than two possible
outcomes.

1*2+3*4

Figure 2-11. An example of an asymmetrical test pattern to determine system state for
four components [14]

Figure 2-11 shows a typical asymmetric fault tree used determine which of four system
components are faulty. The tree shows the optimal diagnostic test pattern when four tests
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are available to test the functionality of the four components. The four components are
represented by the four digits in the ovals in the diagram. The first digit corresponds to
the first component, etc. The s with subscript indicates which system state the test
indicates.
Table 2-1. Test schematic [14]
Component
Test

1

2

3

4

1

1

0

0

0

2

0

1

0

0

3

1

0

1

0

4

0

1

0

1

Table 2-1 shows the test schematic for Figure 2.11. The first test, t1, determines the
status of components 1 and 3, t2 determines the status of components 2 and 4, t3
determines the status of component 3, and t4 determines the status of component 4.
Although not explained in the article, it seems tests 1 and 2 cannot determine which of
the components they are testing are okay. If the result is faulty, both components are
faulty, otherwise one of the two components is okay. It is also not explicitly stated
whether 1 represents a fault or normal behavior, but using 1 to represent a fault is
implied. It also seems that component 4 is assumed to be faulty given the starting state of
the system. Based on these assumptions, state s12 can be determined just by running test
1. Since component 4 is known to be faulty, running test 1 would show components 1
and 3 are faulty, and hence state s12 where components 1, 3, and 4 are faulty is reached.
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The ultimate goal is the generation of an optimal diagnostic tree (the order in which the
test are conducted based on previous test results). Biasizzo, et al [14] employ a
Sequential Diagnosis Tool using graph search algorithms on existing decision trees for
particular systems. They use a heuristic evaluation function to guide the graph search.
The heuristic is an estimate of the remaining cost in the diagnosis procedure from a
particular node. They contend the “proof of the admissibility” of this technique is given
in [64].

The conventional test sequencing problem is defined as follows [64]:

1. The set of system states S = {s0, s1,...,sm} where s0 denotes the fault-free state of the
system and si, (1 ≤ i ≤ m) denotes one of m potential faulty states of the system. In
practice, the latter refers to a faulty functional part of the system or to a faulty system
function.

2. The set of probabilities P = {p(s0), p(s1),...,p(sm)}, where p(si) is the a-priori
probability of the system being in the state si before the diagnostic procedure is started
(i.e., the probability of a fault occurrence described by the system state).

3. The set of available tests T = {t0, t1,...,tm} and the associated test costs c = {c0, c1,..,cm}
which can be measured in terms of time, manpower requirements, or other economic
factors.
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4. The binary test matrix D composed of binary column vectors, D = [dj], 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
where dj = [dij], dij ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, represents diagnostic capabilities of test tj. dij = 1
denotes that test tj fails if the system is in state si, and dij = 0 otherwise.

This diagnostic procedure is a sequence of tests to isolate any system state, presented as a
decision tree. The problem is to find a diagnostic procedure for a given system at
minimal cost. Since a diagnostic procedure is easily described by AND trees, the authors
use AND/OR graph search algorithms to determine the best diagnostic procedure.

The preceding definition can be modified to generalize to asymmetrical and multi-valued
tests by using the following step.

4. The set of all possible outcomes L of the tests t ∈ T: R = {r0, r1,...,rL}
The test matrix D composed of matrices, D = [D(k)], 0 ≤ k ≤ L, where D(k) is the test
matrix associated with the response rk. Each D(k) is composed of column vectors:
D(k) = [dj(k)], 1 ≤ j ≤ n

(2-1)

The vector of diagnostic inference for the test tj with outcome rk is
dj(k) = [dij(k)], 0 ≤ dij(k) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ i ≤ m

(2-2)

where dij(k) is the conditional probability that the outcome of test tj is rk if the system is in
state si.
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Biasizzo, et al [14] demonstrate their technique using examples from other published
papers. In general, systems with strongly interconnected functional blocks and few
internal test points are more difficult to diagnose.
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Figure 2-12. Electrical schematic [14]

Figure 2-13. The resulting test tree based on the schematic of Figure 2-12 [14]
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The electrical schematic in Figure 2-12 and resulting decision tree in Figure 2-13 show
how their method works. In the electrical schematic in Figure 2-12, the M1, M2 etc. and
the A1, A2 etc. labels indicate a test point. These test points are shown in Figure 2-13 as
tests; for example, the node at the top of the tree tests point M3. These test points are
transcribed into the optimal symmetric decision tree which would then be used to check
the electrical component (shown in the schematic) for faults (non-uniform costs have
previously been assigned to each test). This tree is optimal because it incurs the least
average cost for a fault diagnosis among all possible trees for this problem.

A similar approach to [14] is found in Bearse [11]. Bearse describes a Diagnostic
Inference Model which generates a new fault tree based on original information, allowing
for asymmetric outcomes. Other similar approaches include Sheppard [80] and Dill [28].
Sheppard [80] uses case-based reasoning (a historical database) to generate information
flow models. Case-based reasoning assumes that similar mechanical system faults
produce similar symptoms. A case-based reasoning system starts with a case history,
consisting of a number of historical cases. The symptoms and correct diagnosis/repair
action are known for each historical case. When a fault occurs in the mechanical system,
the symptoms are compared to the recorded historical symptoms. The “nearest neighbor”
to the new case is identified, and the diagnosis/repair action used in the historical case is
applied to the new case. The resulting system combines the case data with model based
systems. Efficient, accurate diagnostic processes are developed from those models.
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Dill [28] applies pass/fail limits to discriminate between operable and faulty systems. At
times, it can be difficult to know whether the results of a particular test should be
classified as a pass or failure. Ideally, pass/fail limits should be set in regions away from
expected values observed in functional components and failed components (which
presumes a significant gap between the two).

Ben-Basset, et al [13] point out issues with just using fault trees. Fault trees tend to cover
only the most typical problems for a given system. However, covering these typical
problems usually requires a very large fault tree. If a new problem occurs, or the repair
recommendation is incorrect, there is no further help available from the tree. If the
system which the fault tree covers is updated, even in a minor way, wholesale changes
are required to every fault tree to keep things current. Better solutions to diagnostic
problems are obtained if different methods (fault trees, physical models, case based
reasoning, etc.) are used in concert to provide a diagnosis.
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Figure 2-14. A case-based reasoning model [1]
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Figure 2-14 illustrates a typical case-based model. A case-based reasoning system
assumes that similar symptoms consistently result from identified problems. The general
knowledge block contains the case history, consisting of a number of historical cases.
The symptoms and correct solution are known for each historical case. When the next
problem occurs, the symptoms are compared to symptoms recorded in the historical
cases. The “nearest neighbor” to the new case is identified, and the solution used in the
historical case is applied to the new case. If changes to the solution are required for this
new case, the old solution is revised, and then this new learned case is added to the
general knowledge repository.

Authors have also addressed the subject of combining model-based systems with decision
tree structures. Ben-Basset, et al [12] present a way in which both types of systems are
combined to provide a diagnostic expert system. They contend it is more cost-effective,
in most real-life applications, to apply case-based reasoning after the system already has
some basic initial knowledge of the system domain and the units requiring testing. Their
system combines both kinds of reasoning in a module which integrates system knowledge
from 4 different sources.
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Diagnostic Algorithms
Figure 2-15. Knowledge integration scheme for case-based reasoning [12]
(UUT – Unit Under Test)

Figure 2-15 shows how data flows in the expert system [12]. Universal domain
knowledge refers to universal knowledge on diagnostics considerations and processes.
Initial unit under test (UUT) knowledge refers to the specifics about the UUT in terms of
its structure, function, and relationship between symptoms and faults. Historical UUT
experience represents past experiences with this UUT. This information is integrated to
form the basis for determining the status of the UUT. The diagnostic algorithms include
model-based reasoning, which matches symptoms with probable faults. The model-based
reasoning portion is used most often. The case-based reasoning portion compares this
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symptom set with previous symptom sets to determine a likely candidate solution. This
method is used almost exclusively for new cases, or for cases for which the model-based
portion has low confidence in its diagnosis (these two sets of cases should overlap
considerably, if not completely).

The main argument against the exclusive use of model-based reasoning is that there are
times when there is insufficient knowledge or time to build a model to support efficient
and accurate diagnosis. However, a partial model of the system/unit under test is always
available. If there is an insufficient number of cases to allow for efficient diagnosis,
additional cases can be produced either by simulation or actual experience, and the
consequent performance of the model will improve with time. Ultimately, the inference
engine of the model-based reasoning function will make most of the diagnostic decisions,
and the case-based function will only be used in very unusual cases. This will allow for
high levels of accuracy in quick diagnoses. Combining the two disciplines into one
model yields the following benefits according to the graphs in Figures 2-16 through 2-18.
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Figure 2-16. Model-based reasoning [12]
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Figure 2-17. Case-Based reasoning [12]

Combination of Case-Based and Model-Based

Acceptable

Ready

Time

Figure 2-18. Combined reasoning [12]

Of particular interest are Figures 2-16 and 2-17. Case-based reasoning never reaches the
level of performance attained by model-based reasoning, while it takes model-based
reasoning a longer period of time to reach an acceptable performance level.
Unfortunately, the article does not describe the situations the authors analyzed which led
to these conclusions. The only statement is these graphs are the product of the authors’
analysis of “many real-life situations”. The graphs appear to be completely notional.
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2.4 Modeling Applications
The most common method for detecting aircraft faults seems to be the application of
neural nets. Chu [22] describes the use of this method in conjunction with a statistical
classifier (this example was briefly described in section 2.2). Chu’s study determines the
feasibility of using neural networks to develop troubleshooting procedures for an onboard avionics system, the F-16 Fire Control Radar (FCR) data. The purpose of Chu’s
experiment was to use a neural net to distinguish between three types of faulty FCRs.
The neural network had three layers (input, hidden, and output) and was constructed
using radial basis functions with a constant standard deviation, which determined the
width of the Gaussian functions used in construction of the neural net.

There are two major classes of neural network models. The first uses nodes (units) which
compute a non-linear function (usually sigmoid) of the product of an input vector and a
weight vector. The other class of neural networks uses the distance between the input
vector and another generalized vector (usually the average of the input vectors) for the
computation at the node (unit). Radial basis functions (RBF) are used as activation
functions in this second class of neural networks.
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Figure 2-19. Typical RBF network

Figure 2-19 shows a typical RBF network. Each input vector has N inputs, indexed 1 to
n, which are combined with M basis functions, indexed 1 to j. There are K output nodes,
indexed from 1 to k. More details about RBFs are provided in Chapter 3.

The RBF structure was chosen because a complex classification problem in a high
dimensional space, such as this one, is more likely to be linearly separable than one in a
lower dimensional space [24]. As previously stated in Chu’s paper, an output from the
neural net classified the faulty avionics system (which all of these were) as either a
“lemon”, “bad actor”, or “normal”. The neural net had 137 neurons in the input layer,
465 neurons in the hidden layer, and 7 neurons in the output layer. The 137 inputs
correspond to which of 137 different possible faults a particular radar set exhibited (by
implication, the 137 different kinds of faults was not an exhaustive listing). Each radar
set consists of 7 Line Replaceable Units (LRUs), and the output vector represented which
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1 of the 7 LRUs was faulty. The neural net was trained using fault data from actual
systems, and using the “leave one out” approach. This approach trains the neural net
using all but one of the input exemplars (466 1x137 input vectors in this study), which is
then used to test the accuracy of the neural network. The process is repeated for all the
inputs, at a constant standard deviation value. The value for the standard deviation was
then varied to determine the optimal standard deviation value (the value which resulted in
the most correct classifications). A cost function was also developed to penalize the
misclassification of each unit. The optimal value resulted in a correct classification of the
faulty LRU 80% of the time. Chu hoped this value could be improved to 90% if more
data was available. A similar study was conducted in 1988 [56] which showed that using
neural nets to classify faults was feasible.

Keller, et al [44] used neural network and fuzzy logic technologies to create models of
F/A-18 subsystem/component health. These tools were developed as part of an internal
research effort at Boeing to develop an Advanced Onboard Diagnostic System (AODS)
along with supporting technologies to reduce CND results which the authors claim were
the most frequently occurring result for many subsystems. AODS was envisaged as a
collection of software modules which implements subsystem/component health
diagnostics, and an integrating system level element which combines the results of the
health diagnostics.
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Figure 2-20. AODS top level data flow [44]

Figure 2-20 shows the data flow through the AODS system. The subsystem modules (of
which there are many) process real-time subsystem parameters and provide a continuous
assessment of system health. The subsystem module reports health status in the form of
an incident type, time of the incident, the health status indicator for that type, the
frequency/duration of the incident, and a level of confidence. Additional aircraft data
which may support later ground processing by the system module or ground testing is
also included. The synchronization module captures appropriate information about the
status of different system components along with the strength of correlation to the
health/fault incident. The system diagnostic assessor then processes the resulting health
status record. This assessor is a rule-based system that processes the health status reports.
It also maintains a record of previous health status messages. This record of health status
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messages is the basis for maintenance recommendations, which are generated either in
real-time or offline.
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Figure 2-21. Generic subsystem diagnostic module [44]
Figure 2-21 shows a notional subsystem diagnostic module. A neural net or fuzzy model
is used to generate an estimate of expected subsystem behavior, and this estimate is
compared to actual subsystem outputs. Additional models are used to determine the
degree of health of a particular aspect of a subsystem.

The Boeing researchers used both neural nets and fuzzy logic models in the development
of this integrating system level element. The neural nets were trained using test cases
while the fuzzy logic portion was developed manually (fuzzy logic model development
using test cases is still in progress according to the paper).
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Test results indicated neural networks provided greater resolution than the fuzzy
comparison and detection models, but did not adequately incorporate adjustments based
on expert human knowledge, which affected the accuracy of the results. Consequently,
the neural networks were used for functional modeling and to map fault patterns to a
system health indication. Fuzzy logic models were used in determining event correlation
and to develop system health monitoring models which could be adjusted based on expert
judgment and intervention. The authors claim this system is a viable architecture;
however, no actual test results were provided to support this claim.

Widyantoro, et al [96] present an approach using RBF neural networks to detect the
presence of air leaks in an engine. Air leaks in a turbine engine occur when a hole
appears in a recuperator passage. This is a place where compressed fresh air is preheated by exhaust gases before entering the combustion chamber. Potentially, these leaks
can result in a long starting procedure, low power, and other problems [93]. The authors
[96] began by matching the effects of the problem with the appropriate values from the
detection sensors. Three types of engines were selected for diagnosis: engines with no air
leaks (normal), engines with small air leaks, and engines with large air leaks. There were
32 sensor readings available from the diagnostic instrument for each engine. The most
effective discriminator signals were identified across the 3 engine types. Signals with
patterns that were very similar between the engine types, or that were very irregular
between the engine types, were not used. Only four signal patterns made the final cut, as
shown below in Figure 2-22.
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Figure 2-22. Graphs of the 4 signals vs time for the 3 engine conditions [96]

Figure 2-22 shows each of the 4 signals considered the best discriminators between
healthy and faulty engines. The graph plots show signal strength versus time. The
following paragraphs describe each signal type in detail.

The ignition exciter signals indicate that power has been applied to the ignition exciter to
ignite the gas-fuel mixture in a combustion chamber. The power is turned off when the
mixture is successfully ignited. A faulty engine (always) takes a longer time to start up
than a healthy engine.

The second indicator signal is the speed of the high-pressure compressor of the engine.
Among other things, this signal is used for fuel scheduling, and is continuously
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monitored during startup. The graph shows that the presence of an engine crack reduces
the acceleration of the compressor, and consequently it takes a longer time for the
compressor to reach the operational point.

The power turbine speed signal is used to infer (indirectly) the presence of engine
thermodynamic inefficiency. In a normal engine, the energy from combusted gases
quickly increases the power turbine speed. This acceleration is reduced when an engine
crack exists.

The fourth signal is the inlet temperature of the power turbine. According to the authors,
it is commonly known that an increased inlet temperature is an indicator of an unhealthy
engine, but the reason for this relationship is unclear. The graph shows a delay in the rise
in signal strength for an engine with a large air leak, and then a somewhat stronger
temperature signal at the end of the time the signals were recorded.

The neural network was trained using a template (generic representative) of each kind of
signal for each kind of engine (12 templates in all). The following diagrams show the
neural network structure:
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Figure 2-25. Top 2 layers of neural network architecture [96]

Figures 2-23 through 2-25 show the neural network architecture used in this study.
Figure 2-23 shows the input scheme. The input consists of the normalized form of the
signals reading. The number of input units is s × m, where s is the number of sampled
signals and m is the number of discriminator signals. In this example, s = 80 and m = 4.

The activation function in each hidden unit is a Gaussian:
φi,j = exp(-ΡIi - µi,jΡ2/σ2)

(2-3)

where Ii is a vector of time series signals from receptive field i, and µi,j is the average
prototype vector of signal type i that is known to have problem category j. (There are i =
4 receptive fields, shown in Figure 2-23. There are j = 3 problem categories,
corresponding to engines with none, small, and large air leaks.)
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Figure 2-24 shows how the input data feeds forward to produce a prediction of being
from one of the three types of engines. This prediction is based on the linear combination
of the hidden units’ activation values, given by:
Ok =

∑w

ijk

φij

(2-4)

i, j

where wi,j,k is the connection weight between hidden units i,j and output unit k. The
purpose of this layer is to perform approximation of the input signals to the prototype
vectors. Since there is only one training signal for each signal type, setting wi,j,k = 1/m
for j = k and wi,j,k = 0 for j ≠ k, the training data can be perfectly predicted. However, this
may cause problems for the neural net when the input data are different from the training
signals. To avoid this difficulty, the authors generated six additional data points from the
original twelve data points, and used an iterative training procedure that changes the
weights to minimize the difference between the target outputs and the network outputs.
How this training procedure changed the weights was unspecified.

The network was tested using 8 signals generated by interpolation from the original
training data, ensuring that none of the training values were replicated in this test set.
The authors computed a target value for each test signal, although how this was done is
not explained in the paper. Using the rule that the largest predicted probability indicates
the problem, the neural network correctly identified all 8 problems, as shown in the
following table:
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Table 2-2. Table showing expected and actual experimental results [96]
Signal Number
Output
Target Value
Prediction
Normal
0.1250
0.2666
1
Small
0.8750
0.9085
Large
0.0000
0.1123
Normal
0.0000
0.0330
2
Small
0.1250
0.1099
Large
0.8750
0.8646
Normal
0.8750
0.8455
3
Small
0.1250
0.3515
Large
0.0000
0.0686
Normal
0.6250
0.5605
4
Small
0.3750
0.4828
Large
0.0000
0.0823
Normal
0.3750
0.3907
5
Small
0.6250
0.6519
Large
0.0000
0.0970
Normal
0.0000
0.1854
6
Small
0.8750
0.7431
Large
0.1250
0.1520
Normal
0.0000
0.1091
7
Small
0.6250
0.4048
Large
0.3750
0.2615
Normal
0.0000
0.0584
8
Small
0.3750
0.1977
Large
0.6250
0.5023

Table 2-2 shows the results from the experiment, indicating the neural net performed
correctly in each test case.

NASA scientists are also working on using models to interpret sensor data, though with a
slightly different emphasis [4]. Their goal is to reproduce sensor readings that are
missed, either by the recording unit, or because of a sensor malfunction. The objective of
their High Reliability Engine Control (HERC) program is to develop and demonstrate
advanced Fault Detection, Identification, and Accommodation (FDIA) algorithms that
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will ultimately increase aircraft safety and improve engine reliability. The focus is
validation of the sensors which report fault conditions. Validation, here means ensuring
appropriate operation of the sensors which are monitoring the machine components, not
the actual machine component itself. The authors contend that a complex dynamic
system usually uses redundant sensors for measuring critical variables within the machine
system. This is done to ensure reliable operation and to improve measurement accuracy.
Since some of these measurements can be very critical to judging the health of the
system, a redundant sensor set is implemented to ensure the measurement goal is met.
This redundant sensor set makes it possible to validate measured data, to identify a sensor
failure, and to recover the failed measurement. The authors claim this redundancy can
also be met through the implementation of an auto-associative neural network.

The diagram in figure 2-26 shows the test schematic they used to develop and test their
neural net, which is shown in figure 2-28:
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Figure 2-26. Test schematic [4]

The diagram in figure 2-27 shows the measurements taken based on the model shown in
Figure 2-26.
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Figure 2-27. Data collection schematic [4]

The data from these sensors were input into the neural network, providing the
aforementioned sensor redundancy without the implementation of an additional set of
sensors.

The neural network (Figure 2-28) was a feed-forward network architecture with outputs
that reproduce the network inputs.
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Figure 2-28. Feed-forward neural network design [4]
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The diagram in Figure 2-29 depicts the purpose of each network component in more
detail:

Bottle-neck

Mapping
layer

De-mapping
layer

Figure 2-29. Purpose of each neural network layer [4]

As shown above, the left half is the mapping layer and the right half is the de-mapping
layer. The bottle-neck layer captures the reduced order (principal components)
representation of the data. In the mapping layer, the redundant sensor information is
compressed, mixed and reorganized in the first part of the network. In the compression
process, the sensor information is encoded into a significantly smaller representation.
The compressed information is then used to regenerate the original redundant data at the
output. Because of the information mixture, if a sensor fails, other redundant sensor data
can still provide enough information to regenerate a good estimate for the faulty
measurement. Because of its parallel-processing capability, the neural network can
process real-time data for time-critical applications. Also, because it learns by example,
the neural network does not require a detailed system model for sensor validation as is
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often required. The neural network is then trained to learn the relationships between the
inputs (sensors) such that if one sensor is bad, an estimate for that sensor can be found
from the remaining valid sensors. The authors present a simple example of three
temperature sensors. If the bottle-neck layer is a single node, then the mapping layer
performs a weighted average of these measurements. Faulty information in one sensor is
thus reduced by a third in the aggregation of all the sensor measurements, resulting in a
measurement closer to the actual value.

The preceding example translates into the following general algorithm for a generic data
collection scheme. During system operation, if a sensor signal is significantly different
from the corresponding estimated value, the sensor signal is considered incorrect and a
failed sensor is identified. The failed sensor reading is isolated (eliminated from
consideration) by feeding the neural network its previous estimated value. The isolation
of a failed sensor enables the neural network to detect subsequent sensor failures, since
only properly working sensors are now considered for future measurements.

The automotive industry has attempted to apply sophisticated modeling techniques to
diagnostics issues, because of the growing complexity of electronic control systems in
today’s vehicles [55]. Traditional diagnostic methods are less capable of correct
diagnosis in complex systems due to the large volume of information exchanged between
the vehicle’s processor and the system under CPU control. Marko, et al [55], designed a
data acquisition system for this high volume of information and used neural nets to
analyze it since automobile trouble shooting is essentially a classification problem. The
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data consists of inputs and outputs of the vehicle’s electronic control system, known as
the electronic engine control computer (EECC). This data is a mixture of high speed
analog and digital signals which regulate the operation of the engine according to a
proprietary strategy. (Exactly what these signals were was not specified.) This strategy
optimizes engine performance while adhering to federal emissions regulations. For [56],
engine performance data was collected for an engine initially in neutral, and then slowly
accelerated. “Certain computational algorithms” (again, unspecified) were performed to
give graphs similar to the one shown in Figure 2-30.
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Figure 2-30. Data from a vehicle with no faults [55]

Figure 2-30 shows the data obtained from a vehicle with no faults. Although not
explained in the paper, the interpretation of the elements of the top graph seems fairly
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self-explanatory, as each element is plotted against time. The bottom part of the graph is
less intuitive, but it seems that each square curve corresponds to one of the terms listed
just above the first square curve. Other than SPARK, the third curve down, what the
other curves are measuring is unclear.
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Figure 2-31. Data from a vehicle where spark plug number four is misfiring [55]

Figure 2-31 shows data from a vehicle where a spark plug is misfiring. In this curve, the
difference in the ARC and NACCEL curves from the previous figure are clearly seen.
No other differences are readily observable, even in the SPARK square curve. This is an
example of a problem whose distinguishing features are clearly contained in only 2 data
streams, and the features are a radical departure from fault free operation. Because of
these attributes, this problem is easy for the fault detection algorithm to detect.
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Traditional diagnosis methods require human expertise to formulate rules to guide the
service technician through an analysis of the above problem graph to an appropriate
conclusion. However, developing these rules is very time-consuming and requires expert
understanding of the system operation, failure modes, and how those modes appear in
graphs like the one above. The resulting diagnostic approach is still not satisfactory,
since the number of resulting rules is quite large, and anything less than a rigorous
analysis may result in a misdiagnosis. Furthermore, the number of vehicle-power train
combinations is quite large, and each combination undergoes relatively constant
modifications to improve performance and reliability. This situation motivates the
research into finding better, faster, more accurate diagnosis techniques.

To test their fault detection algorithm, Marko et al introduced 26 different faults into the
engine and observed the engine’s operating characteristics at a fast idle. These faults
included a plugged injector, broken manifold pressure sensor, and a shorted spark plug
(no comprehensive list was provided). Each fault data set had 52 elements corresponding
to the collected information (again, unspecified). 16 sets of data were collected for each
of the 26 different faults. An equal number of sets was collected for testing the neural
networks after training.

Marko et al [14] have found from previous experience (no work cited) that single
component failures are much easier to find than multiple failures. In [14], a single fault
mode is an unstated assumption, given the composition of the fault data training sets
(only one fault at a time). Additionally, it is easier to detect faults if the signature of the
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fault is contained in 2 or 3 of the 52 collected signals, rather than consisting of a number
of small anomalies spread out over a larger number of signals.

The results presented in [14] show 100% accuracy on classification of their validation set
after training the network. The network quickly trained to an accuracy rate of ~95%, but
it required a number of modifications to the neural net to achieve 100% accuracy. These
modifications included the use of continuous weight updating (not batch learning), and
reducing the number of hidden nodes to less than the number of input nodes. This final
accuracy result was matched by their best human performer, but at a far slower speed.
This approach was then adapted to run on a vehicle in real-time, with similar results.
Since the system is passively observing the signals passing between the EECC and the
engine, this system may be ultimately capable of providing real-time diagnostics on any
vehicle.

Marko et al updated their work [55] with a paper addressing the issue of which classifier
to use, based on accuracy and expected degree of generalization [54]. In this paper,
generalization is defined as a network which correctly classifies an input pattern that was
not among the input patterns it was trained on. The neural network is assumed to have
been trained on each problem category that may arise in the course of operation of an
automobile engine. Of course, the input patterns themselves do not necessarily
completely span the space of actual data. Hence, the network must have some capability
to generalize by extrapolation—identify vectors near but not within regions occupied by
the training patterns.
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The data set for analysis remains the same as before—the data stream between the EECC
and the engine. The authors chose a specific portion of the data, the portion that the
EECC observes when the engine is in operation. 144 patterns were collected, containing
7 kinds of faults. For this data, unlike their previous data set, expert technicians could
neither specify an algorithm for classification nor separate the data using graphical
visualization.

A variety of different classifiers were tested on this data, including multi-layer feedforward networks, nearest neighbor classifiers, and binary trees. A binary tree is
generally applied to a two-class separation problem. All the data is gathered at the base
of the tree (the root node). The data are divided into different groups termed branches,
two branches at a time. If all the data along a branch belong to the same class, no further
separation is possible. Otherwise, an additional node may be formed, leading to
additional separation. A branch may also be terminated if it is judged that further
separation is likely to lead to poor generalization. A node that separates into two
branches is a terminal node. This process is carried out until all branches terminate. In
this instance, the authors used the Fisher linear discriminant to separate the data. They
then chose a particular class to separate from the rest of the data. Once that class was
separated, another class was chosen for separation. The classes were chosen “shrewdly”,
so it only took a few branches before a chosen class was completely separated.

A binary tree classifier is considered similar to a feed-forward network. However, the
binary tree approach uses far fewer weights, and correspondingly, generates decision
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boundaries that are simpler than a feed-forward network. Training and execution of
binary tree classifiers tend to be much faster than that of back-propagation and wellsuited for time-critical applications.

Their results for this data showed multi-layer feed forward neural networks to be
generally equal in classification power to the binary tree method (~90%). The nearest
neighbor classifier only had an accuracy rate of 80%. In their conclusions, however, the
authors declined to select a best classification method, stating rather that substantially
more data is required before conclusions regarding the best classifier are possible.

Besides commercial industry, branches of the armed forces have also been developing
prognostic based tools [37], [43], [50], [82], [83]. The following section reviews some of
these efforts.

Smith, et al [82], [83] discuss the inclusion of a PHM system on-board a Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) aircraft. The JSF program has four pillars; lethality, survivability,
supportability and affordability. Smith et al contend a PHM system is one of the keys to
meeting two of these pillars; providing a supportable and affordable aircraft. As the
performance of the fighter begins to degrade, the on-board PHM system is expected to
sense these changes and inform the aircraft maintainers of an impending system failure.
This system will also inform the maintainers of the actions required to prepare the fighter
for its next sortie. The objective is to keep the sortie generation rate high through the use
of support systems which allow a proactive response to the needs of the aircraft. This
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capability should replace the current brute force approach to maintenance with a more
affordable and reliable approach.

These objectives will be accomplished through a Joint Distributed Information System
[82]. According to Smith et al, this concept is at the heart of the JSF information system.
As well as providing internal aircraft data to the maintainers for their proactive action, it
is also intended to provide multi-organizational information system operability. This
capability will allow for more efficient planning of maintenance actions based on the
availability of spare parts, a historical overview of failures allowing for more fighterspecific maintenance actions, and better sortie planning based on the knowledge of when
fighters will return from maintenance to operational readiness. This architecture is
expected to supply the right information to the right people at the right time.

In a related work [83], Smith, et al discuss the development of a Advanced Strike
Integrated Diagnostics (ASID) project to develop a program for a “fully integrated
systems solution to diagnostics”. This program was intended to develop an integrated
diagnostic architecture leading to an affordable JSF platform, and to evaluate and
recommend integrated diagnostic design tools and techniques. In this context, the term
“architecture” means the structure of components, their interrelationships, and the
principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution over time. The intent is
for this architecture to span the entire life cycle of the diagnostic/PHM system.
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The ASID program led to an Integrated Diagnostics (ID) Concept Plan which identified
the ten best technology maturation programs. These programs were identified as crucial
to the success of an integrated diagnostics/prognostics system. They include developing
a structural health monitoring system and a engine monitoring system for prognostics
health management. Other programs include developing an information delivery system,
creating a virtual test bench (for testing new concepts), and maximizing the use of
commercial software in the PHM system. Once completed, these technologies are
expected to provide superior weapon system supportability.

Schaefer and Haas [75] present a summary of efforts to include Health and Usage
Monitoring Systems (HUMS) on the Army and Navy helicopter fleets. The goal of this
endeavor is to reduce operational and support costs by transitioning from a time-based
maintenance philosophy to a condition-based maintenance philosophy that relies on
prognostic techniques to assess the health of aircraft components. Schaefer and Haas
present a high fidelity simulation model to analyze the effect of HUMS technology on the
existing maintenance process and to provide a means to optimize its use.

Their simulation model represents flight-line level maintenance in a discrete-event
simulation. The model includes mission generation modules, a module to simulate inflight failures, a number of maintenance modules, and a cost module for tracking the
amount of resources required for the maintenance activities. The focus of this flight-line
maintenance model is to examine how different maintenance policy philosophies impact
operational readiness.
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Although the Schaefer and Haas indicate their work is not fully complete, their initial
simulation results show that specifying a certain range of performance for a helicopter
system, and scheduling maintenance when that system is no longer performing in that
range, can minimize maintenance costs. Additionally, their model shows that there is a
limit to the utility of advanced diagnostics for certain helicopter components which affect
other components. For example, it may be possible to specify helicopter operation
procedures to produce low vibration levels to defer the maintenance action of balancing
the main helicopter rotor, but the requirement for low vibration levels will affect the
operational capability of the helicopter. In this case, specifying a particular performance
range for minimization of maintenance activity is counter-productive.

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has been developing a distributed shipboard system
for diagnostics and prognostics on systems with rotating equipment [37]. Their system,
termed a Machinery Prognostics/Diagnostics System (MPROS), is composed of two
parts. The first is a data collection system, which collects data from vibration,
temperature, pressure, electric current, and other (unspecified) sensors. The collection
system also includes local intelligent signal processing devices called Data Concentrators
(DC). The second part is a centrally located subsystem called the “Prognostics,
Diagnostics, Monitoring Engine” [sic], or PDME. This system combines the results from
the DCs to provide the best possible diagnosis.
The specific shipboard application is centrifugal chillers (air-conditioning systems).
These systems combine several rotating machinery equipment types to form a complex
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system with many different parameters available for monitoring. The parameters that are
chosen for monitoring are combined along with diagnostic and prognostic algorithms into
the MPROS. Since the MPROS can diagnose each component part of this system, as
well as the whole system, it should be readily extendable to monitor any pump, motor, or
compressor in the naval fleet. Additionally, there are a large number of facilities, both
military and industrial, that use centrifugal chiller-based air-conditioning systems.
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Figure 2-32. MPROS system [37]
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IME-NLC

In Figure 2-32, the sensors connected to the machinery are shown at the lower left. The
sensors for a particular system capture the failure characteristics of a specific failure
mode. There are two basic kinds of sensor data. The first kind includes low-bandwidth
measurements, such as those from process variables, temperature, pressure, etc. Failure
modes associated with this category usually develop slowly and consequently, data can
be sampled at low rates without losing the pattern of a particular trend. The authors
believe this kind of failure is best detected with a fuzzy-based rule set as an expert
system. The second kind includes high-bandwidth measurements, such as vibrations and
electrical current data. This type of data requires a much higher sampling rate in order to
capture enough information to appropriately categorize the failure signature. These kinds
of faults are best detected with a feature extractor/neural net classifier. The ONR used
this second approach for this particular problem.

This data feeds into the left hand box , the DC (Data Concentrator), whose components
are shown. Of most interest is the Database and the four data processing algorithms. The
database stores information configuration, machinery configuration, test schedules, test
measurements, diagnostic results, and condition reports. The DLI expert system
(PredictDLI is a company with a Navy contract to develop these kinds of algorithms) is a
vibration expert system adapted to run in a continuous mode. It detects departures from
steady-state norms. The SBFR (State Based Feature Recognition) algorithm facilitates
recognition of time-correlated events in multiple data streams. The wavelet neural
network also analyzes vibration data, but it focuses on drawing inferences from transitory
phenomena rather than steady-state data. The fuzzy logic algorithm draws diagnostic and
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prognostic conclusions from non-vibrational data. Since these algorithms overlap in
some areas, there is the potential for conflicting diagnoses (as well as reinforcing ones).
The authors use Knowledge Fusion (KF) to combine the conclusions from the algorithms.
The authors consider KF to be the coordination of reports from a number of sources, as
opposed to the correlation of single platform data (similar to the function of the DC).

The PDME (Prognostics, Diagnostics, Monitoring Engine) contains the KF component,
as well as resident algorithms for performing PDME functions and a couple other
features. The DCOM and user interfaces interact with the DC DCOM element and the
user, as one might expect (DCOM stands for Distributed Component Object Model, a
communications standard developed by Microsoft). The OO Ship Model, or Object
Oriented Ship Model, represents parts of the ship, such as the compressor, chiller, deck,
machinery space, etc. It models the physical, mechanical, and energy characteristics of
the machinery being monitored. It also stores diagnostic conclusions from the four
algorithms and the KF component.

The system has been tested successfully in the laboratory, and the authors are preparing
to install it on a hospital ship in San Diego [37].

The Army is also developing prognostic tools [43]. Their main emphasis is the M1A1
Abrams tank, and the diagnosis of fuel flow problems in the tank’s gas turbine engine.
The system collects data available in the turbine engine startup sequence to diagnose
three types of faults in the main metering fuel valve: bouncing valve, sticking valve (later
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referred to as fuel flow error), or stuck valve. These faults prevent fuel from being
delivered to the tank’s engine in accordance with a fuel flow algorithm, which sets fuel
flow based on a number of different criteria, including the current demand on the engine,
available air from the intake, etc.

Fuel flow faults can be detected in the signals from the Electronic Control Unit’s (ECU)
diagnostic connector. The ECU is an analog computer whose fuel flow algorithm is
dependent upon throttle position, ambient air and turbine inlet temperatures, and
compressor and turbine speeds. These voltage signals reflect the status of the ElectroMechanical Fuel System (EMFS), which responds to ECU commands. The EMFS is a
fuel metering device that delivers fuel to the engine under the management of the ECU.
Each of the variables previously mentioned (throttle position, ambient air and turbine
inlet temperatures, and compressor and turbine speeds) has a representative voltage signal
available for collection and consequent analysis.

The initial data sets were obtained by starting the tank engine and recording the
appropriate sensor data. Most of these data sets were fault-free, since the fuel flow
problem apparently rarely occurs upon startup. Because accurately training a neural net
on a particular problem requires a number of cases exhibiting the actual phenomena
associated with the problem, the authors [43] seeded faults into the startup procedure.
Additionally, they “translated” some data sets from fault-free starts to faulty starts
(methodology unspecified).
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Figures 2-33 through 2-36 show some of data that was collected. It is relatively easy to
discern based on the collected and processed signatures what kind of fault is present. The
curves include 3 different sensor streams, although the sensor streams are not
individually identified. It is likely that they are graphs of the variables previously
mentioned (throttle position, ambient air and turbine inlet temperatures, and compressor
and turbine speeds).

The neural net tool used for the fuel valve diagnostic was the NeuroWindows Artificial
Neural Network (ANN) simulator software. Visual Basic was employed as a
user/computer interface development tool. Using the data sets as described above, they
trained the neural network to distinguish between the three fault conditions. However,
simply using the sensor values as the one input to a simple feedforward ANN does not
capture all the information available in the time domain. To capture time dependent
information, the input to the ANN included first derivatives of sensor values and first
derivatives of differences between pairs of sensor values. How these first derivatives
were calculated is not mentioned in the paper.
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Based on the analysis by the ANN system, TEDANN (Turbine Engine Diagnostics
Artificial Neural Network) determines which fuel flow voltage readings are out of
tolerance with normal operational parameters. Upon this determination, TEDANN will
display either a fault status message identifying the EMFS faults or a message stating that
the EMFS is fully operational.

Table 2-3. TEDANN’s diagnostic performance (severity) [43]
Diagnosis (across)/
Actual Conditions
(below)
Bouncing valve
Stuck valve
Fuel flow error
No fault

Bouncing valve

Stuck valve

Fuel flow error

1.00
0.00
0.00
0.03

0.00
0.98
0.00
0.02

0.00
0.00
1.00
0.08

Table 2-3 results indicate TEDANN does remarkably well in diagnosing the individual
faults. The entries in Table 2-3 are the neural network’s assessment of how severe the
fault is, using the following scale:

0.00-0.25 - no fault (normal)
0.26-0.75 - warning (fault)
0.76-1.00 - critical (fault)

The entries in each cell are an average over several data sets (variation is not specified).
The table does show a completely accurate diagnosis based on the severity scales—all
actual fault conditions would be detected and correctly diagnosed, and all actual non-fault
conditions would be diagnosed as such, since the resulting severity figures are less than
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the 0.25 threshold. The authors are continuing to refine their study, and hope to extend it
to other tank components and Army systems.

Logan [50] describes a prognostics system currently in use. This system is assisting the
Navy reduce both manning and maintenance costs. To that end, the Navy is
implementing ship designs which support minimum crew sizes and minimum
maintenance requirements, while maintaining mission readiness goals [50]. A major
component of this strategy is the development and implementation of predictive
maintenance (prognostic) systems. These systems can be exploited for monitoring,
control, and condition assessment of critical shipboard systems. Artificial intelligence
methods will provide the necessary assessment capabilities. These capabilities include
the abilities to:
•

Be initially deployed using existing experiential and empirical knowledge;

•

Function properly with missing, noisy, or corrupted measurement data;

•

Compute and assess uncertainty measures following valid statistical techniques;

•

Infer measurements that are either too costly or too difficult to acquire.

Logan et al [50] believe artificial neural networks are particularly well-suited to
diagnostic applications. They contend that neural nets can classify novel input patterns
not included in training data, and that neural nets are tolerant of noisy or incomplete input
patterns. In addition, system state recognition is usually performed in real time. Of
course, the critical aspect of deploying neural networks is access to training data that
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adequately represents the input/output state space the network is likely to encounter in the
specific application.

There are problems with accumulating neural network training data. Since good
maintenance practices tend to prevent failures from occurring, actual failure data is
extremely scarce and very expensive to collect and/or create. The fault coverage of
actual failure data is typically very narrow and it may require many years of data
collection to obtain an adequate data set for neural network training. Unless the data is
collected under controlled or known conditions, historical failure data may be incomplete
or include unreliable measurement values. Additionally, the data will be insufficient to
provide coverage for all possible machinery faults which might occur. If this data used
for training the neural network, the network’s fault classification performance may be
adversely affected. Also, typical monitoring systems do not store data at adequate
sampling rates to ensure that sufficient data are recorded to accurately classify the failure
event, as well as events leading to the actual failure.

Logan et al [50] recommend an alternative, hybrid approach. The engineering
knowledge of domain experts can be used to construct a diagnostic knowledge base
suitable for neural network training. This can be accomplished by conducting a
comprehensive Failure Mode And Effects Analysis (FMEA) on the appropriate
mechanical system. A FMEA provides a comprehensive listing of probable failure
modes of all “major” mechanical system components, where “major” is defined as the
level of detail appropriate for that particular system. This information is obtained from
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interviews with engineering crews and maintenance personnel. It also includes
information on all available sensor measurements, and identifies the fault/symptom
relationships required for an effective monitoring program.

The neural network of choice for this application is a probabilistic neural network (PNN).
It has a number of favorable characteristics [96], [2]. PNN training is effectively
instantaneous, as opposed to the slow error convergence training of other neural network
techniques. Besides the reduced effort for system commissioning, instantaneous training
is extremely attractive for allowing training data set modifications and PNN retraining in
the field by end-users. The PNN outputs the fault classification probabilities, meaning it
is easy for the end user to interpret the result. PNNs have strong generalization
capabilities (as do other neural networks) which can handle situations in which one or
more input variables are missing or are corrupted. This makes the method attractive for
real-world applications where sensor failures occur on a regular basis, such as in a
shipboard environment. Also, PNNs can be initially deployed using existing experiential
and empirical knowledge and can be readily updated as new knowledge is acquired.

A PNN is designed to estimate the class conditional probability density functions
according to the following equation:

fA(X) =

1
(2π ) p / 2 σ

p

 ( X − X Ai )T ( X − X Ai ) 
1 m
exp

∑ −
m i =1
2σ 2



(

i = pattern number
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)

(2-5)

m = total number of training patterns (1/m is a normalizing constant)
XAi = ith training pattern from category A
σ = “smoothing parameter”
p = dimensionality of measurement space

Equation 2-5 defines the PDF for each fault as the sum of several multivariate Gaussian
distributions centered at each training sample for a given class. In a typical problem, the
PNN is trained using the results of the FMEA for the subject mechanical system. This
effort typically results in a fault/symptom matrix in which only a single training vector is
developed for each fault. In the case of only a single training pattern per class (i.e. m=1),
the above equation simplifies to:

fA(X) =

 ( X − X A )T ( X − X A ) 
exp −

(2π ) p / 2 σ p
2σ 2


1

(

)

(2-6)

Conceptually, Equation 2-6 compares the input symptom vector to the training symptom
vector for the fault class. The closer the match between the two, the larger the probability
of that fault classification. Note that the fault probability can still be obtained even if one
or more components of the input symptom vector X are unavailable or mismatched. In
these cases, the resulting fault probabilities may be lower, but the method will still return
a result.

Equation 2-6 is implemented in the pattern units of the PNN, as depicted in Figure 2-37.
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Figure 2-37. Network topology [50]

The network topology in Figure 2-37 differs from conventional neural nets in that the
summation and output units are not used here, since there is only a single training
example for each fault classification. The input units simply feed the input values to the
pattern units. Each input unit has a connection with every pattern unit, and there is one
pattern unit for each training pattern. The pattern units form the dot product of the input
pattern vector, X, with a weight vector, wi, which is the training vector in this case. The
dot product calculated in each pattern unit undergoes a nonlinear transformation in the
PNN using an activation function similar to the form of the Gaussian PDF given in
Equation 2-6.
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The input vector X is comprised of the symptom pattern representing either current alarm
conditions or predicted alarm conditions, depending on whether the system is performing
a diagnostic or prognostic application. Quantitative alarm condition data are collapsed
into categories. For this work, they are represented by a three-way classification as
HIGH, LOW, or NORMAL states numerically encoded into the input vector. These
classifications are performed by simple thresholding, as is done in most existing alarm
monitoring systems.

Network training is accomplished by setting the weight vector of each pattern unit equal
to the values of one of the training vectors. In this way, each training vector uniquely
defines the weights of one pattern unit.

The only parameter adjusted in the PNN is the “smoothing” parameter σ, which is related
to the variance of the underlying PDF. This parameter effectively controls the ability of
the PNN to generalize when the input vectors do not exactly match the training vectors.
Small values of σ result in poor generalization, causing the PDF to have distinct modes
corresponding to the training sample positions in input space [86]. Larger values of σ
produce greater degrees of generalization, with the PNN interpolating between training
sample points. In this case, input vectors close to the training samples produce
probability values close to that of the training points.
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Logan et al [50] use this network for prognostic applications by performing a statistical
regression analysis of each mechanical system parameter used in the network. The data
points xi from the sensor are used to create a regression equation (usually linear):
y = β0 +

∑β x
i

i

(2-7)

i

where the βs represent the appropriate coefficients. Both raw measurements and timebased deviations from baseline conditions are analyzed over a pre-defined time interval.
The length of this interval is determined by how much future warning is required for an
actual alarm condition. The coefficients of trend equations are calculated from historical
data within the pre-defined time interval and then tested at a 99% confidence level for
statistical significance. If the coefficients are statistically significant, the trend equation
is considered valid. Valid trend equations are then used for alarm prediction.

Each valid trend detected by the system is used to predict future alarm conditions within
the mechanical system. The parameter associated with the trend is extrapolated out into
the future using the estimated trend equation. If the predicted parameter value exceeds an
alarm threshold within the pre-defined time interval, then the system inputs this alarm to
the PNN-based inference engine. The PNN then uses its pattern recognition capabilities
to predict plant fault conditions most closely associated with predicted alarms. The same
PNN is used for both diagnostics and prognostics.
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Figure 2-38. Example of a predicted bearing temperature alarm [50]

Figure 2-38 shows an example alarm prediction based on input data which were recorded
for about a month. A trend is identified and modeled using linear regression. The
regression line is projected out until an alarm threshold is encountered. If the trend
continues over time, the bearing temperature will reach its HIGH threshold in
approximately 15 days. A similar alarm prediction function is performed for all
parameters having detected trends. For a prognostic application, the predicted HIGH
bearing temperature alarm, along with other predicted alarms occurring in the same time
frame, would be fed into the same diagnostic neural network to determine what system
may be experiencing degraded performance.
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Federici, et al [31] use a simulation model to determine problems in an electrical circuit.
Their fault simulation process consists of simulating a circuit in the presence of faults,
and comparing the results of fault simulation with the fault-free simulation of the same
circuit with the same input test pattern. They propose the definition of a Behavioral Fault
Simulation (BFS) technique which could be applied to VHDL (Very High Speed
Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) Hardware Description Language) behavioral descriptions.

For clarity, VHDL is a large high-level VLSI design language with Ada-like syntax, and
is the DoD standard for hardware description, now standardized as IEEE 1076. VLSI
stands for Very Large Scale Integration and refers to semiconductor integrated circuits
composed of hundreds of thousands of logic elements or memory cells [79].

The primary goal of the BFS as described in [31] is to determine the set of faults
(belonging to the fault model) to be detected by a test pattern. A test pattern is a
sequence of steps which are followed to test a circuit for faults. Different test patterns
detect different faults. Their procedure submits faults from a global list to their
simulator, in conjunction with the test pattern (shown as the test sequence). The aim of
the test pattern generation process is to define patterns to test physical defects. The
defects can be detected only if they induce an irregular behavior called a fault. The fault
effect or error is measured by a difference between the state of the fault-free model
(reference model) and the state of the faulty model (model in which a fault hypothesis is
injected).

2-80

VHDL
DESCRIPTION

INTERNAL
MODEL

TEST
SEQUENCE

FAULT FREE
SIMULATION

SIMULATION
WITH FAULT
LIST
PROPAGATION

LIST OF
DETECTED
FAULT

GLOBAL
FAULT
LIST

Figure 2-39. A schematic showing the experimental plan [31]

The experimental plan is shown in Figure 2-39. The test sequence process is the list of
steps a test pattern takes to determine if a particular set of faults exist within the system.
System defects can be detected only if they induce an irregular behavior, compared to
normal functioning (found in a reference model called fault free simulation), which is
then called a fault. The fault effect or error is measured by a difference between the state
of the fault-free model (reference model) and the state of the faulty model (model in
which a fault hypothesis is injected). All possible faults (from the global fault list) are
systematically injected into the systems, and the specific test pattern is run to see if that
particular fault is detected. The output is a list of faults the system actually detects.
Ultimately, this simulation process could be used to evaluate and compare Behavioral
Test Pattern Generation software via the different fault lists These lists would show the
different faults each kind of test pattern would detect. Currently, this kind of capability
does not exist [31].
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Rebulanan [68] describes another simulation model. The focus of the simulation was on
the PHM system, and the purpose was to assess an initial estimate of JSF supportability
through the use of this system. The analysis compared the availability of four JSF
aircraft with a PHM system with four JSF aircraft without a PHM system. The essential
difference was that the PHM JSF aircraft provided a predicted component failure time
before landing, while the aircraft without a PHM system did not. This reflects the
expected difference between the two kinds of aircraft. A PHM equipped aircraft should
provide fault reports before landing, providing additional lead time in the repair process.
A non-PHM equipped aircraft will have to land and be inspected by a mechanic (the
traditional/current diagnostic method) before any fault reports are available.

Relevant specifics of the simulation approach follow. The failure time of a particular
aircraft component was assumed to be known, based on the Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) measure associated with each component. The Mean Time To Repair (MTTR)
was used to generate repair times. In the simulation, each time was generated from an
associated probability distribution. The PHM system’s detection of the impending
component failure was assumed to be automatic and completely correct. The time the
PHM model detects component failure was set to be 95% of the components useful
lifespan. As an example, if a component’s lifespan was 1000 minutes, the PHM system
would automatically send a report at 950 minutes predicting this component’s failure at
1000 minutes. A time to repair was also randomly generated from multiple single
variable probability distributions based on multiple criteria. This criteria included the
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component to be repaired (measured as probable in-stock availability of the component),
transit time of the repair part to the flight line, and performing the actual repair.

As expected, the average availability of PHM-equipped aircraft is significantly higher
than the availability of non-PHM equipped aircraft. A somewhat unexpected result was
the higher variability in the availability rate of the PHM-equipped aircraft.
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Figure 2-40. Comparison of Availability Rates between PHM (ALS) equipped aircraft
and non-PHM (ALS) equipped aircraft [68]

Figure 2-40 shows that the availability rate varied between 89-91% for the PHM aircraft,
while the rate was a practically constant 84% for the non-PHM equipped aircraft.
Although Rebulanan [68] noted this variability existed for PHM aircraft, the variability
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was not explained. However, this observed variability is likely due to the variability
associated with the probability distribution used to determine the component failure time.
The variability associated with the component failure time translated into variability
associated with the prediction of the actual failure time on the PHM-equipped aircraft.
This variance in the timing of the fault report, and consequent maintenance lead time, led
to variance in overall aircraft availability. In contrast, the non-PHM equipped aircraft
had no variability associated with maintenance lead time, since the aircraft had to land
and be inspected before a fault report was generated. Based on Figure 2-40, it seems the
time for this ground inspection was constant, although this is not explicitly stated in the
paper.

Malley [53] followed Rebulanan’s work on simulating an ALS system with a detailed
computer model that simulated a PHM system. This PHM system model fit in the
context of the previously developed ALS system. His simulation modeled the operations
of one JSF wing and the activities of the corresponding support organizations for those
aircraft. It used a neural network to analyze notional prognostic sensor signals to
determine when an associated JSF system component (the engine, in his thesis) would
fail. The simulation of these prognostic signals incorporated sensitivity to component
wear-in, sensitivity to changing flight conditions, and a measure of variability as to when
the component would begin exhibiting signs of failure. These measures were varied to
produce different PHM signal sets. He found that averaging a number of these signals, or
“batching” them, produced robust measures that a neural net could use to predict the JSF
engine state with reasonable accuracy - about 82% of the time with his architecture.
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These predictions of impending failures came when the engine was about 95% of the way
through its expected life cycle, allowing enough time for the engine to be fixed before it
failed in flight.

2.5 Literature Review Summary and Conclusions
Most published research concerning a prognostics effort is either concerned with a single
component of a system (such as a rotor) or a single aspect of a system (such as startup
data). Very few papers actually address the issue of what a complete prognostics system
should contain. Most of those that do address these systems at a very high level. The
literature apparently contains only one example of a complete prognostics system,
Logan’s DEXTERTM system [50].

A fully developed prognostics system needs to be all-encompassing. It starts with the
layout of the sensors within the system. This first step requires knowledge of the
appropriate location for each sensor, the type (acoustic, electrical, etc.) of each sensor
that should be used at a given location, and the total number of sensors that should be
used (to avoid too little or too much information). Then, the data from these sensors
needs to be captured and processed. Afterwards, the processed data is fed to a intelligent
reasoner of some kind which interprets the data input and provides a system health
assessment. This assessment may include a confidence level. Then, this assessment is
reported to appropriate entities. These may include system operators, system mechanics,
and system operations planners.
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The prognostics reasoning capability is best described as the capability of a PHM system
to extrapolate from current data streams to predict when a certain portion of the system is
expected to fail. Of course, the biggest reason to monitor a system using PHM
technology is to detect an impending component failure in time to prevent a system
failure by replacing the affected component before it actually fails. Rather than repairing
or replacing a component after it has failed, it can be repaired or replaced when the
prognostics system indicates that probable time to failure (or probability of component
failure) is within some critical threshold. The question is what is required for this
impending component failure to be detected.

The nature of the prognostics reasoning problem is a difficult one. Experts in this field
identified reliable estimation of time-to-failure as one of the greatest challenges in
manufacturing and machine monitoring, and one of weakest areas in existing methods
[82]. Furthermore, these experts state that methods used to analyze the data from
mechanical system processes must be robust, i.e., methods which can tolerate significant
deviations from assumed or nominal signal characteristics. In general, the signal and
noise environment in these kinds of applications is highly complex, non-Gaussian, and
exhibits large variability and/or non-stationarity. The operating conditions may vary
dramatically between sensor locations. To ensure the user accepts these monitoring
methods, low false alarm rates are an absolute necessity. This places an additional
burden on the robustness of the methods. A successful prognostics system
implementation must address all these issues.
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The first requirement for a prognostics reasoning system is on-board sensors which
record the performance of aircraft systems. This requirement in and of itself is a
significant issue. The total number of sensors required for producing a prognostics
capability is an open question. If there are too few sensors, not enough data will be
collected for analysis and prognostic functions. If there are too many sensors, the
prognostic system may be overcome by so much variation from the sensor reports that it
fails to recognize any impending failures at all. The variation in the readings may also be
coming from failed sensors, as opposed to systems which are actually failing. The
recorded data may also exceed the capability of the system bus to report it, so data is lost
before it is ever recorded. However, with modern technology, this “data overflow” issue
is becoming less of a concern.

The next issue under this first requirement is which systems the sensors are attached to.
There are a tremendous number of systems present on a modern aircraft (somewhere in
the hundreds). Should all these systems be monitored, or just some of them? If only
some systems should be monitored, which ones should they be? And given those
systems, what kinds of measurements should be taken (acoustic, electrical, vibration,
etc.)? These questions need to be answered to determine the proper scope of the data for a
prognostics reasoning system.

Once the sensors are in place for aircraft data collection, the actual collected data will
require pre-processing before submission to the prognostic system. Raw sensor data is
typically very noisy, and key features describing the performance of the monitored
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system are not readily apparent. The concern here is which kinds of processing
techniques should be employed. By its very nature, data pre-processing modifies some of
the collected data (hopefully removing the noise) while enhancing the rest of the data (the
signal of interest). However, since many pre-processing techniques are well known and
their effects are understood, this is not as significant of an issue as are other issues.

The biggest issue for a prognostics reasoning system is the interpretation of the collected
and pre-processed data. In order to assess the health of an aircraft based on this
information, it must be compared to previously existing information which has been
classified as either representative of a healthy system, a degraded system, or a failing
system. In order for this comparison to be done, this “previously existing” data must be
collected from similar (if not exactly the same) systems that are operating in a known
state.

At this point, a few words are in order about the presumed nature of general mechanical
system faults. Most faults are believed to begin with small (but detectable) precursor
events and to stem from a progressive (not necessarily linear) degradation of the system
component. The degradation curve is usually assumed to follow some kind of
exponential relationship [82], although some naval applications show a linear trend [51].
Thus, the tracking of this degradation along with an ongoing prediction of the time-tofailure is of great importance to a prognostics system. Additionally, as previously stated
[60], the signal and noise environment in these kinds of applications is highly variable
and complex. Also, the signal characteristics from many types of degradations are non-
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monotonic. Consequently, an understanding of the overall trend, as well as continuous
monitoring to track the history of the developing fault, is essential [82]. Faults that are
neglected are those which develop rapidly without any forewarning (such as the effects of
combat). Clearly, no prognostics system can predict rapidly developing events which
occur completely within a time window that is considerably less than a single operational
cycle.

In order to make sense of this data, there must be a reasoning function in the PHM
system. This reasoning function is required to identify normal behavior and system faults
with high confidence. To accomplish this, there must be patterns present within the
reasoning function which represent functional and failed behavior. The reasoning
function for a PHM system is also expected to predict when component failure will
occur. This requires clear patterns of how system faults develop. How these patterns can
be captured is addressed below.

The patterns for a functional state are thought to be the easiest to collect. Once an expert
(probably human) has assessed the system as working correctly, the data from the system
are fed to the reasoning system, which encodes the data as representative of a functional
state. Should there be more than one functional state, conditions in which these
functional states exist can also be replicated and encoded within the reasoner. As the
system operates, comparisons between this part of the prognostic reasoner and the system
data should clearly indicate whether the system is in a functional state or not. This is one
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way a PHM system can provide an instantaneous (simple yes/no) assessment of system
health.

The collection of failure patterns is a somewhat more difficult problem. When systems
are in a failure state, by definition they are not operating. This may prevent the collection
of certain kinds of system data. To overcome this, outside expertise is required to
supplement the data patterns recorded when a system is in a failure state. Additionally, it
is difficult to record every conceivable failure state a priori. The prognostic reasoner
must be able to accept new failure states as they appear during the operation of the
system. Using this data, the reasoner can provide instantaneous estimates of system
failure by comparing it to known functional and failed states, if the failure status is not
readily observable.

Collecting patterns of how system faults develop is difficult, but essential in order for a
PHM system to accurately predict when a failure will occur. For this predictive
capability to be developed, there must be a well-defined path (henceforth called a “failure
path”) from current operational conditions to the many fault conditions, and all variations
along these failure paths must be understandable and detectable. Collecting the data to
meet this requirement is the most difficult technical challenge of these three. Mechanical
systems undergo preventive maintenance to avoid failures, which interrupt the collection
of data along fault paths. Actually operating a functional system to observe the failure
path of a single component can result in ruining the entire system. Re-running the same
experiment to note any variations in the failure path of the same component will double
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the costs. And, as previously discussed, the data along these paths is highly complex,
non-Gaussian, and exhibits large variability and/or non-stationarity.

To overcome these problems and collect the required data, most failure paths are mapped
based on performance of an individual component on a test bench. There are two
potential problems with this approach. The first potential problem here is that the
individual component is being assessed independently of the overall system; interactions
are not captured. And secondly, most components are very durable, and take a very long
time to fail when subject to normal operational stresses. To save experimental time and
cost, components are overloaded with operational stresses that are multiples of the
normal values. The resulting failure path may not represent what really happens to the
component for this specific type of failure. It also may mask other failures that would
normally occur before the specific type of failure under consideration.

Another way to obtain failure information from system data is to use the known failure
points of the system components, and not use any computed failure path patterns at all.
These failure points may consist either of the time which a particular component is
expected to last, or component readings at failure.

If only the time that a particular system component is expected to last is being used to
compute a possible failure point, then the system simply keeps track of the amount of
operational time a component has been in use. This is compared to the distribution of
failure times for this component. When an appropriate threshold is reached, the system
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indicates it is time to replace the component. This threshold may be expressed as the
point at which a certain percentage of the components have failed, or how long it will be
until failure is virtually certain. The potential problem here is that all the aircraft
components are usually manufactured at the same time. The initial failure time
distribution becomes less and less representative of the actual population as these
components age. In the process of maintenance, some components are refurbished with
new units, so averaging their performance together with the unrefurbished units leads to a
distribution that is not really representative of either population. However, the Air Force
is tracking some of its electronic components by barcode. There could be two failure
distributions; one for refurbished units, and one for the others. Although this does require
a lot of bookkeeping, tracking the different maintenance actions by electronic unit has
been shown to be feasible.

If the component readings at failure are being used, trend analysis is applied to the data
being collected from these system components. If the PHM system detects a “definite”
trend towards a failure point, this would be reported as negative system health. A
projection along this “definite” trend will give an assessment of how long it will be
before the component fails. The advantage of this approach is that failure path generation
is not required. Disadvantages include the need to know precisely what a component’s
failure point is. Projecting the “definite” trend is also a disadvantage since it requires
extrapolation beyond the original data set. As an example, what may have been
originally thought to be a linear trend may turn into an exponential trend, leading to
failure much sooner than anticipated. The reverse situation also leads to problems, as
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maintenance action is scheduled sooner than required, leading to the replacement of a
component with remaining usable life.

Assuming that patterns for the functional state, the failure paths, and the failure states all
exist within the prognostic reasoning system, assessments can be made of instantaneous
system health and time to component failure. As previously mentioned, comparisons
between the system data and the functional patterns present within the prognostic
reasoner can give a simple yes/no indication of system health. Another way is to
compare current system readings, or operational time deployed, with known failure
points for these systems. This information can provide a simple yes/no assessment of
system health as well, if the proximity of the sensor reading is “close” to the known
failure reading. (The same holds true for comparing time deployed to the time-to-failure
distribution.) This information can also provide a probability assessment of impending
failure. The third way is to compare trends (or current values) in the system data with the
previously defined failure paths. The data of any component that doesn’t indicate normal
operation can be mapped to the failure path. This provides an instantaneous (negative)
health assessment. It also provides an estimate of time remaining to failure, based on the
distance remaining on the failure path. Of course, this assumes the failure path and/or
fault condition is known for the specific event. If not, the PHM system will only be able
to provide a (negative) assessment of system health (what the PHM system is seeing
doesn’t match the data for normal operation).
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III. Data Fusion Methods

3.1 Background
Multi-sensor data fusion is a field that has experienced rapid growth comparatively
recently. The problem of merging similar (or disparate) information from multiple
sources has grown in importance as the number of information sources available to the
decision maker has significantly increased in the past 20 years. In past years, decision
makers would assess written or verbal reports, with or sometimes without certain levels
of confidence, and decide on a course of action based on their internal “fusion” of the
information. As computer power has increased through the years, the automated
computation of the “best” estimate of what all these sensors say has become more and
more possible. The number of methods used to assimilate the data into a unified
assessment of a given situation has also increased greatly in recent years. Arguably, it is
no longer humanly possible to correlate all the data streams available to provide the best
interpretation of the data, without computational assistance.

Data fusion is required because of data fission. The total signature of an entity is usually
manifested in many separated types. Since most sensors only collect one type of
information, the complete entity signature can only be reconstructed through fusing these
collected types to reconstruct the original entity. The information decomposition can be
attributed to different types of phenomena. These include different characteristics under
consideration, such as shape or motion; detection of different information types, such as
electromagnetic or acoustic radiation; detection of different parts of the frequency
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spectrum, such as electrical current or infrared data; restricted spatial or temporal
coverage; and an historical legacy of separate processing systems. Rarely does one
sensor embody more than one collection technique. Consequently, a single sensing
mechanism is unlikely to be capable of capturing all the desired information on an entity
at a given instant of time. Data fusion brings this information back together to provide
the picture of the original entity.

The methods of data fusion depend on the situation. There may be several similar
sensors providing information on the same entities. In this case, the sensors detect the
same features on the entities, yielding what is termed competitive data. The overlapping
features of the data must be correctly merged to identify the data sources. The other case
occurs when different types of sensors collect different features on the same entities,
yielding complementary data. In this case, the data between the different sensors does
not overlap. In both cases, however, a single sensor usually collects data on more than
one entity, so the data is almost always dependent.

Data fusion techniques are also dependent on the type of data present. The preceding
paragraph discusses a situation in which signal processing techniques would be quite
helpful (signal filtering, spectral analysis, time-domain fusion). To estimate the state of a
given system, Kalman filters or some other kind of Bayesian reasoning may be most
appropriate. If there is more background knowledge available, then what may be called a
“cognitive technique” can be used. These techniques can include neural nets,
clustering/genetic algorithms, or fuzzy logic. If expert knowledge can help determine the
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exact state of affairs, expert systems or case-based reasoning may be applicable.
However, there is no one “golden method” which applies in all situations. Most
problems will require a combination of the above techniques to provide an accurate
solution. In the example of the preceding paragraph, a combination of an expert system
(previously existing signatures) could be combined with time-domain fusion to provide a
fused picture of the environment.

Of course, the methods chosen to fuse the data also depend on the kind of data available.
For most military applications, the data comes from multiple sensors collecting
information throughout the electromagnetic spectrum, as well as audio, motion, and
vibration detectors. This includes sensor location and at times, a level of confidence in
the collection. However, sensor reliability, previously analyzed data, large databases,
expert systems, and other types of pre-existing information are also candidates for data
fusion. The degree to which each data stream is weighted compared to the other streams
is of central importance. Of course, data fusion can never totally recover the loss
introduced by the original data fission.

There are varying definitions of what constitutes multi-sensor data fusion, but these
definitions differ primarily only in technical details. For example, the International
Society of Information Fusion defines it as follows [25]: “Information Fusion, in the
context of its use by the Society, encompasses the theory, techniques and tools conceived
and employed for exploiting the synergy in the information acquired from multiple
sources (sensor, databases, information gathered by human, etc.) such that the resulting
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decision or action is in some sense better than (qualitatively or quantitatively, in terms of
accuracy, robustness and etc.(sic)) than would be possible if any of these sources were
used individually without such synergy exploitation.” The USAF Research Lab [21]
defines it as: “Information Fusion: Events, activities and movements will be correlated
and analyzed as they occur in time and space, to determine the location, identity and
status of individual objects (equipment and units), to assess the situation, to qualitatively
and quantitatively determine threats and to detect patterns in activity that reveal intent or
capability. Specific technologies are required to refine, direct and manage the information
fusion capabilities.” In essence, data fusion is the management (and consequent
minimization) of uncertainty associated with the input data. The goal is to obtain the best
assessment of the system under consideration with a minimal amount of uncertainty.

The use of the data in data fusion has widely varying adherents throughout the
community. There are those who advocate a “sensor to shooter” data fusion architecture.
The raw data from the sensor is sent directly to the warfighters who put ordnance on the
target. Unfortunately, with the tremendous amount of data being collected on the modern
battlefield, the warfighter cannot hope to keep up with the flow of information. And that
is ignoring the issue of contradictory and/or simply incorrect sensor reports. As some
leaders in this community have said, the warfighter is awash in information but starved
for knowledge. What a sensor report means in the context of other sensor reports is far
more valuable than an individual report standing alone.
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The data in data fusion are useless unless they are placed in context, then the data may be
considered information. Knowing what the data indicates and the associated level of
confidence are essential. In turn, when this information is placed in its proper context, it
may be considered knowledge. An indicator from a ships’ radar of tank activity would be
expected if the ship was close to shore, but perhaps not if the ship was in the middle of
the ocean The knowledge of what the sensor indicates and whether that is reasonable
given current surroundings is also important. This idea can extended to knowledge of
multiple activities, which could be called understanding. Perceiving what purpose
underlies the knowledge of the enemies’ activities is yet another level of fusion.
However, interpretation of purpose exceeds current computational capabilities.

3.2 Neural Network Methods
The term “artificial neural network” (ANN) refers to a wide range of analog
computational schemes that are loosely based on biological nervous systems. These
schemes are generally built to classify an unknown object into a particular class of
objects based on observations (input data) obtained from that object. Neural nets can also
be used to classify a system’s operation into one of a number of operational modes (e.g.,
running efficiently, nearing failure, non-operational, etc.) based on data obtained from
system components.

A typical ANN consists of a web of interconnected simple mathematical processors
called “neurons” or “units” or “nodes”. Three components are required to describe a
network:
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1. The neural units, the number of layers in the network, and their “activation” functions.
2. The connections between units, known as the neural architecture.
3. A training algorithm to develop the most appropriate weights for connections between
units.

The following section describes each of these three components in turn.

3.2.1 Neural Units
A single-layer neural net (also known as a “perceptron”) looks like the following figure.

Output
y

w0
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w1

Bias
x0

x1

Inputs

xd

Figure 3-1. Single-layer neural net [15]

Figure 3-1 shows a single layer neural net. This architecture is also known as a
“perceptron.” The bias node is a constant value specified by the user. The inputs are
weighted to give an output. The net is trained on known data so the weights on each
branch are the best for classifying that particular data set (training will be addressed in
more detail later). The initial set of weights is usually chosen randomly.
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A multi-layer neural net schematically looks like the following figure.

Outputs
y
Hidden
Nodes
zd

Bias
z0

z1

Bias
x0

x1

Inputs

xd

Figure 3-2. Multi-layer neural net [15]

Figure 3-2 shows the input layer, hidden layer, and output layer of a typical multi-layer
neural net. This type of architecture is also known as a multi-layer perceptron neural net.
There are many more weights in this type of architecture. Again, a set of data where the
actual outcome is known for each set of input data is used to train the network.

In the type of ANN considered here (multi-layer perceptron), the neural net node takes
the weighted sum of its inputs and feeds that value into an activation function (which is
typically nonlinear. The activation function transforms the weighted input from other
nodes into a new value.
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Neural Net Node Function
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Figure 3-3. Activity performed in a typical neural network node

Figure 3-3 shows the usual function of a neural network node. Usually, there are many
inputs into a single node. Each input is multiplied by a weight. Then, the resulting
products are added to form a single sum. This sum is then input into the activation
function. The result is computed and sent forward as the output of that particular node.
The output may also be sent to many nodes.

An activation function commonly used in these kinds of neural nets is the sigmoid
(logistic) function:
f (x ) =
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1
1 + e−x

(3-1)

Other commonly used activation functions include the hyperbolic tangent (tanh(x))
function. In some cases, researchers also use units with linear activation functions.
Linear activation functions are most commonly used in the output layer of the network.

3.2.2 Network Connections
Nodes (represented below by circles) are connected to propagate a signal from the inputs
to the outputs of the net.
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Figure 3-4. Single output neural net [15]

The network shown in Figure 3-4 could be used to approximate a function of two
variables, Y=f(X1,X2). The input values (X1, X2) are appropriately weighted and fed
into the nodes above them. Subsequent units compute their values according to the
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weighted connections and activation functions. The answer, Y, is read from the unit in
the output area.

ANNs are often partitioned into distinct sets of related neural units, called “layers” or
“areas”. For example, all of the units used as inputs to the unit constitute the “input
layer”; likewise units used as outputs make up the “output layer”. All other units are
organized into one or more “hidden layers”. The resulting arrangement of nodes and
connections in a network is known as the network topology.

Layers are connected by groups of lines (loosely, the “nerves”) called projections. A
non-zero weight is usually assigned to each projection. For ANNs, units in a particular
layer are usually connected to every other unit in each adjacent layer. A notable
exception is what is termed the “bias node” or “bias unit”. The weight attached to this
value is usually set at 1, and the negative of this value is usually known as the
“threshold”.

Many neural networks have the structure given in Figure 3-2 with an additional hidden
layer. This is because of a theoretical result which states that a neural network with three
layers of weights can produce an arbitrarily complex decision boundary [90]. In other
words, it can correctly classify objects no matter how tightly they may be grouped
together in real life. Unfortunately, the theorem only states that the network existsfinding it is another matter altogether. In a similar result, a network with two layers of
weights (just like Figure 3-2) and sigmoid activation functions can approximate any
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decision boundary to arbitrary accuracy. So using sigmoid activation functions allows
the use of a smaller network, but with the same guarantee that the perfect neural net for a
particular problem exists [15], [40], [90]. Again, finding that neural net is another issue
altogether. That issue is partly addressed by how the network is trained, which leads into
the next section.

3.2.3 Training Neural Networks
Making a network perform useful work, e.g. correctly classifying a large number of
unknown entities, involves finding good values for the weights of the connections
between units. While commonly referred to as “training”, this is basically an
optimization problem, and has been addressed in several different ways:

Local methods, such as backpropagation and its many variants. These methods
focus on a small area of the solution space at a time.

Global gradient-based methods, e.g. conjugate gradient, Levenberg-Marquardt.
These methods focus on a larger area of the solution space.

Stochastic methods, e.g. genetic algorithms, simulated annealing. These methods
use some form of a random process to generate better and better weights.

These training methods in general involve an iterative procedure for minimization of an
error function, with the weights being adjusted in a sequence of steps [15].
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3.2.4 Different Neural Network Methods
There are many different implementations of the neural network architecture in the
literature. There are two major classes of neural network models. The first uses nodes
(units) which compute a non-linear function (usually sigmoid) of the product of an input
vector and a weight vector. The main example of this technique is the multi-layer
perceptron. The other class of neural networks uses the distance between the input vector
and another generalized vector (usually the average of the input vectors) for the
computation at the node (unit). Radial basis function neural networks and probabilistic
neural networks are examples of this latter type. The following list briefly summarizes
some of these network methodologies with are considered to be suitable for automated
machine learning [73].

The multiplayer perceptron with backpropagation learning is probably the most
commonly applied ANN model [74]. When a neural net is being trained, input data and
the associated desired network output values (called targets) are presented to the network.
The backpropagation algorithm, in general, feeds the error (distance from the target)
associated with a particular input vector back through the network. The out put layer
computes its error, and feeds this back to the previous layer, which computes its error,
and feeds back its error, until the first layer in network has computed its error. Once each
individual neuron has computed its error, it estimates a change for the weight vector that
would reduce its error. This change is typically multiplied by a learning rate which is
significantly less than one (usually 0.1). The learning rate reduces the amount of change
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to produce a neural network that can classify many similar inputs well, instead of one
input perfectly.

The functional link neural network (FLNN) performs least squared error learning like that
of a backpropagation neural net, but no learning takes place in the hidden layer. Instead,
the hidden layer combines the inputs using various nonlinear functions [45].

The probabilistic neural net (PNN) is an ANN implementation of the Parzen windows
method. The output is a weighted sum of all training points, where the weighting is
exponential according to the distance of an unclassified input from a given training point
[85], [86]. The general regression neural network (GRNN) is the PNN augmented by a
normalizing factor [84].

Radial basis function neural networks (RBFNN) contain a set of uniformly distributed
processing units each with a radially symmetric response. During training, the algorithm
adjusts the amplitude of the response to estimate the function [69].

Radial basis functions (RBF) are used as activation functions in this second class of
neural networks.
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Figure 3-5. Typical RBF network [15]

Figure 3-5 shows a typical RBF network. There are N inputs, indexed 1 to n, which are
combined with M basis functions (M =N in almost all cases), indexed 1 to j. There are K
output nodes, indexed from 1 to k.

The general problem radial basis function neural networks are used to solve is the
mapping from a d-dimensional input space x to a one-dimensional target space t. The
input data consists of N input vectors xn, and corresponding targets tn. The object is to
find a function h(x) such that h(xn) = tn, for n = 1 to N [65]. The radial basis function
approach [65] assigns a basis function to each of the N data points. The basis function
has the form φ(|x - xn|), where φ is usually Gaussian, the distance function |x - xn| is
usually Euclidean, and x is usually either the average of the input vectors or the center of
the assigned basis function. The output of the mapping is a linear combination of all M
basis functions (at present, M =N):
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h(x) =

∑

wnexp([-1/2σn2]*|x - xn|2)

(3-2)

The weights wn are found via a two-stage process [15]. In the first stage, the input data
set is used to determine the parameters of the basis functions (µ and σ if the function is
Gaussian). The basis functions are then kept fixed while the second layer weights are
found in the second training phase. Mathematically, if the radial basis function is written
as:
M

∑

yk(x) =

wkjφj(x)

(3-3)

j =0

then the matrix representation is:
y(x) = Wφ
φ

(3-4)

where W = wkj and φ = φj. The error function is a sum of squares expression:
E = .5 ∑
n

∑

{yk(xn) – tnk}2

(3-5)

k

where tnk is the target value for output unit k, corresponding to the input vector xn. The
weights are found from a set of linear equations
ΦTΦWT = ΦTT

(3-6)

where (T)nk = tnk and (Φ
Φ)nj = φj(xn). The formal solution is given by:
WT = Φ*T

(3-7)

where the Φ* notation denotes the pseudo-inverse of Φ. In practice, the equations given
above are solved using singular value decomposition to avoid problems associated with
the possible ill-conditioning of the matrix Φ.
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Typically, for radial basis function neural network, the number of basis functions is much
less than the number of data points [15]. In general, the radial basis function neural
networks learns quicker than multi-layer perceptron neural networks. The trade-off is
that the multi-layer perceptron neural networks exhibit improved generalization
properties, especially for regions not sufficiently represented in the data set [47]. To
obtain this improved generalization, an RBF network has to have more functions to better
characterize the input space [39]. The number of functions exhibits a direct exponential
dependence on the dimension of the input space. The benefit of using radial basis
function networks is the property of best approximation: the function with minimum
approximating error is in the set of approximating functions this network may adopt [39].
Girosi and Poggio [39] also showed that the multi-layer perceptron does not share this
property.

Similar to the an RBFNN, the k-nearest radial basis function network (KNRBF) learns
like the RBFNN. Its output is computed the same way, except only the k nearest basis
functions are used in the exponentially weighted sum [73].

The dynamic radial basis function neural network with locally tuned units (LTRBFNN)
uses a clustering technique on the input data to determine optimal placement of its nonsymmetric basis functions. Then, it uses heuristics to determine the widths of the basis
functions. On a second pass through the data, it uses least mean squares to determine the
amplitude of the basis functions [59].
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The dynamically stable learning neural network (DYSTALNN) was derived from the
actual wiring of a simple invertebrate nervous system and the details of mammalian
learning at a cellular level. A DYSTALNN maps an input vector to the processing unit
that stores a cluster center vector that matches the input best. The output is the product of
the measure of similarity and the output vector stored at the processing unit. This
architecture adds new processing units whenever it encounters an input significantly
different from any previous inputs [3].

The restricted coulomb energy neural network (RCENN) allocates regions to some
training inputs. RCE allocates the first input to a large region, but ignores subsequent
inputs that fall inside that region unless they are associated with a different output value.
In this occurs, the RCENN divides the previous region and allocates a portion to the new
input. The training technique requires several passes through the training data to ensure
that all training data falls inside some allocated region. When the network is trained,
input vectors (with unknown targets) will fall into some region with a training input at its
center. The output is what was pre-defined for that region during training [70].

The cerebellar model articulation controller (CMAC) was inspired by the architecture of
the mammalian cerebellum [2]. This architecture maps input values to a particular bin,
represented by a fixed integer value. The minimum value in the input range maps to 0,
and the maximum value maps to the bin associated with the largest value. The number of
bins used for the mapping depends heavily on the application. For training, all entries in
the bins are initialized to 0. When a bin encounters a training input, the bin value of 0 is
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replaced by the desired output. If a bin does not encounter a training value, the value
remains 0. If the bin encounters multiple different outputs, on the last output recorded is
retained. Various generalization algorithms are used to compensate for this. The chief
advantage of this technique is that the error surface has a unique minimum that is “down
the slope” from every other point on the curve, and that learning process converges to this
unique value fairly rapidly. The technique is not susceptible to local minima in the error
surface, unlike other neural network architectures.

3.2.5 Combining Neural Networks
Opitz and Maclin [61] discusses the comparison of 2 different data fusion techniques,
known as Bagging and Boosting. These techniques combine the predictions of multiple
classifiers to produce a single classifier. The resulting classifier, which is referred to as
an ensemble, is generally more accurate than any of the individual classifiers making up
the ensemble. Theoretical and empirical research has demonstrated that a good ensemble
is one where the individual classifiers in the ensemble are both accurate and make their
errors on different parts of the input space. The Bragging and Boosting methods rely on
resampling techniques to obtain different training sets for each of the classifiers.
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Figure 3-6. A classifier ensemble of neural networks. [61]

Figure 3-6 illustrates the basic framework for a classifier ensemble. In this example,
neural networks are the basic classification method, though conceptually any
classification method (such as decision trees) can be substituted in place of the networks.
Each network in the figure's ensemble is trained using the training instances for that
network. Then, for each example, the predicted output of each of these networks is
combined to produce the output of the ensemble. The consensus among many
researchers [61] is that an effective combining scheme is to simply average the
predictions of the ensemble.

Of course, combining the output of several classifiers is useful only if there is a
reasonable amount of disagreement among them. Obviously, combining several identical
classifiers produces no gain. Hansen and Salamon [38] proved that if the average error
rate for an ensemble is less than 50% and the component classifiers in the ensemble are
independent in the production of their errors, the expected error for that example can be
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reduced to zero as the number of classifiers combined goes to infinity. However, such
assumptions rarely hold in practice. Krogh and Vedelsby [46] later proved that the
ensemble error can be divided into a term measuring the average generalization error of
each individual classifier and a term measuring the disagreement among the classifiers.
They formally showed that an ideal ensemble consists of highly correct classifiers that
disagree as much as possible. Other researchers [61] have empirically verified that such
ensembles generalize well.

As a result, methods for creating ensembles center around producing classifiers that
disagree on their predictions. Generally, these methods focus on altering the training
process in the hope that the resulting classifiers will produce different predictions. For
example, neural network techniques that have been employed include methods for
training with different topologies, different initial weights, different parameters, and
training only on a portion of the training set. The remainder of [61] focuses on two
methods (Bagging and Boosting) that try to generate disagreement among the classifiers
by altering the training set each classifier sees.

Bagging is a bootstrap ensemble method that creates individuals for its ensemble by
training each classifier on a random redistribution of the training set. Each classifier's
training set is generated by randomly drawing, with replacement, N examples, where N is
the size of the original training set. Many of the original examples may be repeated in the
resulting training set while others may be left out. Each individual classifier in the
ensemble is generated with a different random sampling of the training set.
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Boosting encompasses a family of methods. The focus of these methods is to produce a
series of classifiers. The training set used for each member of the series is chosen based
on the performance of the earlier classifier(s) in the series. In Boosting, examples that
are incorrectly predicted by previous classifiers in the series are chosen more often than
examples that were correctly predicted. Thus Boosting attempts to produce new
classifiers that are better able to predict examples for which the current ensemble's
performance is poor. (Note that in Bagging, the resampling of the training set is not
dependent on the performance of the earlier classifiers.)

In [61], the authors also examine two new forms of Boosting: Arcing and Ada-Boosting.
Like Bagging, Arcing chooses a training set of size N for classifier number K+1 by
probabilistically selecting (with replacement) examples from the original N training
examples. Unlike Bagging, the probability of selecting an example is not equal across
the training set. This probability depends on how often that example was misclassified
by the previous K classifiers. Ada-Boosting uses either the approach of (a) selecting a set
of examples based on the probabilities of the examples, or (b) simply using all of the
examples and weight the error of each example by the probability for that example (i.e.,
examples with higher probabilities have more effect on the error). This latter approach
has the clear advantage that each example is incorporated (at least in part) in the training
set. This form of Ada-Boosting can be viewed as a form of additive modeling for
optimizing a logistic loss function. In this paper, the authors have chosen to use the
approach of subsampling the data to ensure a fair empirical comparison (in part due to the
restarting reason discussed below).

3-21

Both Arcing and Ada-Boosting initially set the probability of picking each example to be
1/N. These methods then recalculate these probabilities after each trained classifier is
added to the ensemble. For Ada-Boosting, Ek is the sum of the probabilities of the
misclassified instances for the currently trained classifier Ck. The probabilities for the
next trial are generated by multiplying the probabilities of Ck 's incorrectly classified
instances by the factor Bk = (1 - Ek)/Ek and then renormalizing all probabilities so that
their sum equals 1. Ada-Boosting combines the classifiers C1, ... ,Ck using weighted
voting where Ck has weight log(Bk). These weights allow Ada-Boosting to discount the
predictions of classifiers that are not very accurate on the overall problem.

In this paper, the authors use a revision where all the weights are reset to 0 to be equal
and restart if either Ek is not less than 0.5 or Ek becomes 0.1. By resetting the weights
they do not disadvantage the Ada-Boosting learner in those cases where it reaches these
values of Ek. The Ada-Boosting learner always incorporates the same number of
classifiers as other methods we tested. To make this feasible, they use the approach of
selecting a data set probabilistically rather than weighting the examples, otherwise a
deterministic method such as C4.5 would cycle and generate duplicate members of the
ensemble. That is, resetting the weights to 1/N would cause the learner to repeat the
decision tree learned as the first member of the ensemble, and this would lead to
reweighting the data set the same as for the second member of the ensemble, and so on.
Randomly selecting examples for the data set based on the example probabilities
alleviates this problem.
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Arcing started out as a simple way for evaluating the effect of Boosting methods where
the resulting classifiers were combined without weighting the votes. Arcing uses a
simple mechanism for determining the probabilities of including examples in the training
set. For the ith example in the training set, the value mi refers to the number of times that
example was misclassified by the previous K classifiers. The probability pi for selecting
example i to be part of classifier K+1's training set is defined as the value of the power
empirically after trying several different values.

The paper gives the following sample of how Bagging and Boosting might work on a
imaginary set of data. Since Bagging resamples the training set with replacement, some
instance are represented multiple times while others are left out. So Bagging's training
set 1 might contain examples 3 and 7 twice, but does not contain either example 4 or 5.
As a result, the classifier trained on training set 1 might obtain a higher test-set error than
the classifier using all of the data. In fact, all four of Bagging's component classifiers
could result in higher test set error; however, when combined, these four classifiers can
(and often do) produce test set error lower than that of the single classifier (the diversity
among these classifiers generally compensates for the increase in error rate of any
individual classifier).
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Figure 3-7. Hypothetical runs of Bagging and Boosting [61]

Figure 3-7 shows hypothetical runs of Bagging and Boosting algorithms. Assume there
are eight training examples. Assume example 1 is an outlier and is hard for the
component learning algorithm to classify correctly. With Bagging, each training set is an
independent sample of the data; thus, some examples are missing and others occur
multiple times. The Boosting training sets are also samples of the original data set, but
the ``hard'' example (example 1) occurs more in later training sets since Boosting
concentrates on correctly predicting it.

The authors draw several conclusions from their analysis. The first is that a Bagging
ensemble generally produces a classifier that is more accurate than a standard classifier.
For Boosting, however, they note more widely varying results. For a few data sets
Boosting produced dramatic reductions in error (even compared to Bagging), but for
other data sets it actually increases in error over a single classifier (particularly with
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neural networks). In further tests they examined the effects of noise and determined that
Boosting's sensitivity to noise may be partly responsible for its occasional increase in
error.

Their results also show that the ensemble methods are generally consistent (in terms of
their effect on accuracy) when applied either to neural networks or to decision trees.
However, there is little inter-correlation between neural networks and decision trees
except for the Boosting methods. This suggests that some of the increases produced by
Boosting are dependent on the particular characteristics of the data set rather than on the
component classifier. In further tests they demonstrated that Bagging is more resilient to
noise than Boosting.

The authors also investigated how many component classifiers should be used in an
ensemble. Consistent with previous research, their results show that most of the
reduction in error for ensemble methods occurs with the first few additional classifiers.
With Boosting decision trees, however, relatively large gains may be seen up until about
25 classifiers.

3.2.6 Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic [42] was developed to handle problems which have incomplete, imprecise,
vague or uncertain information inherent in the problem statement. These problems
involve data which are at times best described by linguistic terms rather than numbers.
As an example, a hospital describes patients’ conditions as good, fair, serious, poor, etc.
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The problem is: describing in an absolute sense these terms which are not precisely
defined, and contain a significant element of subjectivity.

The originator of fuzzy logic, Zadeh [98], proposed the following approach to deal with
the above problem; in particular, dealing with linguistic variables. He defined a fuzzy set
as a set which allows for an object to be a member of a set to some degree. This is unlike
classical set theory, which only allows for an object to be either a member of the set or
excluded from the set. This “black and white” characterization, in many applications, is
unsatisfactory. As an example, consider the set that describes all males who are tall as
those whose height is greater than or equal to 5'8". Then a 6'0" male is a member of the
set. However, a male whose height is 5'7" is not a member of the set. This implies that a
man who is 1" shorter than a tall man is not tall. By the same token this approach does
not differentiate between members. An individual who is 7'6" and an individual who is
6'1" are both “equal” members of the set “tall”. Information about relative sizes has been
lost once members have been conglomerated into a set.

Fuzzy sets differ from classical sets in that they allow for an object to be a partial
member of a set. This approach can preserve relative sizing information. The
relationship is defined by a membership function. For any fuzzy set A the function
represents the membership function for which µA(x) indicates the degree of membership
that x, of the universal set X, belongs to set A and is, usually, expressed as a number
between 0 and 1:
µA(x): X → [0, 1]
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(3-8)

These sets can be either discrete or continuous. The “degree of membership” represented
by the value between zero and one can be arbitrarily selected by the user or assigned
according to some scale. For example if Jack is 6'3", one can arbitrarily decide that Jack
is a member of the set “tall” to degree 0.8. Alternatively, a scale could be used which
relates all members’ heights to that of the tallest person in the set.

To formalize the idea conveyed by classifying set members in different ways, Zadeh [97]
later proposed fuzzy sets of type 2. Here, the membership grades themselves are fuzzy
sets. A fuzzy set A of type 2 in a set X is the fuzzy set characterized by the fuzzy
membership function as:
µA: X → [0, 1][0, 1]

(3-9)

where µA is known as a fuzzy grade, a fuzzy set in [0,1]. Mizumoto and Tanaka [58]
discuss the properties of these sets and give the example of the set X = [Susie, Helen,
Ruth, Pat] and A is the fuzzy set of beautiful women in X:

A=beauty={middle/Susie + low/Helen + very high/Ruth + high/Pat}

(3-10)

where middle, low and high are fuzzy sets. As an example, instead of saying Helen is
“beautiful to degree 0.3”, she is “beautiful to degree ‘low’”, thus associating a fuzzy set
as opposed to a specific value. These fuzzy sets of type 2 allow for classifications of
members of a fuzzy set with another fuzzy set.
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The goal behind defining fuzzy sets (besides usefully describing imprecise, incomplete or
vague information) is to use them to make inferences about a particular real-life problem
which cannot be easily addressed using conventional mathematical models. The
construction of a Fuzzy Information System (FIS) begins with determining the fuzzy sets
that describe the problem. Continuing with a medical example, these may involve
various qualitative measurements about a patient (low temperature, serious fracture, fair
condition) which ultimately will lead to a diagnosis and then a treatment plan. Then the
rules describing how these fuzzy sets interact are determined. These rules usually have
an IF....THEN.... nature. The rules are then combined in some way. This process is
referred to as rule composition. Finally, conclusions have to be drawn in a process
known as defuzzification. The answer to the problem is typically found as a fuzzy set,
and the answer needs to be “defuzzified” to provide a clear, unambiguous course of
action.

Fuzzy logic is often used in conjunction with artificial neural networks (ANNs). The
neural nets are used to aid in the development of FISs. As Takagi and Hayashi [89] point
out, fuzzy reasoning presents particular problems:

1. the lack of a definite method for determining the membership function;
2. the lack of a learning function.

They then go on to describe an approach for using ANNs to overcome these problems.
The method is to investigate if-then rules by using neural networks to determine the
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membership functions of the antecedent and then determine the consequent component as
the output for each rule. The approach they use is to take raw data (say, in a control
problem), apply a conventional clustering algorithm to group the data into clusters and to
apply an ANN to this clustered data to determine the membership of a pattern within
particular fuzzy sets.

The authors apply this approach to two real-world problems - estimation of chemical
oxygen demand density in Osaka Bay and the estimation of the roughness of a ceramic
surface. Their method in both cases out-performed more conventional methods. This
combination of neural networks and fuzzy reasoning does allow for automatic generation
of µ in certain applications.

As has previously been stated, finding a solution to a fuzzy logic problem requires
defuzzification. There are various techniques available. Lee [48] describes the three
main approaches as the max criterion, mean of maximum and the center of area (most
common). The max criterion method finds the point at which the membership function is
a maximum. The mean of maximum takes the mean of those points where the
membership function is at a maximum. The most common method is the center of area
method which finds the center of gravity of the solution fuzzy sets. Lee states,
"Unfortunately, there is no systematic procedure for choosing a defuzzification strategy.''
Although the process of reducing the final fuzzy set to a crisp value does seem
appropriate for control problems much information is lost by doing this and further work
needs to be done on how to use the information available in the solution fuzzy set.
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In the main, the approaches adopted in fuzzy logic problems have been very domain
specific, not applied to large complex problems and the evaluation of the efficacy of their
approach is often not systematic enough for conclusions to be drawn. Determining the
membership functions, the rules, the operators and the defuzzification strategy is a
difficult task that requires a good deal of effort before it can be said that any particular
system is the optimal fuzzy system for that particular application.

3.2.7 Summary of Other Methods
The most common methods in the literature at present for analyzing system data are
variations of neural network and/or fuzzy logic techniques. However, there are a number
of other techniques which can be used to analyze system data. Some of these methods
are summarized in a table in the appendix for chapter 3.
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IV. Mathematical Programming Model

4.1 Model Development
A prognostics system, at an abstract level, is composed of two parts. The first part
consists of sensors which are attached to various parts of a mechanical, electrical, or other
kind of system, and report the system data. The second part is a reasoning function
which interprets this data to provide an assessment of current and future system health.
This section develops a mathematical model of the former part to determine a “best”,
latter reasoning function configuration. The objective function calculation approach is
present in the next chapter.

Different types of models can be used to represent a particular system. For the purposes
of this discussion, a model which emphasizes a system’s components and subcomponents
is used.

Component A
Component A
Component A
No Subcomponents
Model

Subcomp. 1
Subcomp. 1

Subcomp. 2

Subcomp. 2
Sub-subcomp. 1

Subcomponents
Model

Sub-subcomp. 2

Sub-subcomponents
Model

Figure 4-1. Different levels of detail for modeling a system

Figure 4-1 shows three different possible levels of detail for modeling a system. A
system can be modeled at a component level, as shown in the left side of Figure 4-1. In
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the middle of Figure 4-1 is a system in which components are divided into
subcomponents. This model will be the focus of this discussion, and will be used to
model a notional prognostics system. The right-hand side of Figure 4-1 shows a system
model where the subcomponents are further decomposed into sub-subcomponents. This
level of abstraction can continue for any number of levels to the required level of detail.

System

Component A
Subcomp. 1

Subcomp. 2

Sensors

A

B

C

D

Classifiers

A

B

C

D

Reasoner
Figure 4-2. A pictorial representation of a simple system

Figure 4-2 shows a simple, generalized system. This simple system consists of one
component and two subcomponents. Each subcomponent may have up to two sensors
attached, each providing information to a classifier. The classifier then determines the
subcomponent state based on the sensor information. The reasoner combines all the
information from the classifiers and makes a final determination about the system state.
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The reasoner also serves as the interface between the system and the human operators.
The challenge is determining whether all sensors are needed or whether there is a
sufficient subset of sensors. A mathematical model can help answer the challenge.

For the purposes of this representation, a component is considered an abstract grouping of
less complicated, smaller substructures. These substructures are represented as
subcomponents in Figure 4-2. As an example, an aircraft engine may be considered as a
component. One subcomponent might be the fuel delivery and ignition system; another
subcomponent might be the turbine blades and the associated control mechanism. Of
course, these definitions of component and subcomponent can be applied to any desired
system at any level, depending on the level of detail/complexity/aggregation required for
a particular application.

The following assumptions underlying the subsequent mathematical formulation are in
keeping with a general philosophy of the prognostics community at the present time. In
this particular model, all the subcomponents are considered critical parts of the system
component. If any subcomponent fails, the parent component and the system will also
fail. System parts which are not critical to component/system functionality are not
addressed with this model. A specific term used to describe this principle is “Failure
Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis” (FMECA) [12]. FMECA analysis is concerned
solely with different system failure modes, as opposed to system operations which may
be aberrant, but do not affect system operation or induce system failure modes. In the
FMECA, the system’s different failure modes are ranked according to severity, likelihood
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of occurrence, and observability. For each failure mode, a group of system experts
determines preliminary symptoms (if any), and which system sensors would be useful in
detecting these symptoms. System modes/conditions which do not significantly affect
the operation of the system are not considered in the FMECA [9].

Logan, et al [50], [51] recommend a similar modeling approach. They use the
engineering knowledge of domain experts to construct a diagnostic knowledge base
suitable for neural network training. They call their approach a comprehensive “Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis” (FMEA) on the appropriate mechanical system. Like the
FMECA, a FMEA provides a comprehensive listing of probable failure modes of all
“major” mechanical system components, where “major” is defined as the level of detail
appropriate for that particular system. This information is obtained from interviews with
engineering crews and maintenance personnel. Technical orders are also reviewed to
ensure the information is correct and complete. The review also includes information on
all available sensor measurements, and identifies the fault/symptom relationships
required for an effective monitoring program. Similar to the FMECA approach, nonfailure modes are not considered.

In Figure 4-2, each of the two subcomponents have potentially two sensors. These
sensors represent the collection and reporting of appropriate information about the
specific part of the subcomponent they are monitoring. Typically, the sensors are
assigned to collect a specific type of phenomenology from the subcomponent. These
phenomenologies may include pressure, temperature, vibration, and electrical current.
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Returning to the preceding example of an aircraft engine, if one subcomponent represents
the fuel delivery and ignition system, one sensor may monitor the pressure within the fuel
delivery system, and the other sensor may record the timing and strength of the spark (the
electrical current) the ignition system produces.

The sensors’ collected data are sent to the classifier functions. The classifier checks the
reported data to ensure the sensor is functioning correctly, processes the raw signal data,
and then uses this processed data to assess the current subcomponent state and predict the
future subcomponent state. The reasoner accumulates these assessments and predictions
from the classifiers, and uses them to assess the current system state and predict the
future system state. (Correctly functioning sensors send two data streams to the
classifier. The main data stream is the subcomponent data. The second data stream
verifies the sensor’s functionality. A correctly functioning sensor sends a specific bit
every xth bit interspersed with the main data stream to verify the sensor is functioning
correctly. If the classifier does not receive this specific bit, it will disregard the incoming
data stream until it again receives this bit from the sensor.) The methods the classifier
may use to interpret the processed data can be quite varied. These methods can range
from mathematical techniques such as neural nets and Bayesian networks to case-base
reasoning and/or expert systems, or any combination of techniques.

The analytical tool used in the model represented in Figure 4-2 represents is the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. A ROC curve is the graph of a relation which
summarizes the range of performance of a particular signal detection algorithm. The
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signal algorithm is designed to detect a particular signal of interest among other signals
which may serve to mask the signature of the desired signal. A ROC curve typically
compares the classifier’s signal of interest detection rate to the classifier’s false alarm rate
(reporting a signal of interest when that signal has not actually occurred). ROC curves
are commonly used to describe the performance of imperfect diagnostic systems,
especially in the fields of automatic target recognition and biomedical research [5].

In the models considered here, each system will typically have more than one component,
each component will typically have more than one subcomponent, and each
subcomponent will typically have more than one sensor/classifier pair. For a given
subcomponent, all possible sensors of the appropriate type (pressure, temperature, etc.)
are possible candidates. As before, every subcomponent is assumed critical for system
operation. Further, each subcomponent of a particular system is assumed to have at least
one sensor attached to it (the mathematical formulation will explicitly enforce this
structural requirement).

4-6

Component B

Component A
System
Subcomp. 1

Subcomp. 1

Subcomp. 2

Subcomp. 2

A

B

C

D

Sensors

E

F

G

H

I

A

B

C

D

Classifiers

E

F

G

H

I

Reasoner

Figure 4-3. A pictorial representation of a system with multiple components

Figure 4-3 expands the model structure found in Figure 4-2. There are now two
components, each with two critical subcomponents, and each subcomponent has multiple
candidate sensors.

In an ideal environment all sensors are included in a system. However, weight, space,
and data processing limitations prohibit such a configuration in actual systems. Thus,
expert judgment may be used to pick a subset of sensors. Mathematical modeling
provides a means to improve upon expert judgment to prescribe some best subset of
sensor/classifier pairs to include in a system. The next section develops a mathematical
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formulation to accomplish this task. This formulation uses the model structure presented
in Figure 4-2 as a basis.

4.2 Formulation
A mathematical programming formulation is used for selecting an optimally sized sensor
set. Let M denote the number of sensors available for use, and define S = {A1, A2, …,
AM) to be the set of sensors available. Define A = {S: S is a non-empty subset of
sensors of S}, and note that A is the power set of S, excluding the empty set, denoted as
A = P(S
S) - ∅. Note that card(A
A) = 2M – 1, that is, there are 2M – 1 different sets in A.
Let Si ∈ A, i = 1, 2, … 2M – 1 be an enumeration of A.

Each sensor has its own classifier. The terminology Ai is understood to refer to any
specific sensor-classifier pair. For a set Si ∈ A containing more than one sensor, a fusion
rule R will be used to fuse the classifiers for each sensor into a single classifier. This
activity will be denoted as R:A
A → GR(S),
where GR(S) = {A1, A2, …, AM, R(A1, A2,), …, R(A1, A2, …, AM)}
= {R(S) | Si ∈ A}.
The set GR(S) contains all the fused classifiers for each Si ∈ A. Note that ensembles
consisting of a single sensor-classifier pair do not undergo fusion since the ensemble
already has a single classifier.
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This paragraph defines the variables and constants found in the formulation below. The
objective is to find a sufficient sensor/classifier subset for the given system. Thus, the
objective function value PTP is the probability of obtaining a true positive (the prognostics
system indicates a system failure when the system has actually failed). The variable PFP
is the probability of obtaining a false positive (the prognostics system indicates a system
failure when the system has not failed). The value PFP* is defined as the maximum
acceptable PFP for any ensemble. The value of PTP depends on Fi, a probability function
that depends a particular ensemble Si ∈ A, and PFP. The evaluation of PTP is developed
c
is an indicator variable that is 1 if the mth sensor is
in Chapter 5. The variable d sm

retained for the sth subcomponent on the cth component, and 0 otherwise. The variable
c
csm
is the cost of employing the mth sensor on the sth subcomponent on the cth

component. This fixed cost is assumed to be independent of the other sensors in the
ensemble. The variable SCcs denotes the maximum number of sensors considered for the
sth subcomponent of the cth component. The parameter SCc is the number of
subcomponents present on the cth component. The parameters ciFP and ciFN denote the
cost of an erroneous prognostics system reading associated with the ith ensemble Si ∈ A,
i = 1, 2, … 2M – 1. The errors are defined as follows: either the system indicates a fault
when no fault is present (cost denoted by ciFP), or fails to indicate a fault when a fault is
present (cost denoted by ciFN). The constant BcE is the budget (maximum allowable cost)
for the costs of retaining a given sensor ensemble on the cth component. The constant BO
is the budget (maximum allowable cost) for the sensor errors. The mixed-integer
nonlinear programming (MINLP) formulation is then given by
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F(PFP*) ≡ max PTP(A)
A ∈ GR(S)

subject to

(4-1)

PFP(A) ≤ PFP*
C

(structural constraints—there are SC =

∑ SC

c

of these constraints, one for each

c =1

component.)
SC sc

∑d
m =1

c
sm

≥1

c = 1, …, C; s = 1, …, SCc

c
d sm

1 if mth sensor retained on sth

= sub - component of cth component
0 otherwise


(employment cost constraints—there are C of these constraints, where C is the number of
components)
SC c

SCsc

∑ ∑d
s =1

m =1

c c
sm sm

c

≤ Β cE

c = 1, …, C

(operational cost constraint)
ciFP + ciFN ≤ BO

Si ∈ A

0 ≤ PFP ≤ PFP* ≤ 1
c
d sm
∈ {0, 1}

c
csm
, ciFP, ciFN, BE, BO ≥ 0

c = 1, …, C; s = 1, …, SCc; m = 1, …, SCcs
Si ∈ A; c = 1, …, C; s = 1, …, SCc; m = 1, …, SCcs

This formulation accommodates two key requirements associated with this general
problem. The first requirement is to consider all appropriate sensor ensembles for a
given system (not necessarily all possible ensembles). This requirement is met with the
employment cost and structural constraints. The employment cost constraint ensures that
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budget associated with a particular sensor ensemble is not exceeded, and the structural
constraint ensures that each critical subcomponent is assigned at least one sensor. The
second requirement is to ensure a given sensor ensemble does not exceed the maximum
allowable error rate. The operational cost constraint ensures this requirement is met.
There is more discussion of the operational cost constraint in section 4.5.

This formulation apportions employment costs to specific system components (recall that
employment cost does not refer just to the actual monetary expense). Size, power,
weight, and similar constraints are likely to be different for any given system component.
Accordingly, this formulation enforces a specific budget for each component.

4.3 Towards a Heuristic Solution Procedure: Subset Generation

This section details a methodology for partitioning the solution space, and indexing the
possible solutions in the resulting subspaces. A subset ordering method is presented to
ensure each subset Si∈ A is considered during the solution process.

If there are M defined sensors, there are 2M – 1 possible sensor combinations containing
at least one sensor within the system (the trivial case of an empty ensemble is omitted).
There are also M different sensor ensemble sizes, ranging from one sensor throughout the
system, to all M sensors employed. Formulation (4-1) can then be partitioned into M
subproblems, one partition for each sensor ensemble size, in order to conveniently
enumerate the solution space, and to partition the solution space into more manageable
subspaces. Define an index j as the number of sensors contained in a particular partition
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 n
(j= 1 to M). Each of the j partitions contains MCj possible solutions, where nCk =   .
k

More formally, this can be expressed as
Aj = {S: S ≠ ∅, card(S) = j} j = 1,…, M.

(4-3)

Aj ⊂ A is the set of sets corresponding to the partition consisting of j sensors selected

among the M sensors available. Note that card(Aj) = MCj and A =

M

U A j.
j=1

4.3.1 Subset Ordering

A logical ordering of all the sensor ensembles allows for a quick and thorough evaluation
of the solution space. To this end, this section develops a notation for tracking each
ensemble, and presents two different ordering methods.

Each particular ensemble in A can be given a unique index. One indexing scheme is a
natural indexing scheme defined as follows. Recall j= 1 to M (sensors). When the index
j is equal to 1, the M ensemble sensor sets are each of size 1, and so are indexed from 1 to

M. When the index j is equal to 2, the MC2 ensemble sensor sets are of size 2, and i is
indexed as
i = M + 1, M + 2, …, M + MC2.

(4-4)

When the index j is equal to 3, the MC3 ensemble sensor sets are of size 3, and i is indexed
as
i = M +1 + MC2, M + 2 + MC2, …, M + MC2 + MC3.
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(4-5)

In general, when the index j is equal to n, where M > n ≥ 3, the ensemble sensor sets are
of size n, with i is indexed as MCk-1
n

i=M+1+

∑
k =3

n +1

n

M

Ck , M + 2 +

∑
k =3

M

Ck , M +

∑
k =3

M

Ck .

(4-6)

The natural ordering sequence is completed by maintaining a lexicographic order within
any Si. A natural ordering sequence is a particular lexicographical method that orders all
subsets of a given set according to the number of items in the subset, from the smallest
number of items to the largest. This ordering allows for the potential elimination of all
sensor subsets of the same size.

Table 4-1. “Natural” sequence for a set of 6 sensors

Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Sensor
Ensemble
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
s1s2
s1s3
s1s4
s1s5
s1s6
s2s3
s2s4
s2s5
s2s6
s3s4
s3s5
s3s6
s4s5
s4s6
s5s6

Index
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Sensor
Ensemble
s1s2s3
s1s2s4
s1s2s5
s1s2s6
s1s3s4
s1s3s5
s1s3s6
s1s4s5
s1s4s6
s1s5s6
s2s3s4
s2s3s5
s2s3s6
s2s4s5
s2s4s6
s2s5s6
s3s4s5
s3s4s6
s3s5s6
s4s5s6
s1s2s3s4
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Index
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Sensor
Ensemble
s1s2s3s5
s1s2s3s6
s1s2s4s5
s1s2s4s6
s1s2s5s6
s1s3s4s5
s1s3s4s6
s1s3s5s6
s1s4s5s6
s2s3s4s5
s2s3s4s6
s2s3s5s6
s2s4s5s6
s3s4s5s6
s1s2s3s4s5
s1s2s3s4s6
s1s2s3s5s6
s1s2s4s5s6
s1s3s4s5s6
s2s3s4s5s6
s1s2s3s4s5s6

Table 4-1 shows a natural ordering for a system with six sensors. As the table shows,
sensor subsets of the same size are grouped together.

There are other subset ordering methods. According to the paper by Furnival and Wilson
[34], a lexicographic ordering method would look like the ordering depicted in Table 4-2.
This ordering method groups the subsets by sensors-the first grouping of subsets all
contain sensor 1, the next grouping contains sensor 2, and so forth. In their paper,
Furnival and Wilson include FORTRAN code to generate these different subset
orderings. Their code has been modified to generate the natural ordering sequence for up
to nine sensors. Other sources also present these ordering techniques as ways to codify a
number of different subsets [92], [23].
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Table 4-2. “Lexicographic” sequence for a set of 6 sensors

Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Sensor
Ensemble
s1
s1s2
s1s2s3
s1s2s3s4
s1s2s3s4s5
s1s2s3s4s5s6
s1s2s3s4s6
s1s2s3s5s6
s1s2s3s5
s1s2s3s6
s1s2s4
s1s2s4s5
s1s2s4s5s6
s1s2s4s6
s1s2s5
s1s2s5s6
s1s2s6
s1s3
s1s3s4
s1s3s4s5
s1s3s4s5s6

Index
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Sensor
Ensemble
s1s3s4s6
s1s3s5
s1s3s5s6
s1s3s6
s1s4
s1s4s5
s1s4s5s6
s1s4s6
s1s5
s1s5s6
s1s6
s2
s2s3
s2s3s4
s2s3s4s5
s2s3s4s5s6
s2s3s4s6
s2s3s5
s2s3s5s6
s2s3s6
s2s4

Index
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Sensor
Ensemble
s2s4s5
s2s4s5s6
s2s4s6
s2s5
s2s5s6
s2s6
s3
s3s4
s3s4s5
s3s4s5s6
s3s4s6
s3s5
s3s5s6
s3s6
s4
s4s5
s4s5s6
s4s6
s5
s5s6
s6

The natural ordering scheme is used for this presentation. In the natural ordering scheme,
within each sensor size, the ensembles are ordered from the smallest number to the
largest number.

This methodology is used in the appendix to develop a methodology to quickly reduce
the size of the solution space that must be searched, if certain conditions about the system
and its operation hold.
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4.4 A Sample Formulation Example

This section illustrates the mathematical formulation with an example. The development
of the solution computation techniques is presented in Chapter V.

Component B

Component A
System
Subcomp. 1

Subcomp. 1

Subcomp. 2

Subcomp. 2

A

B

C

D

Sensors

E

F

G

H

I

A

B

C

D

Classifiers

E

F

G

H

I

Reasoner
Figure 4.4. Figure 4.3 reproduced for clarity

In this example, there are nine sensors and corresponding classifiers (M), four critical
subcomponents (SC), and two system components (C). The specific formulation is:
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F(PFP*) ≡ max PTP(A)
A ∈ GR(S)

subject to

(4-7)

PFP(A) ≤ PFP*

(structural constraints)
PFP(R(S)) ≤ p
SC 1A

∑d
m =1

A
sm

≥1

SC1A = 2

A
sm

≥1

SC A2 = 2

B
sm

≥1

SC1B = 2

B
sm

≥1

SC B2 = 3

SC 2A

∑d
m =1

SC 1B

∑d
m =1

SC 2B

∑d
m =1

d

c
sm

1 if mth sensor retained on sth

= sub - component of cth component
0 otherwise


(employment cost constraints)
SC A

SC sA

∑ ∑d
s =1

m =1

SC B

SCsB

∑ ∑d
s =1

m=1

c ≤ Β EA

A A
sm sm

c ≤ Β BE

B B
sm sm

(operational cost constraint)
ciFP + ciFN ≤ BO

Si ∈ A

0 ≤ PFP ≤ PFP* ≤ 1
c
d sm
∈ {0, 1}

c
csm
, ciFP, ciFN, BE, BO ≥ 0

c = 1, 2; s = 1, …, SCc; m = 1, …, SCcs
Si ∈ A; c = 1, 2; s = 1, …, SCc; m = 1, …, SCcs
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Note that there are two employment cost constraints corresponding to the two system
components, and there are four structural constraints, corresponding to the four critical
system subcomponents. The operational cost constraint remains the same. Assume that
each Si ∈ A is indexed in natural order.

4.5 A Possible Modification to The Operational Cost Constraint

The formulation presented in section 4.2 is time independent. It may be useful for a
particular system to model time in the operational cost constraint. This section builds a
methodology to accommodate that capability.

There are four possible outcomes for the prognostic system’s assessment of the data
stream. These outcomes are summarized in the table below.
Table 4-3. Summary of sensor readings and their associated probabilities
Sensor Report
Reality (Truth)
Fault (n readings)
No Fault (N readings)
False Positive (PFP)
No Fault
True Negative (PTN)
Cost ciFP
False Negative (PFN)
True Positive (PTP)
Fault
Cost ciFN
•

PTN is the probability that the prognostics system does not report a fault when no
fault is present.

•

PFP is the probability that the prognostics system reports a fault when a fault is not
present. The cost of this event is ciFP.
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•

PFN is the probability that the prognostics system does not a report a fault when
one is actually present. The cost of this event is ciFN.

•

PTP is the probability that the prognostics system reports a fault when one is
actually present.

The ciFP and ciFN costs may be more appropriately expressed as a function of PFP and PFN,
respectively. The larger PFP and PFN, the more often the cost will be incurred. However,
the idea of “often” introduces a time element into the formulation. Let N be the total
number of no-fault readings for a given time period, and let n be the number of fault
readings for the same time period. Let the total number of readings be represented by T =
N + n. Then the quantities N and n can be considered the expected number of “no fault”

and “fault” readings, respectively, per T trials.

Estimates for the number of failure readings which might occur during a given sortie can
be obtained from Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) information. MTBF is the
number of time units (usually hours) that pass before a component, assembly, or system
fails. It is a measure of hardware product or component reliability, and is a commonlyused variable in reliability and maintainability analyses. The MTBF for a particular
component can be used to determine estimates for N and n, given the rate at which
system readings are collected. Let tT denote the system reading rate and S be the length
in time of the sortie. Then
T = t T S
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(4-8)

 S 
n= 

 MTBF 

(4-9)

S 

N = T 
 MTBF 

(4-10)

and

As a specific example, assume a 20 hour sortie (S), a system reading (tT) every second,
and an MTBF of 10 hours. Then T = 72,000, N = 71,998, and n = 2.

The modified form of the operational cost constraint would be:
PFPnciFP + PFNNciFN ≤ BO

(4-11)

4.6 A More General Formulation

The formulation presented in section 4.2 apportions employment costs among the
different system components. The underlying rationale is that size, power, weight, and
similar constraints are likely to be different for any given system component. However,
there are parts of the cost of employing a sensor ensemble that might be freely transferred
among system components, such as monetary costs. Additionally, there may be system
components where size, power, weight, and similar constraints are not limiting factors.
Here, the employment cost constraint is relaxed to allow for an overall system budget.
The new formulation is given by
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F(PFP*) ≡ max PTP(A)
A ∈ GR(S)

subject to

(4-11)

PFP(A) ≤ PFP*

(structural constraint--there are SC of these constraints, where SC is the number of
subcomponents)
SC sc

∑d
m =1

c
sm

≥1

c = 1, …, C; s = 1, …, SCc; m = 1, …, SCcs

d

c
sm

1 if mth sensor retained on sth

= sub - component of cth component
0 otherwise


(employment cost constraint—there is now only one constraint)
SC

SC s

∑ ∑d
s =1

m =1

c
c
sm sm

c

≤ ΒE

s = 1, …, SCc; m = 1, …, SCcs

(operational cost constraint)
ciFP + ciFN ≤ BO

Si ∈ A

0 ≤ PFP ≤ PFP* ≤ 1
c
d sm
∈ {0, 1}

c
csm
, ciFP, ciFN, BE, BO ≥ 0

c = 1, …, C; s = 1, …, SCc; m = 1, …, SCcs
Si ∈ A; c = 1, …, C; s = 1, …, SCc; m = 1, …, SCcs

Note that only the employment cost constraint was modified from the general
formulation. The solution details are presented in Chapter V.
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V. Fusion Rule Assessment

5.1 Fusion Rule Definitions

Given a system like that shown below in Figure 5-1, the objective is to find the optimum
allocation of sensors that provides the “best” ROC curve for determining the system
status. This notion of a “best” ROC curve is developed in a later section. The ROC
curve for each classifier under consideration is assumed to be known for the discussion
that follows.

System

Component A
Subcomp. 1

Component B
Subcomp. 1

Subcomp. 2

Subcomp. 2

A

B

C

D

Sensors

E

F

G

H

I

A

B

C

D

Classifiers

E

F

G

H

I

Within
Fusion

Within
Fusion

Across Fusion

Within ROC
curves
Across ROC
curves

Within
Fusion

Within
Fusion

Across Fusion

Across Fusion

Figure 5-1. Graphic showing the terms for the different fusion operations
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Figure 5-1 shows the terminology developed for each fusion method. The ROC curves
associated with each classifier need to be combined to provide a single ROC curve
associated with the subcomponent. This first fusion method will be called within fusion.
The within fusion method creates a ROC curve for each subcomponent that has multiple
(or redundant) sensors, although a subcomponent does not necessarily require multiple
(or redundant) sensors. The ROC curves for the subcomponents (whether they have
multiple sensors or not) will be called within ROC curves.

The ROC curves associated with each subcomponent need to be combined to provide a
single ROC curve associated with their common component. This second fusion method
will be called across fusion. The across fusion method is used to combine within ROC
curves. The across fusion method creates a ROC curve for each system component. (A
component does not necessarily have to have multiple subcomponents). The ROC curves
resulting from this operation will be called across ROC curves. Each of these two fusion
methods (within and across) is described in detail in the next section.

5.2 Fusion Methods

At the lowest level of system decomposition (the subcomponent level in this model),
there are a significant number of options for sensor allocation, even on a single
subcomponent. To accurately categorize the current and future states of a particular
system, sensors must be appropriately placed on all subcomponents. As a reminder,
referring back to Figure 5-1, all subcomponents in this model are assumed to be critical to
component and system operation. In any given system, there is a balance between using
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enough sensors to ensure a high level of confidence in the prognostic system’s reports on
system status, while not exceeding power, weight, bandwidth, and other limitations
which restrict the number of sensors which may be used. Although it may be desirable to
measure the performance of every part of every subcomponent, and include redundant
sensors on the most important subcomponents, such configurations are not likely to be
feasible. The underlying assumption of this desire for these types of redundant
configurations is that multiple sensors will provide a higher level of confidence and
accuracy in the prognostic system’s reported results. To reflect that, the within fusion
method creates a ROC curve which is always equal to or greater than each of the ROC
curves of the individual classifiers which contributed to it. This topic is explored further
at the end of section 5.2.1.

5.2.1 Within Fusion

The within fusion methodology is developed using the following definitions. Let Ξ be
the event set. Let X be the feature space, and let x be a specific instantiation of this set
X. Let Xf be the set of system feature vectors indicating a system failure. Let pf = Pr(x
∈ Xf) be the prior probability that a critical subcomponent part will fail. The

corresponding definition and prior probability of the critical subcomponent part not
failing (operating nominally) is Xn and pn = (1 - pf) = Pr(x ∈ Xn). The critical
subcomponent part is assumed to only take on these two states (nominal or failed). These
two states will be termed a label set, and will be denoted by L = {F, N}.
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These two values of the label set are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive; i.e.,
L = Ln ∪ Lf, and Ln ∩ Lf = ∅.

The critical subcomponent part is assumed to have two sensors A and B attached to it.
Let Aθ and Bφ refer to the classifiers for sensor A and sensor B on the system,
respectively, where θ∈Θ and φ∈Φ, where Θ and Φ are admissible sets of parameters
associated with tuning each classifier [5]. These classifiers are assumed to assess failure
or non-failure independently (this assumption will be addressed in more detail in section
5.2.3).

Ξ
Event Set

A, B

X

Aθ, Bφ

Feature Set

L
Label Set

Figure 5-2. Methodology summary

Figure 5-2 summarizes the methodology presented to this point. System events are
detected by sensors A and B. These sensors report their collected data to the classifiers,
which assign a label (either nominal-N or failed-F), to the data stream.

The expression Cθ,φ will be used to denote the concatenated classifier of the classifiers Aθ
and Bφ.
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Ξ

X

A, B

Event Set

L×L

Cθ,φ

Feature Set

Label Set

Figure 5-3. Function of the concatenated classifier

Figure 5-3 shows the transformation of system event data into a label set via the
concatenated classifier. Since the concatenated classifier consists of both classifiers Aθ
and Bφ, the label set consists of two distinct labels.

Ξ
Event Set

A, B

X

Cθ,φ

Feature Set

L×L
Label Set

R

L
Label Set

Figure 5-4. Transformation of the system event to a final system functionality
classification

Figure 5-4 shows the complete notional flow of information through this model. Once
the concatenated classifier has determined two distinct labels, a rule R transforms these
two labels into a single label. Specifically, R(L, L) = L ∨ L, where the ∨ operator is
defined as in Table 5-1 below.
Table 5-1. Definition of the ∨ operator
∨

F

N

F

F

F

N

F

N
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Table 5-1 shows the label obtained from each classifier on the exterior of the table. The
combination of the two labels is shown in the interior of the table. In this table, the ∨
operator is defined as a “logical or” rule. A “logical or” rule is used to declare a system
failure; if either or both of the classifiers indicate a failed condition, the system is
assumed to have failed. This formulation is consistent with the FMECA assumption that
every component is critical. Only if both classifiers consider the system to be operating
nominally is the output from the rule R a nominal reading.

The expression Dθ,φ will be used to denote this fused classifier. Note that Dθ,φ = R ° Cθ,φ,
and
Dθ,φ(x) = R ° Cθ,φ(x) = R(Aθ(x), Bφ(x)) = Aθ(x) ∨ Bφ(x)

(5-1)

The operator ° denotes the transformation of the concatenated classifier Cθ,φ to the fused
classifier Dθ,φ using the rule R.

There are certain probabilities associated with each possible classification event, given
the single subcomponent’s operational state. The probability of a true positive is defined
to be a classifier declaring a failure, given the system has failed. The probability of a
false positive is defined to be a classifier declaring the system has failed, given the
system is operating nominally. The probability of a true negative is defined to be a
classifier declaring the system is operating nominally, given the system is operating
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nominally. The probability of a false negative is defined to be a classifier declaring the
system is operating nominally, given the system has failed. These probabilities are
defined mathematically below. To simplify the notation, the probability of classifier Aθ
providing a correct positive reading will be denoted as PTPA = PTP(Aθ). The parameter θ is
suppressed in this new expression. The probability of classifier Bφ providing a correct
positive reading will be denoted as, PTPB = PTP(Bφ), and so forth. Similarly, the parameter
φ is suppressed in this new expression. More rigorously, the definitions for the classifier

Aθ are
PTPA = Pr((Aθ(x) ∈ Lf|x ∈ Xf)

(5-2)

PFPA = Pr((Aθ(x) ∈ Lf|x ∈ Xn)

(5-3)

PTNA = Pr((Aθ(x) ∈ Ln|x ∈ Xn)

(5-4)

PFNA = Pr((Aθ(x) ∈ Ln|x ∈ Xf)

(5-5)

The definitions for classifier Bφ are obtained by replacing A with B and θ with φ in
equations 5-2 through 5-5.

The following table summarizes these eight conditional probabilities as measures of
distinct system events. Again, the classifiers are assumed independent.
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Table 5-2. Conditional probability table for one system component and two classifiers
Classifier Report
F, F
F, N
N, F
N, N
Cθ,φ = (Aθ,Bφ)

True State
Nominal

PFPA PFPB

PFPA PTNB

PTNA PFPB

PTNA PTNB

Failed

PTPA PTPB

B
PTPA PFN

PFNA PTPB

B
PFNA PFN

Table 5-2 shows the conditional probability for each possible event, where the classifier’s
responses are conditioned on the subcomponent’s true state.

The joint probability table in Table 5-3 lists the possible outcomes as disjoint events. The
general formulation is
Pr(Cθ,φ(x) ∈(Li × Lj) ∩ (x ∈ Xk))

(5-6)

= Pr((Aθ(x), Bφ(x)) ∈(Li × Lj) | (x ∈ Xk))Pr(x ∈ Xk)

(5-7)

= Pr(Aθ(x) ∈ Li | (x ∈ Xk) Pr(Bφ(x)) ∈ Lj | (x ∈ Xk) Pr(x ∈ Xk)

(5-8)

where i, j, k ∈ {f, n}.

Table 5-3. Joint probability table for one system component and two sensors
Classifier Report
F, F
F, N
N, F
N, N
Cθ,φ = (Aθ,Bφ)

True State
Nominal

PFPA PFPB pn

PFPA PTNB pn

PTNA PFPB pn

PTNA PTNB pn

Failed

PTPA PTPB pf

B
PTPA PFN
pf

PFNA PTPB pf

B
PFNA PFN
pf
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Table 5-3 shows the probability of occurrence for each possible event as a product of
individual probabilities. The events in this table are mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive. The first column lists the two possible states of the system, nominal or failed.
The top row lists the four different aggregate classifier reports. An “F” means the
classifier has reported a failed condition. An “N” means the classifier has reported a
nominal condition. The reports are listed at the top of each column as ‘classifier Aθ
report’, ‘classifier Bφ report’. For example, the third column lists the possible outcomes
if Aθ reports a failed condition, and Bφ reports a nominal condition.

As an example, the entry in the third row and the third column denotes the specific event
where Aθ indicates failed operation and Bφ indicates nominal operation, and the system
has failed. Mathematically, the expression is:
B
PTNA PFN
pf = Pr(Aθ(x) ∈ Lf | (x ∈ Xf) Pr(Bφ(x)) ∈ Ln | (x ∈ Xf) Pr(x ∈ Xf)

(5-9)

The ROC curves for each classifier consist of a set of points where a probability of true
positive value (ordinate) is specified for each probability of false positive value
(abscissa). The within fusion methodology uses these coordinate pairs, at common set
points along the abscissa, to create the new ROC curve. The mathematical method used
to combine the abscissas and ordinates into a new point is described below.

The pair of points used to develop the methodology will be denoted as ( PFPA , PTPA ) and
( PFPB , PTPB ), following the notation from Table 5-3. The point resulting from this fusion
C
process will be labeled ( PFP
, PTPC ). The probability of false positive for the combined
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classifier Cθ,φ is the probability that Cθ,φ declares a failure, given that the system is
operating nominally. This classifier will declare a failure in three cases: if either Aθ, Bφ,
or both, declare a failure. Again, this is the “logical or” failure rule. Note that
C
PFP
= 1 - PTNC

(5-10)

This suggests the following formulation using the probability structure suggested in
Table 5-3. The definition of true negative is the declaration of nominal system operation,
given the system is operating nominally. Note that
PTND = Pr(Dθ,φ(x) ∈ Ln | (x ∈ Xn))

(5-11)

= Pr((Aθ(x) ∨ Bφ(x))∈ Ln | (x ∈ Xn))

(5-12)

PTNC = Pr((Aθ(x) ∈ Ln) ∩ (Bφ(x) ∈ Ln) | (x ∈ Xn))

(5-13)

Pr(Aθ(x) ∈ Ln | (x ∈ Xn)) ∩ Pr(Bφ(x)) ∈ Ln ∩ (x ∈ Xn))
Pr(x ∈ Xn)

(5-14)

= [ PTNA ][ PTNB ]

(5-15)

= [1 - PFPA ] [1 - PFPB ].

(5-16)

C
PFP
= 1 - [1 - PFPA ] [1 - PFPB ]

(5-17)

C
PFP
= [ PFPA + PFPB – PFPA PFPB ].

(5-18)

as is evident from Table 5-3

Finishing, note that
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The corresponding true positive values, for the identical probability of false positive
values on each ROC curve, are combined in the same fashion. The preceding derivation
is repeated below with appropriate changes in notation.
C
PTPC = 1 - PFN

(5-19)

D
PFN
= Pr(Dθ,φ(x) ∈ Ln | (x ∈ Xf))

(5-20)

= Pr((Aθ(x) ∨ Bφ(x))∈ Ln | (x ∈ Xf))

(5-21)

C
PFN
= Pr((Aθ(x) ∈ Ln) ∩ (Bφ(x) ∈ Ln) ∩ (x ∈ Xf))

(5-22)

Pr(x ∈ Xn)
Pr(Aθ(x) ∈ Ln | (x ∈ Xf)) ∩ Pr(Bφ(x)) ∈ Ln | (x ∈ Xf))

(5-23)

B
]
= [ PFNA ][ PFN

(5-24)

= [1 - PTPA ] [1 - PTPB ]

(5-25)

PTPC = 1 - [1 - PTPA ] [1 - PTPB ].

(5-26)

PTPC = [ PTPA + PTPB – PTPA PTPB ].

(5-27)

as is evident from Table 5-3’

As expected, the formula is

The point on this fused ROC curve is given by
C
, PTPC )=( PFPA + PFPB – PFPA PFPB , PTPA + PTPB – PTPA PTPB ).
( PFP

(5-28)

Again, these results assume the classifiers A and B are independent in their
measurements, and that their respective operating points are set a priori. This is not
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likely to be the case in a real system. This within fusion rule is therefore a weak upper
bound for the fused ROC curve, C. This is explored further in section 5.3.3.

This within fusion method allows for the combination of any number of classifiers. Once
the ROC curves associated with the classifiers for two sensors have been combined into a
single ROC curve, this single curve can be combined with another ROC curve associated
with the classifier for another sensor. This iterative process continues until all the
classifiers associated with the sensors on a particular subcomponent are represented by a
single ROC curve. Using a similar iterative process, any number of these within ROC
curves may be combined to form an across ROC curve, and so forth.

As an example of the within fusion rule, consider a critical subcomponent with two
sensors and two classifiers. Let the ROC curve for classifier A be given by y1 = x0.1, and
1

 2 
 6
let the ROC curve for classifier B be given by y2 =    arcsin( x)  . These are
 π 


reasonable choices for ROC curve models because like ROC curves, they begin at the
origin and end at the point (1, 1). Also, these curves are a reasonable estimate for actual
classifier performance.
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Two Notional ROC curves

Probability of True
Positive

1
0.8
0.6

ROC curve for
sensor A

0.4

ROC curve for
sensor B

0.2
0
0

0.5

1

Probability of False Positive

Figure 5-5. Two notional ROC curves

Figure 5-5 shows the two notional ROC curves. Notice that the PTP values for classifier
A exceed those for classifier B at every PFP value. Classifier A is said to dominate
classifier B.

Notional and Fused ROC curves

Probability of True Positive

1

0.8
ROC curve for sensor A
0.6
ROC curve for sensor B
0.4

Fused ROC curve for sensors
A&B

0.2

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Probability of False Positive

Figure 5-6. Graph of the two notional and fused ROC curves
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Figure 5-6 shows the two notional ROC curves and the within ROC curve. Note that the
within curve dominates both of the other curves over all of the operating range. The

values for the within ROC curve have been linearly interpolated from the values obtained
from the within fusion process.

Consider another example where one of the notional ROC curves is significantly
dominated by the other curve. Let the ROC curve for classifier C be given by
y1 = tanh(4x), and let the ROC curve for classifier D be given by y2 = x0.13.

Notional and Fused ROC curves

Probability of True Positive

1

0.8
ROC curve for sensor C
0.6
ROC curve for sensor D
0.4

Fused ROC curve for sensors
C&D

0.2

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Probability of False Positive

Figure 5-7. Graph of two more notional and fused ROC curves

Figure 5-7 shows the comparison of the within ROC curve to the original ROC curves.
Again, despite the disparity in the two original curves, the within curve still dominates
both other curves over all of the operating range. It seems from these examples the
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within ROC curve will always equal or dominate each of the ROC curves of the

individual classifiers which contributed to it. To demonstrate this in general, consider
two notional classifiers that are independent. Let these classifiers have associated
probabilities of true positive of p1 and p2 at any given probability of false positive value.
Without loss of generality, let p1 ≥ p2, and recall that p1, p2 ∈ [0,1]. Consider the quantity
p2(1-p1); this value is clearly greater than or equal to 0. Since p2(1-p1) ≥ 0, adding p1 to
both sides gives
p1 + p2(1-p1) ≥ p1

(5-29)

p1 + p2 - p1p2 ≥ p1

(5-30)

or

Equation 5-30 shows that the probability of true positive value for the within ROC curve
generated from these two independent classifiers will equal or exceed the probability of
true positive value of the individual classifier.

5.2.2 Across Fusion

The across fusion methodology, as previously stated, addresses the combination of the
within ROC curves, when the classifiers are independent. It also addresses the

combination of across ROC curves. The essential system difference between the across
fusion technique and the within fusion technique is that the within fusion technique only
deals with classifiers on one critical subcomponent. The across fusion technique focuses
on combining ROC curves from at least two different system parts (subcomponents and
components).
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This methodology is based on a monograph by Oxley and Bauer [63]. In this
monograph, Oxley and Bauer use a ‘logical or’ rule to combine two ROC curves and
produce a third ROC curve. Their underlying assumptions about this situation are
summarized below.

System
Comp. A

Comp. B

Sensors

A

B

Classifiers

A

B

Reasoner
Figure 5-8. Notional prognostics diagram with a two component system and two sensors

Figure 5-8 shows a diagram that illustrates the notional system used for the fusion
technique presented in [63]. The system, represented by the large box at the top of the
figure, contains two components. Each component sends data to a sensor, which records
this information and sends it to a classifier. The classifier uses the sensor data to report
the current condition of the component and the overall system. The sensors are assumed
to operate independently of each other, as are the system components.
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Based on this figure, conditional probabilities are defined below. The labeling
convention conditions the classifier output on the actual system data.

P(classifier declares failure|component j is actually failed) = PTPj , j ∈ {A, B}
P(classifier declares failure|component j is actually nominal) = PTPj , j ∈ {A, B}
P(classifier declares nominal|component j is actually nominal) = PTPj , j ∈ {A, B}
P(classifier declares nominal|component j is actually failed) = PTPj , j ∈ {A, B}

In Table 5-4, the first entry in the “True State” column refers to the true state coming
from “component A”. The second entry column refers to the true state of “component
B”. The first entry in the “Classifier Reports” row refers to the report from the classifier
based on data from sensor A. The second entry refers to the report from the classifier
based on data from sensor B. These reports are component specific. The mapping
between these system reports and an actual determination of system failure has not yet
been specified. However, regardless of the system report, the system has actually failed
if there is an “F” in the “True State” column (the middle three rows of the table).
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Classifier
Reports
(A, B)

Table 5-4. Conditional probability values [63]
F, F
F, N
N, F

N, N

True State
F, F

PTPA PTPB

PFPA PTNB

B
PFNA PTP

B
PFNA PFN

F, N

PTPA PFPB

PTPA PTNB

B
PFNA PFP

B
PFNA PTN

N, F

PFPA PTPB

B
PFPA PFN

B
PFNA PTP

B
PFNA PFN

N, N

PFPA PFPB

PFPA PTNB

PTNA PFPB

PTNA PTNB

Table 5-4 shows the conditional probability values for the two classifiers A and B in the
presence of both failure and nominal system data. For instance, the first entry in the cell
in the third row and fourth column, PFNA , represents the probability that the classifier
reports nominal functionality of component A given component A has failed. The second
entry in the cell, PFPB , represents the probability that the classifier reports a failure of
component B given component B is operating nominally.

The following joint probability table combines these values with the a priori
probabilities. Again, both of the two failure types are assumed to be independent of each
other.
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Table 5-5. Joint probability values [63]
Classifier
Reports
(A, B)

F, F

F, N

N, F

N, N

True State
F, F

PTPA PTPB pfqf

B
PTPA PFN
pfqf

PFNA PTPB pfqf

B
PFNA PFN
pfqf

F, N

PTPA PFPB pfqn

PTPA PTNB pfqn

PFNA PFPB pfqn

PFNA PTNB pfqn

N, F

PFPA PTPB pnqf

B
PFPA PFN
pnqf

PTNA PTPB pnqf

B
PTNA PFN
pnqf

N, N

PFPA PFPB pnqn

PFPA PTNB pnqn

PTNA PFPB pnqn

PTNA PTNB pnqn

Table 5-5 summarizes these joint probabilities as a series of disjoint events. The third
row indicates the actual data shows a failure on component A and no failure on
component B. The failure on component A is reflected with the a priori probability pf,
and the nominal condition on component B is reflected with the a priori probability qn.
These are expected to be small and large probability values, respectively.

In their monograph, Oxley and Bauer [63] use the preceding table to develop an
expression for the fused ROC curve for two mechanical system components. Let fA and
fB represent the two original ROC curves. Also, as before, let pf be the prior probability
of failure of component A, and let qf, be the prior probability of failure of component B.
Let the following relationships hold:
γ = pf + qf - pfqf, r ∈ [0, 1], s ∈ [0, r]
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(5-31)

Then the fused ROC curve is given by
fC(r) =

 1   r (1 − γ )   1 
 −   min ( z )
  − 
  γ  0 ≤ p≤ r
γ   γ

(5-32)

where
 
 r − s  
 r − s 
z = 1 − ( p f f A (s ) + (1 − p f )s ) 1 −   q f f B 
 
  + (1 − q f )
 1 − s  
 1− s 
  

[

]

(5-33)

Equation 5-37 is the relation used to combine two within or across ROC curves to
produce another across ROC curve.

5.2.3 Dependent Sensors

This section develops bounds for the effects of dependent sensors within a given system.
Consider a system where the sensors A and B are completely dependent. This would
occur if two sensors were both measuring the same phenomenology on the same
component, as they would if the sensors are redundant. In such a system, accurate
readings from sensor B would match accurate readings from sensor A in every possible
operating condition. In effect, sensor B provides no new information on the condition of
the system. Note that this condition does not assume the accuracy of the sensors would
be the same, just that their accurate readings would be the same. In this case with
completely dependent sensors, the logical decision is to chose the sensor with the better
accuracy, and discard the other one. Hence, a lower bound on the fused ROC curve C is
the best ROC curve associated with the classifier for one of the two original sensors A
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and B. In passing, it is worth noting that the only time the accuracy of the sensors would
be the same is when the sensors are identical, AND have identical operating conditions.

As previously stated, the within fusion methodology provides a weak upper bound on the
fused ROC curve C. This is because the methodology uses set operating points from both
ROC curves to generate the fused ROC curve. This methodology is in contrast to the
across fusion methodology, which takes a specific operating point from one ROC curve

and searches along the entire length of the other ROC curve to choose the best point to
obtain the best probability of true positive value. If the within fusion methodology had
been developed using a similar technique, the fused ROC curve C would be optimal,
relative to the classifier thresholds. (This result is found in Oxley and Bauer [63].) This
means this optimal within ROC curve would have probability of true positive values that
are at least equal to the values of the fused within ROC curve generated using set
operating points, and potentially have a number of values that exceed the values of this
fused within ROC curve. However, the within (and across) fusion methodology assumes
the sensors that provide data to the classifiers operate independently. This assumption
may not always hold, particularly if the sensors on a subcomponent are intended to be
redundant. If there is some degree of dependency between the sensors, then the optimal
within ROC curve will overestimate the actual within ROC curve. The fused within ROC

curve generated using set operating points may also overestimate the actual within ROC
curve, but to a smaller degree than the actual optimal within ROC curve. Hence, the
fused within ROC curve is used to provide the estimate of the actual within ROC curve.
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With an established lower bound (the best single ROC curve) and a weak upper bound
(the fused within ROC curve) for the fused within ROC curve C, it is obvious that the
actual within ROC curve for a system with dependent sensors would lie between these
two extremes. Precisely where it would be located depends on the amount of dependency
between the two sensors. This amount of dependency may change from one operating
condition to another. There also may be a minimum level of dependency which is
present in every operating condition. The actual within ROC curve is probably best
determined through empirical observation of the actual system in question.

5.3 Application to a Two-Component System

In this section, two problems are constructed and solved using the within and across
fusion methods described in this chapter. Additionally, a solution algorithm is presented
for solving these problems. Section 5.3.1 presents the across fusion methodology, using
a simple system as an example. This simple system has a single component with two
subcomponents and two sensors on each subcomponent, as shown in Figure 5-9. Section
5.3.2 presents the general solution algorithm for solving these types of problems. Section
5.3.3 uses the solution algorithm presented in section 5.3.2 to solve a second, more
complicated problem. This second problem expands the first problem by adding a second
component to the system. This new component also has two subcomponents, but with
two sensors on the first subcomponent and three sensors on the second subcomponent.
Section 5.3.4 presents an excursion where the per component budget constraint is relaxed
to apply only to the overall system.
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5.3.1 A Single Component Problem

This section presents a simple problem to demonstrate the application of the two fusion
methods. The notional system used for this problem has a single component and two
subcomponents.

System

Component A
Subcomp. 1

Subcomp. 2

Sensors

A

B

C

D

Classifiers

A

B

C

D

Reasoner
Figure 5-9. Figure 4-2 reproduced for clarity

Figure 5-9 shows the design of the simple system which will be used to demonstrate
solving the across fusion problem. Solving this problem will require four notional ROC
curves (one for each sensor), two fused ROC curves (within curves) using the within
fusion methodology, and ultimately one ROC curve (across curve) using the across
fusion methodology. The objective is for this across ROC curve to be the best one
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possible. To accomplish this objective will only require three fused ROC curves since
there is no budget constraint on the number of sensors that may be considered per
subcomponent.

The curves that were used to produce the illustrative examples in section 5.2.1 will be
used to solve this problem. As a reminder, the ROC curve for classifier A was given by
1

 2 
 6
y1 = x , and the ROC curve for classifier B was given by y2 =    arcsin( x)  .
 π 

0.1

Notional and Fused ROC curves

Probability of True Positive

1

0.8
ROC curve for sensor A
0.6
ROC curve for sensor B
0.4

Fused ROC curve for sensors
A&B

0.2

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Probability of False Positive

Figure 5-10. Figure 5-6 reproduced for clarity

Figure 5-10 shows these two notional ROC curves and their associated within ROC
curve.
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As before (section 5.2.1), let the ROC curve for classifier C be given by y3 = tanh(4x),
and let the ROC curve for classifier D be given by y4 = x0.13.

Two more Notional ROC curves

Probability of True Positive

1
0.8
0.6

ROC curve for sensor C
ROC curve for sensor D

0.4
0.2
0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Probability of False Positive

Figure 5-11. Two more notional ROC curves

Figure 5-11 shows these two notional ROC curves. Neither curve is completely
dominated by the other.
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Notional and Fused ROC curves

Probability of True Positive

1

0.8
ROC curve for sensor C
0.6
ROC curve for sensor D
0.4

Fused ROC curve for sensors
C&D

0.2

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Probability of False Positive

Figure 5-12. Graph of two more notional ROC curves, and the fused curve

Figure 5-12 shows the graph of ROC curves C and D, and their within ROC curve.

Probability of True Positive

Fused ROC curves
1
0.8

ROC curve for fused
sensors A & B

0.6

ROC curve for fused
sensors C & D

0.4

ROC curve for all four
sensors

0.2
0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Probability of False Positive

Figure 5-13. The across ROC curves for the two classifier pairs, and the across ROC

curve obtained by fusing all four classifiers using across fusion
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Figure 5-13 shows the fusion of the two across curves into a single across ROC curve,
using the across fusion method. This is now the ROC curve for the component/system.
Note that the across ROC curve approximately splits the difference between these two
curves.

5.3.2 The General Solution Algorithm

This section presents the general solution algorithm for solving these types of problems.

Get first subset
Get next subset via
natural ordering*
No

Last subset?

Yes

Finish

No
No

Is subset
employment
operational
structural

feasible?
Yes

Fuse Components
Compute PTP, Cost **
* Exploits
F(A, B, C) = F(F(A, B), C)
** Refers to costs that are
transferable among components

Add to Portfolio
-orKeep Maximum

Figure 5-14. Algorithm for problem solution
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Figure 5-14 shows the algorithm employed to solve this problem. Each subset for a given
component is enumerated. The employment, operational, and structural costs are
determined for each subset. If any of these costs exceeds the values specified in the
problem constraints, the subset is considered to be infeasible. Infeasible subsets are
eliminated from the solution space. The subset fusion (using within and across
techniques) is performed only if a subset is feasible. When the fusion process has been
completed, the PTP value is computed and compared to the current maximum PTP value.
If the PTP of the current subset exceeds the current maximum, the current subset becomes
the new optimal solution. Otherwise, it is discarded and the next subset is checked for
feasibility. This process continues until all possible subsets have been considered.

5.3.3 A Two Component Problem

As was demonstrated in section 5.3.1, the across fusion method is used to fuse other
across curves. As previously stated, most systems will typically have more than one

component. Figure 4-3 (reproduced below) shows a more complex system.
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Component B
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Reasoner
Figure 5-15. Figure 4-3 reproduced for clarity

A mathematical programming framework was presented in chapter 4 to determine the
optimal allocation of sensors to subcomponents problem. This is a complex problem
because there are an exponential number of subsets that must be considered in light of
various structural and operational constraints. Each subset of sensors typically requires
multiple ROC curve fusions. These fusions are the most computationally intense
calculations encountered in the optimization. Some of the constraints are rapidly
evaluated and as such certain sensor subsets are eliminated from consideration.
Interestingly, this mathematical programming problem is actually easier to solve given
the addition of these easily evaluated structural and operational constraints. Consider the
problem posed by Figure 5-15. In this example, it is notionally assumed that one sensor
subset for component A and three sensor subsets for component B are not feasible. It is
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also assumed that at least one sensor is monitoring each subcomponent, which means the
subset of no sensors (the empty set) is excluded from consideration.

Table 5-6. Number of sensor subsets to consider given constraint types

Criteria

Number of sensor combinations

1. Any non-empty sensor combinations

511

2. At least one sensor per component

465

3. At least one sensor per subcomponent

189

4. One sensor per subcomponent and cost feasible

144

Table 5-6 shows the number of sensor ensembles which must be considered given the
various constraint types. The number 511 in the first row was obtained by determining
the total number of subsets of the nine sensors available for use (512), and subtracting the
empty set. The number 465 was computed by determining the total number of subsets of
the four sensors available for use on the first component (16), and subtracting the empty
set to yield a total of 15. The total number of non-empty subsets on the second
component was similarly determined to be 31, and multiplying these two numbers gives
465. The number 189 in the third row was determined using a similar process. The
number of non-empty subsets for each subcomponent was determined, and these numbers
(3, 3, 3, and 7) were multiplied together to give the number of subsets that have at least
one sensor per subcomponent. The number in the fourth row incorporates cost
feasibility, so of the nine non-empty subsets for component one that have at least one
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sensor per subcomponent, eight are assumed to be cost feasible. Similarly, 18 of the
second component subsets are cost feasible, and multiplying these two values gives 144.

Notice that the last row listed in the table, which embodies the mathematical
programming approach espoused in chapter 4, corresponds to a 72% reduction in the
number of ensembles to be considered. It should be noted that entries 2, 3, and 4 in the
table are not consistent with the mathematical programming assumption that each
subcomponent requires at least one sensor.

Solving this example will require five additional notional single classifier ROC curves.
For simplicity, let the classifiers E through H have the same ROC curves as classifiers A
through D. The ROC curves will then be defined as:

Classifier A and Classifier E -- y1 = x0.1,
1

 2 
 6
Classifier B and Classifier F -- y2 =    arcsin( x)  ,
 π 


Classifier C and Classifier G -- y3 = tanh(4x),
and Classifier D and Classifier H -- y4 = x0.13.

Let the ROC curve for classifier I be given by y5 = (1-(x-1)2)0.5 (the upper left quadrant of
a circle centered at (1, 0)).

5-31

Probability of True Positive
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Figure 5-16. Notional ROC curves for all 9 classifiers

Figure 5-16 shows the graphs for all of these notional ROC curves.

The overall sensor budget is divided into a portion for each component. This is because
the cost for employing a sensor includes power, weight, space, and other constraints that
are not readily transferable to other components. However, some of this cost is the actual
monetary cost required to purchase the sensor hardware. Consequently, some portions of
the unused budget amounts for a given component could be transferred to other
components. This point is addressed in section 5.3.4.
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Table 5-7. Sensor costs for the employment cost constraint

Sensors/Component

Per Unit Cost

A, E

45

B, F

30

C, G

25

D, H

35

I

35

Table 5-7 shows the cost for each sensor. The budget for component A is 125 and the
budget for component B is 135.. These values incorporate the notional assumption that
one sensor combination is infeasible for component A, and three sensor combinations are
infeasible for component B. The solution method rapidly determines all the feasible
sensor combinations, and then computes the respective ROC curves.

It is of interest to compute the “best” ROC curves (those that possess the largest PTP value
among all the ROC curves at a given PFP value) for subsets within the components. It
should be noted that in the range 0.0 ≤ PFP ≤ 0.04, there are many ensembles which have
the same probability of true positive, to four decimal places. However, a unique
ensemble is always the “best” ensemble when the probability of false positive value
reaches 0.05.
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ROC curves of optimal ensembles
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Figure 5-17. The solution for component A

Figure 5-17 shows the solution for component A. Sensor ensemble ABD is the “best”
ensemble until the probability of false positive value reaches 0.37, then sensor ensemble
ABC is the “best” ensemble. Sensor ensemble ABCD would have been included on this
graph if it had been cost feasible.
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ROC curves of optimal ensembles
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Figure 5-18. The solution for component B

Figure 5-18 shows the optimal ROC curves for component B. Sensor ensemble EFH is
the “best” ensemble until the probability of false positive value reaches 0.16, then sensor
ensemble EFGH is the “best” ensemble.

The actual solution process is implemented according to the algorithm presented in figure
5.9. Once all the feasible ROC curves have been generated for each component, they are
combined using the across fusion method. In this example, this means that each of the 8
feasible ROC curves from component A are individually combined with each of the 18
feasible ROC curves from component B. This creates the entire set of feasible ROC
curves. Then, for each probability of false positive value, the solution method determines
which ROC curve has the best TP value. This usually leads to a collection of a number
of ROC curves, as one ROC curve supersedes another as the maximization process
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continues. The optimal solution for this problem is given by the four curves shown
below.

ROC curves of optimal sensor ensembles
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Figure 5-19. The optimal ROC curves for this example

Figure 5-20 shows an enlarged view of the area of the graph where the probability of true
positive value is greater than0.8.
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ROC curves of optimal sensor ensembles
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Figure 5-20. A closer view of the optimal ROC curves

Figure 5-19 shows that the sensor ensembles ACDEH, ACDEFH, ACDEFGH, and
ABCEFGH are the “best” curves for this notional example. These ensembles will be
referred to as sensor ensembles 1-4, respectively, for simplicity. As an example, sensor
ensemble 1 (ACDEH) is represented by the diamonds, and dominates the other curves
over a small part of the range, from domain values 0.05 through 0.06. At the domain
values 0.07 through 0.23, sensor ensemble 2 (ACDEFH) dominates. For the domain
values 0.24 through 0.61, sensor ensemble 3 (ACDEFGH) dominates. And sensor
ensemble 4 (ABCEFGH) dominates for the remainder of the domain values, 0.62 through
1.00.

Once these best sensor ensembles have been identified, the best overall ensemble is
selected. This is done by selecting a maximum allowable value for the probability of
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false positive. The ensemble with the largest probability of true positive value at that
particular point is chosen as the ensemble to employ on the system. In this example, if
the maximum allowable value for the probability of false positive is 0.2, the best sensor
ensemble is ACDEFH.

5.3.4 Two Component Problem Excursion

As previously stated, some unused portions of the budget for a particular component are
not transferable to other components, in the context of this model. However, excess cost
may be transferred between components. This ability to transfer excess cost may require
the calculation of new solutions. Assuming the excess budget amounts may be
transferred between the two components, the optimal solution changes.

ROC curves of optimal sensor ensembles
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Figure 5-21. The optimal ROC curves if unused budget allocations could be transferred

among components
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ROC curves of optimal sensor ensembles
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Figure 5-22. A closer view of the optimal ROC curves

Figure 5-21 shows the optimal solution to the problem if the entire budget could be
shifted among the two components. The change from sensor ensemble ABDEFHI to
sensor ensemble ABCDEFHI occurs at 0.29. The change from sensor ensemble
ABCDEFHI to sensor ensemble ABCDEFGH occurs at 0.63. These ROC curves are
generally only a few thousandths better than the ROC curves presented in Figure 5-19.
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VI. Summary and Recommendations

6.1 Overview

This dissertation research makes contributions in the emerging field of prognostics. This
section summarizes these contributions and presents recommendations for future
research.

6.2 Theoretical Contributions

A mathematical programming model was developed to optimally allocate sensors and
their respective classifiers among system components. The model includes structural,
employment cost, and operational cost constraints, allowing this formulation to be
tailored for any given system and budget.

System data fusion methods were developed to allow for the combination of information
from the classifiers associated with different sensors. Two different types of fusion
methods were employed. The first method, called within fusion, uses the characteristics
of sensors on a single system component to provide an assessment of that component’s
functionality, and is developed here. The second method, called across fusion, combines
within fusion measures (and other across fusion measures) to ultimately provide an

assessment of the system’s functionality.

A proof was given demonstrating to show that in the absence of noise for independent
sensors, adding sensors of any capability to a given sensor ensemble will improve the
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ability of the ensemble to accurately determine the system state. This allows for rapid
evaluation of points in the solution space, since if all ensembles of a certain size are
feasible, all smaller ensembles will have smaller objective function values and can be
eliminated from consideration.

A methodology was developed to assess the relative merit of various fusion rules. There
are many different methodologies for combining the information from multiple sensors.
The method presented for scoring the different methodologies allows for the selection of
the best methodology for fusing sensor information, based on the capabilities of the
sensors, the relative importance of avoiding false negatives compared to false positives,
and the reliability of the system components under consideration.

A proof was given demonstrating that demonstrate that under the conditions of sensor
independence and no system “noise”, a “logical or” fusion rule is the best methodology
for combining sensor information. It also demonstrates that there is no “best” fusion rule
for situations which do not meet the conditions required for this proof.

A similar proof was given to show that under the conditions of sensor independence and
no system “noise”, a “logical and” fusion rule is the best methodology for combining
sensor information. It also demonstrates that there is no best fusion rule for situations
which do not meet the conditions required for this proof.
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6.3 Applied Contributions

A comprehensive literature review was written summarizing research activities
associated with applying the science of prognostics to various military and industrial
applications. This review includes descriptions of efforts to develop both system-wide
and component-part prognostic systems. It also discusses some of the technical
challenges that must be overcome in order to successfully implement a prognostics
system.

A Prognostics and Health Management system taxonomy was developed to provide a
common frame of reference for discussions about prognostics systems. This taxonomy
included the definitions of various types of faults, and the expected outputs from a
prognostics system.

Sample problems using the mathematical program and the system data fusion
methodology were presented and solved to show the application of this methodology. A
notional two-component system was constructed with places for notional sensors to be
employed. ROC curves were used to approximate the sensors’ classification
performance. Notional costs were assigned to each sensor, and a problem solution
algorithm was developed to ensure the optimal solution was found, while avoiding
unnecessary sensor fusion computations.

6-3

6.4 Areas for Future Research

This methodology could be employed to perform prognostics functions on real world
systems. Data can be collected from a given system of interest. Once sufficient data has
been collected analysis of that data should reveal unique data patterns which correspond
to different failure states. An appropriate set of classifiers can then be trained to
recognize these unique patterns and provide high confidence diagnoses of system
problems. The algorithm for optimum sensor allocation from this research can be
employed to appropriately deploy sensors on this system and use these classifiers to
provide system prognostics.

The prognostic information from the preceding effort could be used to manage
operational systems. Once information about the future health of multiple systems is
known, that information can be used to proactively schedule maintenance actions, assess
population health, determine future mission/production capability rates, and adjust future
mission/production schedules. These capabilities have been collectively described as an
Autonomic Logistics System (ALS). A possible research effort would involve actually
designing an ALS which performed these functions.

System damage generation and prediction mechanisms could be developed. Real system
damage data streams are hard to find. The goal of system maintenance is to prevent
damage from occurring. Additionally, allowing a system to be destroyed to capture the
actual failure data can be prohibitively expensive. In virtually all cases, modeling
catastrophic failure paths must be accomplished via analytical models or simulation as
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opposed to actual data. The development of a damage generation model would allow for
the simulation of catastrophic damage processes for a wide variety of systems. This
would provide data for a prognostics system to recognize the early symptoms of
catastrophic damage, and allow for preventative action to terminate system operations
before the catastrophic failure occurred.

The sensor fusion methodology presented in this dissertation can be applied to other
sensor fusion problems. These problems include Automatic Target Recognition, Combat
Identification, Battle Damage Assessment, and related battlefield issues. All these issues
require a high degree of confidence in the answer, and consequently employ a number of
different data streams to ensure the answer provided is as accurate as possible. The
fusion methodology presented in this work could be used to combine the different data
streams to provide the accurate answer required.
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Appendix A. Methodology Comparison

The following table [95] briefly describes and compares 18 different methods, including
variations on neural network and fuzzy logic implementations.

The column headings on each page list the different techniques, and the row headings on
each page describe a characteristic of interest associated with each technique. The row
headings begin with “Nature of the required data” and “Nature of the system”. The first
heading describes the kind and amount of data required for the particular technique to be
useful. The next heading describes the kind of system for which the technique would be
most effective. The next row headings are “Time required to generate a solution” and
“’Cost’ of the solution (in a relative sense)”. The “Time” heading provides an
assessment of the time required to develop an appropriate solution. The “Cost” heading
provides a relative idea of how much time and how many resources would be expended
to develop a good solution, compared to other the other techniques. Next are the
“Reliability (robustness) of the solution” and “Stability of the solution” headings. The
“Reliability” heading describes how accurately model results reflect the true nature of the
system. The “Stability” heading describes the technique’s consistency over time. The
last heading “Changes required if something new is introduced to the underlying system”
describes what changes must be made to the model if the underlying system changes.
This row provides an idea of how easy or hard it is to maintain an appropriate model
using a particular technique. Nearly all systems will be changed (through maintenance,
upgrades, etc.) from their original configuration during their operational lifetime, and the
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model in use must adapt to these changes to continue to provide accurate system
diagnoses. Some modeling techniques are inherently more flexible than others, and this
row indicates which techniques are more flexible.
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Table 3-1. Summary of Diagnostic/Prognostic Methods [95]
Technique/
Fuzzy Logic
Neural nets
Genetic
DempsterAlgorithms
Schafer
Problem
(“reasoning”)
(“associative”)
(optimization)
(evidential
Parameters
theory)

Nature of the
required data

Maybe
Incomplete,
low-fidelity,
small amounts

Nature of the
system

Non-linear,
highly complex
(use other
techniques if
system is
“linear”, has
lots of data)
Moderate/Very
long if experts’
opinions must
be gathered

Time required
to generate a
solution

“Cost” of the
solution (in a
relative sense)
Reliability
(robustness) of
the solution
Stability of the
solution

Changes
required if
something new
is introduced to
the underlying
system

Moderate

Optimal—
depending on
initial expert
opinions
Depends on
inherent
“disagreement”
among the
“experts”
Requires
updating but
easy to update

Lots of data,
“Large”
high fidelity,
solution
need to cover population, data
dynamic range can be missing,
of system, need incomplete or
large separation discontinuous
between data
classes
Non-linear,
Non-linear,
highly complex highly complex
(use other
(use other
techniques if
techniques if
system is
system is
“linear”)
“linear”)

Incomplete,
low-fidelity,
small amounts
conflicting

Missing or
conflicting
informationneed to
combine
information

Short,
moderate, or
long training
time depending
on size of net
Moderate to
large

Very long

Short to
moderate

Large

Moderate

Optimal,
guaranteed to
exist (finding it
another matter)
Very stable for
data on which
the network has
been trained,
unpredictable
otherwise
Net requires
more training

Optimal
solution not
guaranteed to
exist/be found
Stable for the
initial problem

Optimal—
depending on
initial expert
opinions
Depends on the
accuracy of the
prior
probabilities

Requires recomputation of
the solution

Requires recomputation of
the solution

A-3

Technique/
Problem
Parameters
Nature of the
required data

Nature of the
system
Time required
to generate a
solution
“Cost” of the
solution (in a
relative sense)
Reliability
(robustness) of
the solution
Stability of the
solution

Changes
required if
something new
is introduced to
the underlying
system

Feature
Selection/
Extraction

Rule-Based
Expert systems

Fuzzy
Clustering/
Classifying

Lots of data,
high fidelity,
needs to cover
dynamic range
of system

Sensor/
Knowledge/
Information/
Fusion
More is better,
can handle
incomplete,
low-fidelity,
small amounts

Incomplete,
low-fidelity,
small amounts

Doesn’t matter

Doesn’t matter

Doesn’t matter

Moderate
amount, hifidelity, large
separation
between data
classes
Doesn’t matter

Depends on
selection/
development
method chosen
Depends on
selection/
development
method chosen
Depends on
initial data

Depends on
selection/
development
method chosen
Depends on
selection/
development
method chosen
Depends on
initial data

Long for
development,
short to run

Moderate

Large if
development
must be done,
small otherwise
Optimal—
depending on
initial expert
opinions
Depends on the
accuracy of the
heuristics

Moderate

Depends on
Depends on
selection/
selection/
development
development
method chosen method chosen
Process must be Process must be
repeated
repeated
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Requires recomputation of
the solution

Depends on
location and
number of
clusters
Depends on
location and
number of
clusters
Requires recomputation of
the solution

Technique/
Problem
Parameters
Nature of the
required data

Nature of the
system

Time required
to generate a
solution

“Cost” of the
solution (in a
relative sense)
Reliability
(robustness) of
the solution
Stability of the
solution

Changes
required if
something new
is introduced to
the underlying
system

Least Squares
Fit

Need clear
definition of
independent,
dependent
variables, lots
of data

Independent
variables must
be independent,
system must be
linear with few
non-linearities
Short

Kalman
Filtering

Simulation

Need accurate Good insight on
system model.
system
“Noise”
functions—
associated with
math models
data must be
used to
Gaussian white,
represent
must have
system must be
“confidence”
accurate
(variance)
associated with
each data point
Linear (nonCan be of any
linear models
kind
exist but not
covered in
class)
Moderate

Depends
directly on
number of
system
functions
Depends
directly on time

Fuzzy wavelet
analysis

Hi-fidelity,
quantity not as
important

Non-linear,
highly complex
(use other
techniques if
system is
“linear”)
Long if
knowledge base
must be
created, else
moderate
Moderate

Small

Moderate

Only over the
range where
data was
collected
Very stable

Optimal for a
linear system

Depends on
accuracy of
math model

Very reliable

Filter “adapts”
to new datacompare to
some baseline
Only if baseline
changes, then
change
comparison
baseline

Very stable

Very stable

Math model
functions must
be altered

Knowledge
base must be
updated—
feature set must
be re-validated

Recomputation
required
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Technique/
Problem
Parameters
Nature of the
required data

Nature of the
system

Time required
to generate a
solution

Statistical
Change
Detection
(SCD)
Accurate data
collection, need
to know “defect
frequencies”

Can be of any
kind producing
frequency
information
Moderate

State-Based
Feature
Recognition

Case-Based
Reasoning

Dynamic
Neural Nets

Accurate
pattern
representation,
state machines
for each failure
mode
Signal data

Hi-fidelity,
sufficient to
describe the
event

Moderate
amount of highfidelity data

Can be of any
kind

Can be of any
kind

Short if case
library
exists/Very
long if case
library needs to
be built
Large if library
needs to be
built, small
otherwise
Reliable, not
optimal—has
difficulty with
novel events
Very stable

Long if fuzzy
sets need to be
built

None—new
events will be
added to the
library as they
occur

New rule sets
must be
generated and
WNN must be
trained further

Long if failure
modes need to
be identified

“Cost” of the
solution (in a
relative sense)

Moderate

Small to
Moderate

Reliability
(robustness) of
the solution

Optimal change
detection point

Very reliable

Stability of the
solution

May be
affected by
noise, other
frequencies not
of interest
Ensure
frequency set of
interest is still
correct

Very stable

Changes
required if
something new
is introduced to
the underlying
system

Modify
appropriate
state machines
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Large

Optimal

Very stable

Technique/
Problem
Parameters
Nature of the
required data

Nature of the
system

ARMA/ARIMA

Weibull
Modeling

“Noise”
associated with
data must be
Gaussian white,
data collected is
evenly spaced
and consecutive
in time
Linear

Actual failure
data, hi-fidelity,
as much as
possible

Time required
to generate a
solution

Moderate

“Cost” of the
solution (in a
relative sense)
Reliability
(robustness) of
the solution

Moderate

Stability of the
solution
Changes
required if
something new
is introduced to
the underlying
system

Stable

Reliable

Baseline
operation series
must be updated
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Failure events
should follow a
Weibull
distribution,
otherwise this
technique is
useless
Moderate/Very
long if failure
data must be
collected
Moderate

Somewhat
reliable—
generated
solution will
never be
correct, but
may be “close
enough”
Somewhat
stable
New failure
data must be
collected and
the curve regenerated

Appendix B. Sensor Ensemble Accuracy

If the assumption is made that each sensor in an ensemble has a positive probability of
detecting a problem (a positive value for PTP), then adding such a sensor to an ensemble
only increases the value of PTP for the ensemble (ignoring any system noise contribution).
The sensors are also assumed to be independent. This assertion is formalized in the
following theorem.

First, given a set X of sensors, define the maximum probability of obtaining a true
positive by max PTP(x).
Theorem 1: Let T ∈ An, S ∈ Am, where n < m, and T ⊂ S. Then maxTP(T) < maxTP(S).
Proof:

Since there are n sensors in T, the probability of not detecting a true fault with this sensor
suite is
n

Pnodetect(T) =

∏ (1 – PTP(Si))

(4a-1)

i=1

Hence, the probability of detecting any problem is given by
n

maxPTP (T) = 1 –

∏ (1 – PTP(Si))

(4a-2)

i=1

This expression is the “logical or” fusion rule—if any one of the sensors detects a true
fault, the fault is defined to be detected.

Consider a set S containing m= n + k sensors, where k ∈ Z+. T = {s1, s2, …, sn}, and S =
{s1, s2, …, sn, sn+1, …, sm}. Clearly, T ⊂ S. The probability of not detecting a true fault
with this sensor suite is
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n+k

Pnodetect(S) =

∏ (1 – PTP(Si))

(4a-3)

i=1

Hence, the probability of detecting a true fault is
n+k

maxPTP (S) = 1 –

∏ (1 – PTP(Si))

(4a-4)

i=1

Note that equations (4a-1) and (4a-3) have the same first n terms. Notice also that each
term in each equation is strictly less than 1. If the terms in common between the
expansions in each equation are removed, then

ω=

n+k

∏ (1 – PTP(Si))

(4a-5)

i=n+1

Since each term in the expansion in equation (4a-5) is less than 1, it is clear that ω < 1. If
n

∏ (1 – PTP(Si)), the equation becomes

both sides of equation (4a-5) are multiplied by

i=1

n

n+k

i=1

i=1

∏ (1 – PTP(Si)) > ∏ (1 – PTP(Si))

(4a-6)

Multiplying both sides of equation (4a-6) by –1 and then adding 1 to each side yields
n

1-

∏ (1 – PTP(Si)) < 1 i=1

n+k

∏ (1 – PTP(Si))

(4a-7)

i=1

But the left-hand side of (4a-7) is (4a-2) by definition, and the right-hand side of (4a-7) is
(4a-4) by definition, so replacement yields

maxPTP (T) < maxPTP (S)
the desired result.
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(4a-8)

It should be noted that even if a sensor is completely dependent with respect to another
sensor in the ensemble, although it will not add to the accuracy of the sensor ensemble, it
will add to the ensemble’s reliability.

This theorem implies that it is possible to reduce the size of the solution space. The first
step is to determine the set of cost-feasible sensors. Each ensemble size is searched for
cost feasibility, beginning with ensembles containing only one sensor (cardinality 1). If
the entire group of sensor ensembles of a particular size (cardinality n) is cost feasible,
the process is repeated on the next ensemble set (cardinality n + 1). If all elements of this
next ensemble set (cardinality n + 1) are cost feasible, the previous set (cardinality n) is
discarded from the solution space since this larger ensemble set will have a higher value
of PTP for any sensor combination, by the previous theorem. However, once a cost
infeasible solution is found in a set of cardinality k , all sensor ensembles of cardinality
k - 1 and greater are retained for further examination (except for cost infeasible
ensembles). All sets of cardinality k – 2 and lower are eliminated from consideration.
M 
 possible solutions, where M is the total
j =1  j 

k −2

This reduces the solution space by

∑ 

number of sensors available.

Alternatively, the search for cost feasibility could begin at the ensemble containing all the
sensors (cardinality M). The search would terminate when all ensembles of a particular
size are found to be cost feasible. If this particular size is k – 1 (as above), then all
ensembles of cardinality k – 2 and below are eliminated from consideration.
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Appendix C. Application of Fusion Rules to the Model

5.A1 Application of Fusion Rules to the Model (Optimality considerations)

This model uses a logical or rule to declare a system failure: if either or both of two
classifiers on a subcomponent indicates a failure, the reasoner concludes a failure has
occurred and reports a failed condition on the system. Both fusion techniques introduced
in the previous section use a logical or rule to combine the ROC curves associated with
each classifier to produce a new ROC curve. This section addresses whether or not a
“logical or” fusion rule may be considered optimal.

The model used for this assessment is the one Oxley and Bauer [63] used to develop the
across fusion methodology (see Figure 5-11). If the two systems’ a priori failure rates

are equal (pf = qf), and the two classifiers’ failure and nominal detection capabilities are
equal (PTP(Aθ) = PTN(Aθ) = PTP(Bφ) = PTN(Bφ)), then the “logical or” rule is the best
fusion rule. If there is even a slight inequality in one of these probabilities, then it is
possible to set the values for the other pair of variables so that a fusion rule other than
“logical or” is the best fusion rule. However, in the general case, “logical or” is the best
fusion rule. The appendix provides a general description of the values of these
parameters showing where the transition from “logical or” to a different fusion rule
occurs.

This appendix also presents a scoring rule for determining which fusion rule is best. This
scoring rule adds the PTP result and the PTN, or (1 – PFP), result obtained from a particular
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fusion rule, given a set of values for the six parameters specified above. More formally,
the equation is
Fusion rule score = w1PTP + w2(1 – PFP)

(5a-1)

where w1 and w2 are weights which can be manipulated to reflect the importance of each
quantity. Note that w1, w2 ∈ [0, 1] and w1 + w2 = 1. The relative importance of each of
these terms depends on the system for which the prognostic system is being designed.

Once the scoring rule is developed, all eight parameters (pf, qf, PTP(Aθ), PTN(Aθ), PTP(Bφ),
PTN(Bφ), w1, and w2) are analyzed to determine the optimal fusion rule based on the
scoring rule, and where the optimal fusion rule changes, based on varying values of these
parameters. As previously stated, the “logical or” fusion rule is the best in most cases.
Other fusion rules only become the best fusion rule if the a priori probability of failures
are relatively high, or the classifier’s accuracy is not very good, or one term of the
scoring rule is weighted much more heavily than the other term. All of these conditions
interact to some extent. The rest of this appendix provides the development and analysis
of these ideas.

The system model is developed as before. Certain aspects will be repeated here for
clarity and further development. Figure 5-8 (reproduced below) is again the basis for this
discussion.
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System
Comp. A

Comp. B

Sensors

A

B

Classifiers

A

B

Reasoner
Figure 5a-1. Figure 5-8 reproduced for clarity

The conditional probabilities associated with this model are assigned a notional value as
indicated below. The terms “high” and “low” refer to a notional relative probability
value for the given condition. The variables “x” and “y”, respectively, correspond to
those probability values.

P(classifier declares failure|actual failure) = PTPA , PTPB = high = x
P(classifier declares failure|actual nominal) = PFPA , PFPB = low = y
P(classifier declares nominal|actual nominal) = PTNA , PTNB = high = x
B
= low = y
P(classifier declares nominal|actual failure) = PFNA , PFN
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These probability values are assumed to be equal to each other (within the high and low
categories) for the sake of the discussion that follows. The joint probability table is
reproduced below for clarity. The cells are numbered for ease of reference.

Classifier
Reports
(A, B)

F, F

Table 5a-1. Joint probability values [63]
F, N
N, F

N, N

True State
F, F

1. PTPA PTPB pfqf

B
pfqf
2. PTPA PFN

3. PFNA PTPB pfqf

B
4. PFNA PFN
pfqf

F, N

5. PTPA PFPB pfqn

6. PTPA PTNB pfqn

7. PFNA PFPB pfqn

8. PFNA PTNB pfqn

N, F

9. PFPA PTPB pnqf

B
pnqf
10. PFPA PFN

11. PTNA PTPB pnqf

B
12. PTNA PFN
pnqf

N, N

13. PFPA PFPB pnqn

14. PFPA PTNB pnqn

15. PTNA PFPB pnqn

16. PTNA PTNB pnqn

Again, Table 5a-1 summarizes these joint probabilities as a series of disjoint events. The
failure on component A is reflected with the a priori probability pf, and the nominal
condition on component B is reflected with the a priori probability qn.

Replacing the this table’s contents with the qualitative values of “high” (x) and “low” (y)
as previously defined in the table yields an assessment of which combinations of
classifier readings and actual data streams would have relatively large likelihoods. Note
that pn = qn = x and pf = qf = y.
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Table 5a-2. Table of relative likelihoods
Classifier
Reports
(A, B)

F, F

F, N

N, F

N, N

True State
F, F

1. x2y2

2. xy3

3. xy3

4. y4

F, N

5. x2y2

6. x3y

7. xy3

8. x2y2

N, F

9. x2y2

10. xy3

11. x3y

12. x2y2

N, N

13. x2y2

14. x3y

15. x3y

16. x4

Table 5a-2 summarizes the relative likelihoods of these 16 disjoint events. The cell
entries in bold (cells 6, 11, 14, 15, and 16) indicate a cell with a relatively high
likelihood. The cells 1, 6, 11, and 16 (on the main diagonal) indicate an accurate
assessment of performance. The cells 4, 7, 10, and 13 (on the anti-diagonal) indicate an
inaccurate assessment of performance from both systems. All the other cells have one
performance report right and one performance report wrong. This table provides a
notional idea of which events are more likely than others.

As can be seen from the table, there are four combinations of readings from the two
classifiers:
1. F, F

2. F, N

3. N, F

4. N, N

These combinations of readings can be thought of as four rules for declaring a system
failure. If a “logical and” fusion method is chosen, then a system failure would be
declared only if the situation described by rule one occurred. This will be referred to
specifically as “applying rule one”, and more generally as “applying a fusion rule”. If a
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“logical or” fusion method is chosen, then a system failure would be declared if rules
one, two, and three were applied. Since there are four rules, there are fifteen different
combinations of rule sets (including the two previously presented) to consider. The
results are presented in the following table.

Table 5a-3. Summary of probability values for different fusion rules
PFP False Positive
Probability
Cells used to declare
PTP True Positive
(intersection with cells
(intersection with cells
Measure
a failure
1-12)
13-16)
(Cells with an actual
Fusion Rule
failure are 1-12)
y2
1 (logical and)
1, 5, 9, 13
3x2y
(2x3 + 5x2y + 4xy2 + y3)
(x + y)2
3
2
xy
2
2, 6, 10, 14
x + 2xy
(2x3 + 5x2y + 4xy2 + y3)
(x + y)2
xy
3
3, 7, 11, 15
x3 + 2xy2
(2x3 + 5x2y + 4xy2 + y3)
(x + y)2
x2
4
4, 8, 12, 16
2x2y + y3
(2x3 + 5x2y + 4xy2 + y3)
(x + y)2
3
2
2
xy + y2
1, 2
1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13,
x + 3x y + 2xy
14
(2x3 + 5x2y + 4xy2 + y3)
(x + y)2
3
2
2
xy + y2
1, 3
1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13,
x + 3x y + 2xy
15
(2x3 + 5x2y + 4xy2 + y3)
(x + y)2
x2 + y2
1, 4
1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13,
5x2y + y3
3
2
2
3
(x + y)2
16
(2x + 5x y + 4xy + y )
2xy
2, 3
2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14,
2x3 + 4xy2
3
15
(2x + 5x2y + 4xy2 + y3)
(x + y)2
x2 + xy
2, 4
2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14,
x3 + 2x2y + 2xy2 + y3
3
2
2
3
16
(2x + 5x y + 4xy + y )
(x + y)2
3, 4
3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15,
x3 + 2x2y + 2xy2 + y3
x2 + xy
3
2
2
3
16
(2x + 5x y + 4xy + y )
(x + y)2
1, 2, 3 (logical 1-3, 5-7, 9-11, 13-15
2x3 + 3x2y + 4xy2
2xy + y2
3
2
2
3
or)
(2x + 5x y + 4xy + y )
(x + y)2
x2 + xy + y2
1, 2, 4
1-2, 4-6, 8-10, 12x3 + 5x2y + 2xy2 + y3
3
2
2
3
14, 16
(2x + 5x y + 4xy + y )
(x + y)2
x2 + xy + y2
1, 3, 4
1, 3-5, 7-9, 11-13,
x3 + 5x2y + 2xy2 + y3
3
2
2
3
15-16
(2x + 5x y + 4xy + y )
(x + y)2
x2 + 2xy
2, 3, 4
2-4, 6-8, 10-12, 142x3 + 2x2y + 4xy2 + y3
3
2
2
3
(x + y)2
16
(2x + 5x y + 4xy + y )
1, 2, 3, 4
1-16
1
1
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Since it is hard to see from Table 5a-3 which rules have high and low probability values,
the following section provides an example with specific values.

5.5 Scoring Rule
Table 5a-4. Fusion rule probability values for a specific case
Probability
Measure
Fusion Rule
1
2
3
4
1,2
1,3
1,4
2,3
2,4
3,4
1,2,3
1,2,4
1,3,4
2,3,4
1,2,3,4

PTP (overlap PFP (cells 13with cells 1- 16 over all in
formul.)
12)

0.960888119
0.019408911
0.019408911
0.000294059
0.98029703
0.98029703
0.961182178
0.038817822
0.01970297
0.01970297
0.999705941
0.980591089
0.980591089
0.039111881
1

0.0001
0.0099
0.0099
0.9801
0.01
0.01
0.9802
0.0198
0.99
0.99
0.0199
0.9901
0.9901
0.9999
1

Score:

1.960788119
1.009508911
1.009508911
0.020194059
1.97029703
1.97029703
0.980982178
1.019017822
0.02970297
0.02970297
1.979805941
0.990491089
0.990491089
0.039211881
1

Table 5a-4 shows the values that would be obtained if the following substitutions were
made: pf = qf = PFP = PFN = .01, PTP = PTN = .99.

In this table, there is also a column titled “Score”. Determining the “best” fusion rule is
done initially by selecting the fusion rule which provides the highest PTP and the lowest
PFP (highest PTN). The formula to determine the fusion rule “score” is:
Fusion rule score = {PTP + (1 – PFP)} or {PTP + PTN}
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(5a-2)

The scoring rule was selected to maximize the benefit obtained from a particular fusion
rule combination. In this context, the best results from the reasoner are true negatives
and true positives. The best fusion rule combination is defined to be the one that
provides the highest probability of true positive and the highest probability of true
negatives (alternatively, the smallest probability of false positive). The fusion rule that
has the highest score for the selected values of pf, qf, PFP, PFN, PTP, and PTN is the “logical
or” fusion rule. These six parameters are used to develop the notion of an “optimal
fusion rule” in the following section.

5.A3 Optimal Fusion Rule Analysis

This result leads to the question of which rule, if any, is optimal, given the set of six
inputs pf, qf, PFP, PFN, PTP, and PTN. (It should be noted that PTP and PTN determine the
values of PFP and PFN.) To answer this question, the following assumptions are made.
The classifiers are assumed to be independent of each other. The a priori component
probability of failure values pf and qf are assumed to be equal. The PFP and PFN values
are assumed to be equal for each classifier, as are the PTP and PTN values. Additionally,
the PFP and PFN values are assumed to be equal to 1 - PTP. The following graph shows
which is the best fusion rule, given the preceding assumptions.
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System probability sensitivity
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1
0.9

Use “logical or”
fusion rule

0.8
0.7

Use all fusion rules but #1“perpetually” declare a failure
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0.5
0.4
0
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A priori probability of system failure

Figure 5a-2. Where the decision rule changes based values of pf and qf (x-axis) and
values of PTP and PTN (y-axis)

Figure 5a-2 shows a graph of system accuracy vs. the a priori probability of system
failure. Points on the graph that fall above the line indicate the “logical or” rule for
declaring failures should be used for a given system having those characteristics. Points
that fall below the line indicate all rules except number 1 should be used to declare a
failure. That is, a system should be declared operational only if both classifiers indicate a
system failure. This makes sense because the a priori probabilities of the classifiers
being correct is less than 0.5, and hence the opposite of what the classifiers are reading
will be correct more often than the actual readings. As an example, if the two
components are expected to fail 10% of the time, and the system correctly reports errors
with 80% or better accuracy, the “logical or” fusion rule should be used to make
decisions.
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Although perpetually declaring a failure may result in the best fusion rule score, it would
not result in productive operation of the equipment. This fusion rule ignores all data from
sensors and their associated system, making it pointless to install them. The perpetual
failure rule contains rule 4. Rule 4 states that if both classifiers declare a normal reading,
then a system failure is declared. This doesn’t make much sense. Declaring a perpetual
failure states that regardless of the classifier readings, a failure is declared. This makes
even less sense. In effect, all fusion rules containing rule 4 make no sense, and would not
be followed in practice.

If these eight rules for declaring a failure are dropped, then the remaining seven rules are
all the combinations of rules 1 (F, F), 2 (F, N), and 3 (N, F). Of these seven
combinations, the remaining one that would not be followed in practice would be the
combination of rules 2 and 3. This rule states that a failure is declared if one system or
the other declares a failure, but no failure is declared if both systems declare a failure.
Again, this is not realistic, and this rule would not be followed in practice.

The remaining rule combinations which will be used to further develop the notion of an
optimal rule are:
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Table 5a-5. Practical fusion rule combinations

Rule Combination
“Logical and”

Rules used
1

Single sensor

2

Single sensor

3

Single sensor plus

1,2

“Logical and”
Single sensor plus

1,3

“Logical and”
“Logical or”

1,2,3

Table 5a-5 shows the six rule combinations that will be used for all further analysis in
this section.

The next issue is weighting different parts of the scoring rule. The new equation is:
Fusion rule score = w1PTP + w2(1 – PFP)

(5a-3)

Recall that w1, w2 ∈ [0, 1] and w1 + w2 = 1. The weights w1 and w2 are set to appropriate
values depending on which capability is more important. As an example, inspectors on
an assembly line may need to ensure that absolutely no defective parts get through. In
probability terms, this means that false positives (claiming a defect exists when it actually
doesn’t) are less important than false negatives (passing a defective part through as a
functional part). Consequently, the value for w2 would be set much higher than for w1 in
this application. Conversely, it may be more important to ensure that a defect really does
exist if there is time pressure to produce the product, and/or defective products don’t cost
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much if they are mistakenly sent through. In that case, the value for w1 would be set
much higher than for w2.

It is of interest to examine which fusion rule is best if w1 ≠ w2. For the following
discussion, only the ratio w2/w1 is considered. PTP is defined to be a function of pf, qf,
w2/w1 , and R, where R ∈ {(1); (2); (3); (1, 2); (1, 3); (1, 2, 3)} (the six different fusion
rules). Let pf = qf = ρ ∈ [0, 0.6], and recall that w1, w2 ∈ [0,1]. Let (w2/w1) = r (w1 ≠ 0).
Then let

PTP* (ρ, r) ≡ PTP(ρ, r, R)
Max R ∈ R

where
{(ρ, r) ∈ [0,1] × [1, ∞)|PTP(ρ, r, R) ≥ PTP* (ρ, r)}

If the weight w1 is larger than the value of w2, then the “logical or” fusion rule is always
the best, regardless of the difference in the weights, provided PTPA and PTPB is at least 0.5.
(If the values for these probabilities fall below 0.5, then rules 2 and 3 tie for the best rule.
These results are independent of the prior probabilities of failure.) However, if w2 was
set higher, then the fusion rule would change, based on other system parameters. If the
prior probability of system failure was varied, the weight at which the decision rule
changed also varied, as shown in the graph below.

C-12

Weight Ratio where Decision Rule
Changes

Decision Rule Weight Sensitivity
Use “logical and” above the curves—use
“logical or” below them
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30

PTP 0.95
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Prior Probability of System Failure

Figure 5a-3. Where the decision rule changes based values of pf and qf (x-axis) and
weights applied to the scoring rule (y-axis). The values of PTP and PTN are held constant
at differing values, as shown in the legend.

Figure 5a-3 shows the ratio of w2 to w1 that causes a change in the best decision rule, for
the given values of PTP and PTN (recall that PTP = PTN). The best decision rule under each
curve is the “logical or” decision rule. Above each curve, the best decision rule is the
“logical and”. As an example, consider the top curve, where PTP = 0.99. If the prior
probability of system failure is 0.1, then the ratio w2/w1 must be at least 45 before the
best decision rule changes from “logical or” to “logical and”. If the value of PTP becomes
0.6 (the bottom curve) and the prior probability of system failure remains constant, then
the ratio drops to 1 before the best decision rule changes. For all practical purposes, the
“logical or” fusion rule is the best decision rule for all “realistic” values of PTP and the
ratio w2/w1.
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In each case, the best decision rule was either “logical or” or “logical and”. No other
decision rule obtained the best score. The best decision rule also changed when the ratio
of the prior probabilities of failure that changed (the weights on the scoring rule were set
equal).

It is also of interest to examine which fusion rule is best if pf ≠ qf. Again, only the ratio
w2/w1 is considered. PTP is still defined to be a function of pf, qf, w2/w1 , and R, where R
∈ {(1); (2); (3); (1, 2); (1, 3); (1, 2, 3)} (the six different fusion rules). Let max (pf, qf) =

r ∈ [0, 0.6], and recall that w1, w2 ∈ [0,1]. Let w2/w1 = r (w1 ≠ 0). Then let

PTP* (ρ, r) ≡ PTP(ρ, r, R)
Max R ∈ R

where
{(ρ, r) ∈ [0,1] × [1, ∞)|PTP(ρ, r, R) ≥ PTP* (ρ, r)}
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Point at where Optimal Decision Rule Changes

Use “logical and”, plus the rule which uses
the sensor on the system which has the
higher probability of failure, above the
curves—use “logical or” below them

Prior Probabilities of Failure Ratio
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Figure 5a-4. Where the decision rule changes based on max {pf, qf} (x-axis) and the
ratio of pf to qf (y-axis). The values of PTP and PTN are held constant at differing values,
as shown in the legend.

Figure 5a-4 shows where the decision rule changes based on the prior probabilities of
system failure and the probabilities of detection. The decision rule changes between only
“logical or” and a two-rule combination. The two rules are “logical and”, and using the
classifier on the system with the larger probability of failure. The other classifier is
ignored except for the “logical and” rule. If the prior probabilities of system failure are
low, and the probability of a true positive is high, then the ratio of the larger probability
of system failure to the smaller probability of system failure is also high. Specifically, if
PTP = 0.99 and the value of the larger probability of failure is 0.1, then the ratio of this
larger probability of failure to the smaller probability of failure is about 90 before the
decision rule changes from “logical or” to the two-rule combination. Provided the
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expected failure rates of the two components are not vastly different, “logical or” is still
the best decision rule.

5.A4 Proof that a Logical OR Fusion rule is the Best For a Logical OR Failure Model

THEOREM: Assume there are two components, each with an equal probability of failure
less than 0.5. Assume there are two sensors, one for each component, each with an equal
probability of (accurately) detecting a failure greater then 0.5 PTP(Aθ) = PTN(Aθ) =
PTP(Bφ) = PTN(Bφ). Then the “logical or” fusion rule provides the best score (Score = PTN
+ PTP) among all six useful fusion rules (1, 2, 3, 1 and 2, 1 and 3, 1 and 2 and 3—see
Table 5-12.). (Note that this result does not hold if either or both of the sets of
probabilities is not strictly equal.)

PROOF:
Let 0 < ε < 0.5.
Assume each component’s probability of failure is (0.5 - ε).
Assume each sensor’s probability of accurate detection is (0.5 + ε).

The approach used is to compute the score for each distinct case. Note that the score for
rule 2 will be the same as that for rule 3 (the formulas in the table are exactly the same).
Similarly, the score for rule combination 1 and 2 will be the same for rule combination 1
and 3. This leaves four distinct cases.
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We have x = (0.5 + ε) and y = (0.5 - ε). Using the preceding table, the denominator of
the PTP expression (2x3 + 5x2y + 4xy2 + y3) reduces to (1.5 + ε) with these substitutions,
and is the same for all cases. The denominator of the PTN (or 1 - PFP) expression, (x + y)2,
simplifies to 1. The PTN results were therefore multiplied by (1.5 + ε) so both the PTP
results and the PTN results were additive. The results that are shown for PTN below are
after this multiplication, without showing the (1.5 + ε) in the denominator.
Case 1: Rule 1. (“logical and”) (from the formulas in the table)
num(PTP) = 0.375 + 0.75ε - 1.5ε2 - 3ε3.
num(PTN) = 0.75 + 2ε + ε2.
num(Score) = 1.125 + 2.75ε - 0.5ε2 - 3ε3.
Case 2: Rule 2/Rule 3.
num(PTP) = 0.375 + 0.25ε + 0.5ε2 + 3ε3.
num(PTN) = 0.75 + ε2.
num(Score) = 1.5 + ε + 2ε2 + 4ε3.
Case 3: Rules 1 and 2/Rules 1 and 3.
num(PTP) = 0.75 + ε - ε2.
num(PTN) = 0.75 + 2ε + ε2.
num(Score) = 1.5 + 3ε.
Case 4: Rules 1 and 2 and 3 (“logical or”)
num(PTP) = 1.125 + 1.25ε - 0.5ε2 + 3ε3.
num(PTN) = 0.375 + 1.75ε + 2.5ε2 + ε3.
num(Score) = 1.5 + 3ε + 2ε2 + 4ε3.
Clearly, case 4 has the highest score of all the cases. Furthermore, the cases are ordered
from lowest score to highest score. The only place this is not obvious is for cases 2 and
3. The difference between the two cases (case 3 minus case 2) is 2ε - 2ε2 - 4ε3.
The claim is
2ε > 2ε2 + 4ε3, for all 0 < ε < 0.5
or equivalently
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(5a-4)

ε + 2ε2 < 1

(5a-5)

ε(1 + 2ε) <1.

(5a-6)

1 < 1 + 2ε <2.

(5a-7)

ε < ε(1 + 2ε) < 2ε < 1,

(5a-8)

ε(1 + 2ε) <1.

(5a-9)

or

Notice that

Multiplication by ε yields

which shows the desired result

This is obviously true for 0 < ε < 0.5. Hence case 3 has a larger score than case 2, and the
cases are arranged in increasing score order.

5.A5 Proof that a Logical AND Fusion rule is the Best For a Logical AND Failure
Model

The result from the preceding section suggests that a “logical and” failure rule would be
optimal for a “logical and” failure model.

The implicit assumption in a “logical and” failure model is that a system component
(subcomponent, etc.) is functional until every part in the component has failed. This
means that not every part is critical to system operation. This assumption contradicts the
general formulation of the system model presented in this paper, where every part of the
component is considered to be critical to system operation. However, there are system
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components that are designed to be redundant. These components have many
subcomponents which all perform the same operation. If some subcomponents fail, the
remaining subcomponents will continue to perform the operation that is critical to system
functionality. In the extreme case, if all the subcomponents fail except one, that single
remaining subcomponent can still perform the component’s function. Since some
components of a system may be designed to be redundant, it seems worthwhile to
determine which fusion rule is best (if there is a “best” rule) for those components which
have a redundant functional design.

Component A

Subcomp. 1

A

A

Subcomp. 1

B

B

Subcomp. 1

C

C

Reasoner

Figure 5a-5. A notional component designed to have redundant functionality

Figure 5a-5 shows a system component designed to have redundant functionality. Each
subcomponent has the same number to indicate identical functionality. This component
would not be considered to have failed until all three subcomponents fail.

C-19

Table 5a-6. Table 5a-2 reproduced for ease of reference
Classifier
Reports
(A, B)

F, F

F, N

N, F

N, N

True State
F, F

1. x2y2

2. xy3

3. xy3

4. y4

F, N

5. x2y2

6. x3y

7. xy3

8. x2y2

N, F

9. x2y2

10. xy3

11. x3y

12. x2y2

N, N

13. x2y2

14. x3y

15. x3y

16. x4

Table 5a-6 shows the likelihood of the occurrence of a particular event, and is reproduced
here as an aid for Table 5a-7.

Table 5a-7. Summary of probability values for different fusion rules
PFP False Positive
Probability
Cells used to declare
PTP True Positive
(intersection with cells
(intersection with cells
Measure
a failure
1-4)
5-16)
(Cells with an actual
Fusion Rule
failure are 1-4)
3xy2
1 (logical and)
1, 5, 9, 13
x2
2
3
2
(x + 4x y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
(x + y)
2
2, 6, 10, 14
xy
2x2y + y3
2
3
(x + y)
(x + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
2x2y + y3
3
3, 7, 11, 15
xy
2
3
(x + y)
(x + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
x3 + 2xy2
4
4, 8, 12, 16
y2
2
3
(x + y)
(x + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
2x2y + 3xy2 + y3
1, 2
1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13,
x2 + xy
2
3
14
(x + y)
(x + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
2x2y + 3xy2 + y3
1, 3
1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13,
x2 + xy
2
3
15
(x + y)
(x + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
x3 + 5x2y
1, 4
1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13,
x2 + y2
(x + y)2
16
(x3 + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
4xy2 + 2y3
2, 3
2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14,
2xy
15
(x + y)2
(x3 + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
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2, 4
3, 4
1, 2, 3 (logical
or)
1, 2, 4
1, 3, 4
2, 3, 4
1, 2, 3, 4

xy + y2
(x + y)2
xy + y2
(x + y)2
x2 + 2xy
(x + y)2
x2 + xy + y2
(x + y)2
x2 + xy + y2
(x + y)2
2xy + y2
(x + y)2
1

2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14,
16
3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15,
16
1-3, 5-7, 9-11, 13-15
1-2, 4-6, 8-10, 1214, 16
1, 3-5, 7-9, 11-13,
15-16
2-4, 6-8, 10-12, 1416
1-16

x3 + 2x2y + 2xy2 + y3
(x3 + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
x3 + 2x2y + 2xy2 + y3
(x3 + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
4x2y + 3xy2 + 2y3
3
(x + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
x3 + 2x2y + 5xy2 + y3
(x3 + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
x3 + 2x2y + 5xy2 + y3
(x3 + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
x3 + 4x2y + 2xy2 + 2y3
(x3 + 4x2y + 5xy2 + 2y3)
1

Table 5a-7 shows the PTP and PFP values for each of the 15 different fusion rules. Since it
is hard to see from Table 5a-7 which rules have high and low probability values, the
following table provides an example with specific values.

Table 5a-8. Fusion rule probability values for a specific case
Probability PTP (overlap PFP (overlap
Measure with cells 1-4) with cells 5-16)
Fusion Rule
1
2
3
4
1,2
1,3
1,4
2,3
2,4
3,4
1,2,3
1,2,4
1,3,4
2,3,4
1,2,3,4

0.9801
0.0099
0.0099
0.0001
0.99
0.99
0.9802
0.0198
0.01
0.01
0.9999
0.9901
0.9901
0.0199
1

0.009850754
0.487686935
0.487686935
0.014775377
0.497537688
0.497537688
0.024626131
0.975373869
0.502462312
0.502462312
0.985224623
0.512313065
0.512313065
0.990149246
1
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Score:

1.970249246
0.522213065
0.522213065
0.985324623
1.492462312
1.492462312
1.955573869
0.044426131
0.507537688
0.507537688
1.014675377
1.477786935
1.477786935
0.029750754
1

Table 5a-8 shows the values that would be obtained if the following substitutions were
made: pf = qf = PFP = PFN = .01, PTP = PTN = .99. Note that the “logical and” rule
provides the highest fusion rule score.

The theorem and proof are analogous to the preceding section.

THEOREM: Assume there are two components, each with an equal probability of failure
less than 0.5. Assume there are two sensors, one for each component, each with an equal
probability of (accurately) detecting a failure greater then 0.5 PTP(Aθ) = PTN(Aθ) =
PTP(Bφ) = PTN(Bφ). Then the “logical and” fusion rule provides the best score (Score =
PTN + PTP) among all six useful fusion rules (1, 2, 3, 1 and 2, 1 and 3, 1 and 2 and 3).
(Note that this result does not hold if either or both of the sets of probabilities is not
strictly equal.)

PROOF:
Let 0 < ε < 0.5.
Assume each component’s probability of failure is (0.5 - ε).
Assume each sensor’s probability of accurate detection is (0.5 + ε).

The approach used is to compute the score for each distinct case. Note that the score for
rule 2 will be the same as that for rule 3 (the formulas in the table are exactly the same).
Similarly, the score for rule combination 1 and 2 will be the same for rule combination 1
and 3. This leaves four distinct cases.
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We have x = (0.5 + ε) and y = (0.5 - ε). Using the preceding table, the denominator of
the PTN (or 1 - PFP) expression (x3 + 4x2y + 5xy2 + y3) reduces to (1.5 - ε) with these
substitutions, and is the same for all entries in the table. The denominator of the PTP
expression, (x + y)2, simplifies to 1. The PTP results were therefore multiplied by (1.5 - ε)
so both the PTP results and the PTN results were additive. The results that are shown for
PTP below are after this multiplication, without showing the (1.5 - ε) in the denominator.
Case 1: Rule 1. (“logical and”) (from the formulas in the table)
num(PTP) = 0.375 + 1.25ε + 0.5ε2 - ε3.
num(PTN) = 0.625 + 0.75ε + 1.5ε2 - 3ε3.
num(Score) = 1 + 2ε + 2ε2 - 4ε3.
Case 2: Rule 2/Rule 3.
num(PTP) = 0.375 - 0.25ε - 1.5ε2 + ε3.
num(PTN) = 0.375 + 0.25ε - 0.5ε2 +3ε3.
num(Score) = .75 - 2ε2 + 4ε3.
Case 3: Rules 1 and 2/Rules 1 and 3.
num(PTP) = 0.75 + ε - ε2.
num(PTN) = 0.25 + ε + ε2.
num(Score) = 1 + 2ε.
Case 4: Rules 1 and 2 and 3 (“logical or”)
num(PTP) = 1.125 - 0.75ε - 2.5ε2 + ε3.
num(PTN) = -0.675 + 1.25ε + 0.5ε2 + 3ε3.
num(Score) = 0.5 + 0.5ε - 2ε2 + 4ε3.
Clearly, the “logical and” fusion rule has the highest score among these four cases (note
that 2ε2 > 4ε3 because 2 is always greater than 4ε when ε < 0.5). Not surprisingly, the
“logical or” rule has the lowest score. This result indicates that the “logical and” fusion
rule should be used to assess the health of components which have redundant
functionality.
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Appendix D. Computer Code

function [subset] = subsetgen()
global subset tot N
% This program lists the natural lexicographic order of all subsets for a given number of sensors, up to 9
total
% Input number of sensors, total count, and storage matrix
N=3;
tot=2^N-1;
subset=zeros(tot,2); % First column is index, second is subset
% Initialize counts
a=0;
b=0;
c=0;
d=0;
e=0;
f=0;
g=0;
h=0;
k=0;
t=0; % Used as sensor subset index
% Subsets of size 1
for a=1:N
t=t+1;
subset(t,1)=t;
subset(t,2)=a;
end
% Subsets of size 2
for a=1:N-1
for b=2:N
if b>a
t=t+1;
input=10*a+b;
subset(t,1)=t;
subset(t,2)=input;
end
end
end
% Subsets of size 3
for a=1:N-2
for b=2:N-1
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for c=3:N
if b>a
if c>b
t=t+1;
input=100*a+10*b+c;
subset(t,1)=t;
subset(t,2)=input;
end
end
end
end
end
% Subsets of size 4
for a=1:N-3
for b=2:N-2
for c=3:N-1
for d=4:N
if b>a
if c>b
if d>c
t=t+1;
input=1000*a+100*b+10*c+d;
subset(t,1)=t;
subset(t,2)=input;
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
% Subsets of size 5
for a=1:N-4
for b=2:N-3
for c=3:N-2
for d=4:N-1
for e=5:N
if b>a
if c>b
if d>c
if e>d
t=t+1;
input=10000*a+1000*b+100*c+10*d+e;
subset(t,1)=t;
subset(t,2)=input;
end
end
end
end
end
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end
end
end
end
% Subsets of size 6
for a=1:N-5
for b=2:N-4
for c=3:N-3
for d=4:N-2
for e=5:N-1
for f=6:N
if b>a
if c>b
if d>c
if e>d
if f>e
t=t+1;
input=100000*a+10000*b+1000*c+100*d+10*e+f;
subset(t,1)=t;
subset(t,2)=input;
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
% Subsets of size 7
for a=1:N-6
for b=2:N-5
for c=3:N-4
for d=4:N-3
for e=5:N-2
for f=6:N-1
for g=7:N
if b>a
if c>b
if d>c
if e>d
if f>e
if g>f
t=t+1;
input=1000000*a+100000*b+10000*c+1000*d+100*e+10*f+g;
subset(t,1)=t;
subset(t,2)=input;
end
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end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
% Subsets of size 8
for a=1:N-7
for b=2:N-6
for c=3:N-5
for d=4:N-4
for e=5:N-3
for f=6:N-2
for g=7:N-1
for h=8:N
if b>a
if c>b
if d>c
if e>d
if f>e
if g>f
if h>g
t=t+1;
input=10000000*a+1000000*b+100000*c+10000*d+1000*e+100*f+10*g+h;
subset(t,1)=t;
subset(t,2)=input;
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
% Subsets of size 9
for a=1:N-8
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for b=2:N-7
for c=3:N-6
for d=4:N-5
for e=5:N-4
for f=6:N-3
for g=7:N-2
for h=8:N-1
for k=9:N
if b>a
if c>b
if d>c
if e>d
if f>e
if g>f
if h>g
if k>h
t=t+1;
input=100000000*a+10000000*b+1000000*c+100000*d+10000*e+1000*f+100*g+10*h+k;
subset(t,1)=t;
subset(t,2)=input;
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
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function [fD] = combinet(rocA,rocB)
% This program combines 2 ROC curves using within fusion
global M N x roc rocA rocB I J K Q alpha beta gam temp
global fA fB fC fD fBQ
% ROC curve computation
xFP=2*x-x.^2;
rocTP=zeros(1,N);
for I=1:N
rocTP(I)=rocA(I)+rocB(I)-rocA(I)*rocB(I);
end
fD=rocTP;
fA=rocA;
fB=rocB;
fD=interp1(xFP,rocTP,x);
figure
plot(x,fA,'red.');
hold on
plot(x,fB,'blue.');
hold on
plot(x,fD,'green.');
hold off

function [fC] = combine(rocA,rocB,fBQ)
% This program combines 2 ROC curves using across fusion
global M N x roc rocA rocB I J K Q alpha beta gam temp
global fA fB fC fD fBQ
% ROC curve computation
fA = rocA;
FA = alpha*fA + (1-alpha)*x;
GA = 1 - FA;
fB = rocB;
fBQa = fBQ(K,1:N,1:N);
fBQaa = zeros(N,N);
for I=1:N
for J=1:N
fBQaa(I,J)=fBQa(1,I,J);
end
end
FBQ = beta*fBQaa + (1-beta)*Q;
GBQ = 1 - FBQ;
fC = zeros(1,N);
for I=1:N,
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minvalue = min(GA(1:I).*GBQ(I,1:I));
fC(I) = temp - (temp-1)*((I-1)/M) - temp*minvalue;
end
%fC=interp1(?,fCa,x)
figure
plot(x,fA,'red.');
hold on
plot(x,fB,'blue.');
hold on
plot(x,fC,'green.');
hold off
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% This program computes every cost feasible ROC curve combination of sensors on a two component
system. Each component consists of two subcomponents. Three of the subcomponents have two sensors,
and one has three.
global M N x roc rocA rocB C I J K Q alpha beta gam temp
global fA fB fC fD fBQ fCout
salloc22 % (get combined curves from other component% 2x2 subcomponent configuration)
M=100;% the number of subintervals
% used to partition the interval [0,1]
%%% Initialize x coordinates
N = M+1; % number of points used to plot
x = zeros(1,N);
for I=1:N,
x(I) = (I-1)/M;
end
% Enter the prior probability alpha
alpha = 0.5;
% Enter the prior probability beta
beta = 0.5;
% Initialize Q
gam = alpha + beta - alpha*beta;
temp = 1/gam;
Q = zeros(N);
for I = 1:N;
%r=(I-1)/M
for J =1:M; %p=(J-1)/M
if J <= I;
Q(I,J) = (I-J)/(N-J);
end
R = Q(I,1:J);
%fBQ(I,1:J) = interp1(p,fB,R);
end
end
roc=zeros(5,N); % 5 ROC curves
fBQ=zeros(10,N,N); % 10 different entries
% ROC 1
roc(1,1:N)=(x).^.1;
fBQ(1,1:N,1:N) = (Q).^(.1);
% ROC 2
roc(2,1:N)=((2/pi)*asin(x)).^(1/6);
fBQ(2,1:N,1:N) = ((2/pi)*asin(Q)).^(1/6);
% ROC 3
roc(3,1:N)=tanh(4*x);
fBQ(3,1:N,1:N) = tanh(4*Q);
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% ROC 4
roc4=(x).^.13;
roc(4,1:N)=roc4;
fBQ(4,1:N,1:N) = (Q).^(.13);
% ROC 5
roc5=zeros(1,N);
for p=1:N
pp=(p/100)-.01;
roc5(p)=((1-(pp-1)^2)^(.5));
end
roc(5,1:N)=roc5;
fBQ(5,1:N,1:N)=((1-(Q-1).^2).^(.5));
% Plot all five ROC curves
figure
plot(x,roc(1,1:N),'r',x,roc(2,1:N),'y',x,roc(3,1:N),'g',x,roc(4,1:N),'b',x,roc(5,1:N),'k')
legend('ROC curve E', 'ROC curve F', 'ROC curve G', 'ROC curve H','ROC Curve I',4);
xlabel('Probability of False Positive');
ylabel('Probability of True Positive');
title('Individual Sensor ROC Curves');
% Set cost for each curve, and total budget
cost1=45;
cost2=30;
cost3=25;
cost4=35;
cost5=35;
budget=135;
% 3 combinations are not cost feasible
% Determine cost for each combination
cost13=cost1+cost3;
cost14=cost1+cost4;
cost15=cost1+cost5;
cost23=cost2+cost3;
cost24=cost2+cost4;
cost25=cost2+cost5;
cost123=cost1+cost2+cost3;
cost124=cost1+cost2+cost4;
cost125=cost1+cost2+cost5;
cost134=cost1+cost3+cost4;
cost135=cost1+cost3+cost5;
cost145=cost1+cost4+cost5;
cost234=cost2+cost3+cost4;
cost235=cost2+cost3+cost5;
cost245=cost2+cost4+cost5;
cost1234=cost1+cost2+cost3+cost4;
cost1235=cost1+cost2+cost3+cost5;
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cost1245=cost1+cost2+cost4+cost5;
cost1345=cost1+cost3+cost4+cost5;
cost2345=cost2+cost3+cost4+cost5;
cost12345=cost1+cost2+cost3+cost4+cost5;
%Initialize ROC curves
fC13=zeros(1,N);
fC14=zeros(1,N);
fC15=zeros(1,N);
fC23=zeros(1,N);
fC24=zeros(1,N);
fC25=zeros(1,N);
fC123=zeros(1,N);
fC124=zeros(1,N);
fC125=zeros(1,N);
fC134=zeros(1,N);
fC135=zeros(1,N);
fC145=zeros(1,N);
fC234=zeros(1,N);
fC235=zeros(1,N);
fC245=zeros(1,N);
fC1234=zeros(1,N);
fC1235=zeros(1,N);
fC1245=zeros(1,N);
fC1345=zeros(1,N);
fC2345=zeros(1,N);
fC12345=zeros(1,N);
% Run combinations if cost eligible
% Same side
% Combination 12
K=1;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=2;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combinet;
fD12=fD;
%xFP=2*x-x.^2;
% Combination 34
K=3;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=4;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combinet;
fD34=fD;
%xFP=2*x-x.^2;
% Combination 35
K=3;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
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K=5;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combinet;
fD35=fD;
%xFP=2*x-x.^2;
% Combination 45
K=4;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=5;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combinet;
fD45=fD;
%xFP=2*x-x.^2;
%Combination 345
rocA=fD34;
K=5;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combinet;
fD345=fD;
% Different sides (2 sensors)
% Combination 13
if cost13 <= budget
K=1;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=3;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC13=fC;
end
% Combination 14
if cost14 <= budget
K=1;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=4;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC14=fC;
end
% Combination 15
if cost15 <= budget
K=1;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=5;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC15=fC;
end
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% Combination 23
if cost23 <= budget
K=2;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=3;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC23=fC;
end
% Combination 24
if cost24 <= budget
K=2;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=4;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC24=fC;
end
% Combination 25
if cost25 <= budget
K=2;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=5;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC25=fC;
end
% Different sides (3 sensors)
% Combination 123
if cost123 <= budget
rocA=fD12;
K=3;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC123=fC;
end
% Combination 124
if cost124 <= budget
rocA=fD12;
K=4;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC124=fC;
end
% Combination 125
if cost125 <= budget
rocA=fD12;
K=5;
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rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC125=fC;
end
% Combination 134
if cost134 <= budget
rocA=fD34;
K=1;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC134=fC;
end
% Combination 135
if cost135 <= budget
rocA=fD35;
K=1;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC135=fC;
end
% Combination 145
if cost145 <= budget
rocA=fD45;
K=1;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC145=fC;
end
% Combination 234
if cost234 <= budget
rocA=fD34;
K=2;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC234=fC;
end
% Combination 235
if cost235 <= budget
rocA=fD35;
K=2;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC235=fC;
end
% Combination 245
if cost245 <= budget
rocA=fD45;
K=2;
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rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC245=fC;
end
% Different sides (4 sensors)
%Combination 1234
if cost1234 <= budget
rocA=fD12;
rocB=fD34;
fBQs=zeros(N);
for I = 1:N;
%r=(I-1)/M
for J =1:M; %p=(J-1)/M
R = Q(I,1:J);
fBQs(I,1:J) = interp1(x,fD34,R);
end
end
fBQ(6,1:N,1:N)=fBQs;
K=6;
combine;
fC1234=fC;
end
%Combination 1235
if cost1235 <= budget
rocA=fD12;
rocB=fD35;
fBQs=zeros(N);
for I = 1:N;
%r=(I-1)/M
for J =1:M; %p=(J-1)/M
R = Q(I,1:J);
fBQs(I,1:J) = interp1(x,fD35,R);
end
end
fBQ(7,1:N,1:N)=fBQs;
K=7;
combine;
fC1235=fC;
end
%Combination 1245
if cost1245 <= budget
rocA=fD12;
rocB=fD45;
fBQs=zeros(N);
for I = 1:N;
%r=(I-1)/M
for J =1:M; %p=(J-1)/M
R = Q(I,1:J);
fBQs(I,1:J) = interp1(x,fD45,R);
end
end
fBQ(8,1:N,1:N)=fBQs;
K=8;
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combine;
fC1245=fC;
end
% Combination 1345
if cost1345 <= budget
rocA=fD345;
K=1;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC1345=fC;
end
% Combination 2345
if cost2345 <= budget
rocA=fD345;
K=2;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC2345=fC;
end
% Different sides (5 sensors)
if cost12345 <= budget
rocA=fD12;
rocB=fD345;
fBQs=zeros(N);
for I = 1:N;
%r=(I-1)/M
for J =1:M; %p=(J-1)/M
R = Q(I,1:J);
fBQs(I,1:J) = interp1(x,fD345,R);
end
end
fBQ(9,1:N,1:N)=fBQs;
K=9;
combine;
fC12345=fC;
end
% Store results in a single array
fCouta=zeros(21,N);
fCouta(1,1:N)=fC13;
fCouta(2,1:N)=fC14;
fCouta(3,1:N)=fC15;
fCouta(4,1:N)=fC23;
fCouta(5,1:N)=fC24;
fCouta(6,1:N)=fC25;
fCouta(7,1:N)=fC123;
fCouta(8,1:N)=fC124;
fCouta(9,1:N)=fC125;
fCouta(10,1:N)=fC134;
fCouta(11,1:N)=fC135;
fCouta(12,1:N)=fC145;
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fCouta(13,1:N)=fC234;
fCouta(14,1:N)=fC235;
fCouta(15,1:N)=fC245;
fCouta(16,1:N)=fC1234;
fCouta(17,1:N)=fC1235;
fCouta(18,1:N)=fC1245;
fCouta(19,1:N)=fC1345;
fCouta(20,1:N)=fC2345;
fCouta(21,1:N)=fC12345;
% Combine results from both components
C=0;
fCboth=zeros(189,N); % Change based on configuration
for II=1:21
% Change based on configuration
for JJ=1:9
% Change based on configuration
C=C+1;
if fCout(JJ,50)>0
rocA=fCout(JJ,1:N);
rocB=fCouta(II,1:N);
fBQs=zeros(N);
for I = 1:N;
%r=(I-1)/M
for J = 1:M; %p=(J-1)/M
R = Q(I,1:J);
fBQs(I,1:J) = interp1(x,rocB,R);
end
end
fBQ(10,1:N,1:N)=fBQs;
K=10;
combine;
fCboth(C,1:N)=fC;
end
end
end
% Determine best curve
fCbotht=fCboth';
for I=1:N
[maxroc(I),maxind(I)]=max(fCbotht(I,:));
end
figure
plot(maxind);
figure
plot(maxroc);
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function [fCout] = salloc22()
% This program determines the optimal sensor allocation for a particular system component. The
component is assumed to consist of 2 subcomponents, each with 2 sensors. Each subcomponent is assumed
to require at least one sensor.
global M N x roc rocA rocB I J K Q alpha beta gam temp
global fA fB fC fD fBQ fCout
M=100;% the number of subintervals used to partition the interval [0,1]
%%% Initialize x coordinates
N = M+1; % number of points used to plot
x = zeros(1,N);
for I=1:N,
x(I) = (I-1)/M;
end
% Enter the prior probability alpha
alpha = 0.5;
% Enter the prior probability beta
beta = 0.5;
% Initialize Q
gam = alpha + beta - alpha*beta;
temp = 1/gam;
Q = zeros(N);
for I = 1:N;
%r=(I-1)/M
for J =1:M; %p=(J-1)/M
if J <= I;
Q(I,J) = (I-J)/(N-J);
end
R = Q(I,1:J);
%fBQ(I,1:J) = interp1(p,fB,R);
end
end
roc=zeros(4,N);
fBQ=zeros(5,N,N);
% ROC 1
roc(1,1:N)=(x).^.1;
fBQ(1,1:N,1:N) = (Q).^(.1);
% ROC 2
roc(2,1:N)=((2/pi)*asin(x)).^(1/6);
fBQ(2,1:N,1:N) = ((2/pi)*asin(Q)).^(1/6);
% ROC 3
roc(3,1:N)=tanh(4*x);
fBQ(3,1:N,1:N) = tanh(4*Q);
% ROC 4
roc4=(x).^.13;
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roc(4,1:N)=roc4;
fBQ(4,1:N,1:N) = (Q).^(.13);
% Set cost for each curve, and total budget
cost1=45;
cost2=30;
cost3=25;
cost4=35;
budget=125;
% Determine budget eligibility for each combination
cost13=cost1+cost3;
cost14=cost1+cost4;
cost23=cost2+cost3;
cost24=cost2+cost4;
cost123=cost1+cost2+cost3;
cost124=cost1+cost2+cost4;
cost134=cost1+cost3+cost4;
cost234=cost2+cost3+cost4;
cost1234=cost1+cost2+cost3+cost4;
%Initialize ROC curves
fC13=zeros(1,N);
fC14=zeros(1,N);
fC23=zeros(1,N);
fC24=zeros(1,N);
fC123=zeros(1,N);
fC124=zeros(1,N);
fC134=zeros(1,N);
fC234=zeros(1,N);
fC1234=zeros(1,N);
% Run combinations if cost eligible
% Same side
% Combination 12
K=1;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=2;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combinet;
fD12=fD;
%xFP=2*x-x.^2;
% Combination 34
K=3;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=4;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combinet;
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fD34=fD;
%xFP=2*x-x.^2;
% Different sides (2 sensors)
% Combination 13
if cost13 <= budget
K=1;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=3;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC13=fC;
end
% Combination 14
if cost14 <= budget
K=1;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=4;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC14=fC;
end
% Combination 23
if cost23 <= budget
K=2;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=3;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC23=fC;
end
% Combination 24
if cost24 <= budget
K=2;
rocA=roc(K,1:N);
K=4;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC24=fC;
end
% Different sides (3 sensors)
% Combination 123
if cost123 <= budget
rocA=fD12;
K=3;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC123=fC;
end
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% Combination 124
if cost124 <= budget
rocA=fD12;
K=4;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC124=fC;
end
% Combination 134
if cost124 <= budget
rocA=fD34;
K=1;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC134=fC;
end
% Combination 234
if cost234 <= budget
rocA=fD34;
K=2;
rocB=roc(K,1:N);
combine;
fC234=fC;
end
% Different sides (4 sensors)
%Combination 1234
if cost1234 <= budget
rocA=fD12;
rocB=fD34;
fBQs=zeros(N);
for I = 1:N;
%r=(I-1)/M
for J =1:M; %p=(J-1)/M
R = Q(I,1:J);
fBQs(I,1:J) = interp1(x,fD34,R);
end
end
fBQ(5,1:N,1:N)=fBQs;
K=5;
combine;
fC1234=fC;
end
fCout=zeros(9,N);
fCout(1,1:N)=fC13;
fCout(2,1:N)=fC14;
fCout(3,1:N)=fC23;
fCout(4,1:N)=fC24;
fCout(5,1:N)=fC123;
fCout(6,1:N)=fC124;
fCout(7,1:N)=fC134;
fCout(8,1:N)=fC234;
fCout(9,1:N)=fC1234;
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